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Abstract 
 
‘Painting of time: duration, emergence, sensation’ investigates a methodological conundrum 
where a painter is unable to orientate painting towards its objective, because the object of 
‘pursuit’ is the absolutely new whose terms will emerge only as they are created in a future. 
The absolutely new, which is not a recombination of extant qualities but a difference in kind, 
can be neither preconceived nor recognised when it emerges, and so the dilemma for a 
painter is not only how to conduct painting, but also how to decide when painting should 
finish. Problematically, the orientation needed is towards the future, and so a trajectory for 
painting could only be conceived retrospectively once it is already possible, and so is 
redundant. This conundrum is a legacy of Modernism and its avant-gardes, where an 
ideology of progress mandates the creation of the new as the purpose for contemporary art 
practice, especially within Western understandings of practice, so that painting’s given aim 
is to create a new image that will lead to new directions in art history. If responsibility for 
creating the new lies with the painter, how could invention be conceived as happening, and 
what are the implications for method in painting? 
 
This study explores, through practice and theory, how painting conducts invention. Henri 
Bergson’s method of intuition is employed in order to examine the terms of the problem, to 
reveal that the conundrum results from confusing heterogeneous time with homogeneous 
space. By bringing image, perception, matter, and memory together into a conception of 
time as duration, Bergson distinguishes discontinuous measured time from the continuum of 
qualitative change that is the living experience of duration. The study finds that it is in this 
qualitative change that the new emerges, in the virtual and actual movements that 
constitute a differing in kind of psychic states intensive to a painter. Here invention happens 
unpredictably, unaccountably, and continuously. What a painter ‘pursues’, then, is a no-thing 
that Bergson calls everything in a work of art, and which creates itself as form. This radical 
discounting of the material aspect of painting by reframing it in duration dissolves the 
temporal conundrum, and also absolves a painter of responsibility for invention. In this 
ontology of becoming, painting emerges continuously as an intensive image-of-emergence, 
so that the question coming out of the study is: Does painting happen? 
 
Painting, however, is a process of both temporal and spatial emergence. In exploring how a 
painter manages to negotiate between the dual and incongruent realities of time and space, 
Gilles Deleuze’s notion of a crystal image provides a means to conceive how emergence, the 
becoming-image, is in both intensive and extensive movements. Bergson’s philosophy is 
brought together with Jan Verwoert’s conception for how painting is conducted as a process 
that has no preconceived outcome, but where criteria for decision-making emerge as 
painting proceeds. A logic of latency and retroaction in painting, developed by Verwoert as 
ABSTRACT…  
   
 
 ix 
a rationale for such emergence, is investigated for its potential to evade teleology, 
retrospection, and representation—and so to mitigate the dilemma that opened this study. 
As an approach taken to painting, Deleuze’s notion of a process of clearing givens and 
creating compounds of sensation is explored in practice, where an image-of-emergence 
coming out of chromatic and achromatic sensation creates affects and percepts that inform 
decision-making about what action to take next in painting.  
 
The exegesis, in three chapters, engages initially with an understanding of Bergson’s 
ontology of duration, image, and movement, as well as his method of intuition. A second 
chapter engages a critical account of late twentieth and early twenty-first century 
engagements with avant-gardism in light of a Bergsonian temporality. The third chapter 
engages my painting practice in detail in light of Bergson’s understanding of nuance and Jan 
Verwoert’s understanding of emergence. The thesis aims at finding a synthetic moment 
between nuance and emergence that seemed essential to my research-through-painting. 
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Overview   
 
‘Painting of Time’ investigates how a painter makes decidable the course painting takes—
how the accident is a becoming-necessary. Decision is posed continually during processes of 
painting. When the aim is to create through terms that emerge in a future, an obstacle arises 
concerning what is undecidable. An orientation is needed towards a future—the new. Yet, 
trajectory can only be presented in terms of the possible, from what is already conceived. 
Trajectory is retrograde and not progressive. This presents a temporal impasse, a separation of a future 
from a present, an impasse that is an essential raison d’être for painting, but also an 
insurmountable obstacle to painting’s invention. This conundrum of a future-orientated 
trajectory was initially framed in this research as the question ‘Where is the image?’ in a 
research practice that extended over six years of doctoral study primarily undertaken in 
studio-based painting. 
 
It is true, perhaps, that painting proceeds by following extant but unexplored possibilities, 
by generating differences in permutations and recombination of extant terms, its already 
givens. However, is this necessarily invention? Is this how the new is understood? As a legacy 
of Western art history, most especially the ideology of Modernism and its Avant-Gardes, it is 
taken as a given that painting aims to create new images that will progress art history by 
leading in new directions. Such art historical narratives are themselves conceived in a 
temporality or temporalising that often goes unquestioned. Central to this research project is 
a fundamental questioning of the temporality assumed in accounts of painting’s processes, 
essentially a temporality that has been spatialised as an unfolding through significant events 
that demarcate periods traversed by waypoints. As this mode of retrospection-as-progress is 
translated to ecologies of painting, methods develop a similar logic: paintings are designed 
and not created, or perhaps paintings are offered as alibi or atonement for the absence of 
any plan for invention. Painting in this study is explored as emergence, where emergence is 
immanent to processes of painting, rather than an outcome of process. In this, the very 
notion of pursuit is misleading. Nevertheless, the question remains: can a painter be said to 
direct the course of painting? When structure emerges as painting proceeds, how are decisions 
made, given that what we call ‘structure’ are emergent criteria?  
 
In this context, the practical path this study explores, through painting, asks how, in ‘pursuit 
of the new’, a painting process conducts invention. Invention is not difference of spatial-
visual arrangement, but creation of the absolute new. While this quixotic pursuit has been 
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 3 
attributed to Modernist ideology, the project has not been undertaken in tribute to 
Modernism, but in an attempt to resolve methodological problems attendant on this 
ideology. The approach taken explores processes of painting based on emergence: no preconceived 
outcomes for painting, no plans, and no representational agendas. Criteria for decision-
making emerge in the process of painting, along with emerging visual structures, as a 
continuous process of forming, de-forming, and re-forming. Sensation is the basis for these various 
‘formings’, so that painting is conducted as a process of creating sensible aggregates or 
compounds of sensation—painting with colour sensation. In exploring how flow is maintained 
in the impetus of decision-making and action, painting in this study is conducted on large 
and small scales, each with different modes, speeds, and durations of action. Figural elements 
de-form representational implications of figuration or abstraction. The figural is, in itself, a 
de-forming mode. My processes of painting explore how sensations, intuitions, and 
perceptions fold or unfold in criteria and decision—that is, in emergence-structures that 
facilitate irruptions as an image-of-emergence.  
 
This exegesis depicts many of the paintings that have been completed during my 
candidature. None of the works is titled, and captions to each figure give the size of the work 
only, recognising an objectification of painting entailed in such empirical description.  Other 
details are given in the list of figures at the front of the document. Each work has emerged 
in quite unaccountable interactions between sensations, memories, and matter—
notwithstanding my remit (or expectation) to bring these processes to account—and is still 
considered to be emerging in its processes of reception. Any reference in the work is 
therefore to unpredictable emergence, and to the continuance of that emergence. A chronology 
of production has not been offered, contrary as it is to the realisation of emergence. 
Moreover, chronological time is the basis of the methodological problem I am attempting to 
resolve. The exhibition of selected works presented for examination is especially discussed in 
Chapter Three.  
 
The exegesis aims at providing a critical account of my research processes, primarily studio- 
based painting, in three broad registers. A first chapter engages the critical and 
philosophical concerns with temporality that I briefly alluded to above. It focuses especially 
on Henri Bergson’s philosophical investigations into time, the image, and perception, 
providing a means to examine the nature of the methodological conundrum being 
investigated in this study, along with the terms of the problem at its basis. The second 
chapter engages an account, especially from the second half of the twentieth century, of a 
range of critical understandings of avant-gardism. In doing so, it provides an emphasis on 
the notion of emergence, alongside a critical encounter with how temporality is accounted 
for with respect to Bergson’s understanding of duration. The chapter introduces Deleuze’s 
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 4 
understanding of painting as sensation and introduces my own painting practice in this 
context. The third chapter provides an extended discussion of my doctoral exhibition and, 
more generally, my painting processes in terms or contexts developed from Chapters One 
and Two. Thus, Chapter One examines the nature of images in Bergsonian terms, as it 
investigates movements in the actual and virtual actions that are of a body’s affective 
response to sensation, and in processes of perception that interact with memory. It examines 
how movement is implicated in the changing intensive states that constitute an image-of-
emergence, and which are immanent to duration. The problem of dual and incongruent 
realities for conceiving time is related to the problem at the basis of this study, and to the 
utilitarian needs of everyday life and of science. In this respect, the chapter sets the work of 
art into the context of its autonomous emergence, and provides a context for posing the 
question: Does painting happen? 
 
Chapter Two discusses movement in relation to art-historical trajectories that provide a 
context for the emergence of a concept of emergence in painting. It examines the ideological 
legacies of Modernism and its Avant-Gardes, the problem of the possible, and investigates 
Post-modern developments that prefigure emergence. These include the idea of provisional 
painting, and debates concerning the ends of painting. From here it moves to a discussion of 
the problematic of the new and the unpresentable, and then more directly discusses the role 
of sensation and the figural in painting based on the ideas of Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guattari. Chapter Three opens with discussion of the exhibition of paintings that emerged in 
this doctoral research, and proceeds to discuss aspects of method in my own practice, as 
they relate to principles of emergence. This includes a discussion of some related practices 
by other artists. Deleuze’s concept of givens as the “painting before painting” is used as a 
basis for a discussion on the role in painting of sensation, conventions such as perspective 
and figure-field relationships, the problem of trajectory and the new, and finally the 
problem of decision-making on painting’s completion.  
 
The Where & When of Emergence 
In all painting, an image emerges as the result of a process. However, in the concept of 
emergence explored in this study, an outcome is not preconceived for the process.  
Emergence is of painting’s procedures, and these emerge differentially throughout the 
course of painting. Emergence is not of a material image, but of an image-of-emergence 
construing a painter’s responding to perceptions of emerging painting. As intensive 
emergence, aimed at qualifications of emergence within contexts constituting this research, 
emergence is qualitative change undifferentiated from living experience. In this conception, 
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 5 
immanent to the impetus of temporalising, emergence is autonomous process with monadic 
inscrutability. Though a painter is present and immanent to emergence as it is happening, what 
happens is unpredictable and essentially unaccountable. Discussion in this exegesis poses this 
enigma precisely in terms of its grounding question: Does painting happen? While emergence 
happens in time, there are dual conceptions of time, one in which time is divisible and the 
other in which time is a continuum of change. The where and when of emergence, therefore, 
has different connotations for each temporality. This study explores the implications of that 
difference for the processes of painting as creative practice.  
 
Developmental Givens 
This resumé of my prior explorations in painting shows how they have brought me to this 
study, and how they are brought as givens into my current painting practice, even if some of 
these givens then need to be cleared from that practice. What I find on looking back, and 
what I remember clearly from the time these works were made, is a consistent exploration 
of ideas about time, movement, and change that developed from a variety of worldly 
contexts, but based on a conceptualisation of living processes, and how life endures through 
processes of evolution. It was accompanied by thinking about the agency of processual 
change, that is, in forces or tendencies that are also behind entropy, gravity, chemistry, and 
other manifestations of physical change. 
 
 
  Figure 2 1   Figure 3 2 
In particular, these ideas came out of my studies into the ecology of the littoral zone of tidal 
estuaries and exposed shores. These are environments characterised by high bio-productivity, 
transience, and subject to the stresses of extreme and variable conditions, with diurnal and 
seasonal rhythms, and change due to random weather events. Impinging electromagnetic 
radiation, as an invisible agent of change, acts on the physiology of organisms with profound 
                                                   
1 Jervis, Ian (1986). Amphibola crenata. Ink and crayon on paper: 11x16cm. 
2 Jervis, Ian (1986). Amphibola crenata. Oil on linen: 15x21cm. 
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short and long term effects. In the exposed tidal mudflats of estuaries, relationships between 
biology, physics and chemistry are palpably evident in the tenuous and tenacious life of 
organisms, and in the movement between individual life, adaptive radiation, and evolution. 
In these environments, one can sense change moving through the material and living world. 
Because I was conceiving time and change in terms of movements in space, my approach was to 
reify these abstractions or invisible influences through depicting their material effects, using 
visual signs in order to divide and articulate the spaces depicted, and to suggest movement 
within those spaces. Time became either compressed or dilated, and then frozen into the 
structure of the drawing or painting. Painting was a process of formulating or inventing such 
signs, that would give visible, albeit symbolic, form to the invisible, and that would suggest 
change, time, energy, and potential—all in terms of spatial movements. For example, in 
Figures 2 to 6 a structure or architecture of marks is deployed to articulate and divide spaces 
depicted. The ideas came from consideration of the principles and methods of scientific 
enquiry, the relationship between phenomena and noumena, conjecture and the formation and 
testing of hypotheses, statistics, accuracy and precision, and the untestable. In all these 
matters, my core interest was in a tendency for change, and so in the provisional, and in the 
limits of knowing. Subject matter, relating to the specific contexts from which these ideas 
emerged, was often depicted in drawings or paintings, for example, as organisms with 
protective carapaces (Figures 2 & 3), or as vials of colour that could be chemical reagents or 
pigments, depending on the ambiguity of context. They may be referencing a chemistry or 
‘alchemy’ of painting (Figure 4). Other works (Figures 15 & 16, for example) were informed 
by considerations of gravity as a tendency of mutual attraction, and of how forces act at a 
distance either through a medium or, more mysteriously, when there is no medium.  
 
The basis for thinking about change was the relationship in living things between 
environment, physiology, anatomy, morphology, behaviour, adaptation, adaptive radiation, 
and evolution. The overarching relationship concerned endurance in time, through change 
and movement. My readings of Bergson’s work on creative evolution and duration 
especially resonated for me with the evolutionary biologist, Stephen Jay Gould, and his 
analyses of teleological persistence in a commonplace understanding of evolution as a 
trajectory of progressive improvements related to an ideal.3  
 
 
 
                                                   
3 Gould, S. J. (1989). Wonderful life: The Burgess shale and the nature of history. (pp.27-52). New York, NY: 
W.W. Norton & Co. 
INTRODUCTION…. 
   
 
 7 
 
  Figure 4 4 
 
Invisible mysteries are sometimes given visible form by the simplest of means: the sprinkling 
of iron filings to reveal magnetic fields; the vapour trails left by radiation’s path through a 
supersaturated gas; the visual static/noise on a television that is a residue of microwave 
radiation from the beginning of time; the entropic change of oxidation. As developing 
technologies allow resolution at increasingly smaller and larger scales, so they open to ‘view’ 
what was beyond the limits of perception, and also open questions concerning how 
interpreted data relates to reality.  
 
 
  Figure 5 5   Figure 6  6 
The characteristically broad horizons and expansive skies of tidal estuaries give a sense of 
exposure, where natural radiations that permeate everything can readily be imagined as 
filling the emptiness, drenching space. In these drawings (Figures 5 & 6) I imagine such 
impinging radiation articulating and dividing that space as they exact the radical change of 
mutation. In referring to invisible forces, these essentially figurative works court abstraction, 
in a way that refers to how the change brought by these forces courts the deformations that 
constitute the vitality of living continuance.  
 
                                                   
4 Jervis, Ian. (1990). [no title]. Oil on linen: 21x55cm. 
5 Jervis, Ian. (1985). [no title]. Ink, crayon, and pencil on paper: 11x16cm. 
6 Jervis, Ian. (1985). [no title]. Ink, crayon, and pencil on paper: 15x14cm. 
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  Figure 7 7    Figure 8 8 
Other works, such as in Figures 7 & 8, were informed by thinking about generation and 
growth evident in the conspicuous inflorescences and fertile buddings of living things. Later 
works explored ideas of latency, now shifting from a biological context to a concern with the 
process of making painted images, so that in Figure 9 colour and form in turmoil may be 
emerging from and folding back into a bloc, pool, or reservoir of potential.  
 
 
  Figure 9  9 
In Figures 10 & 11, as examples from different installations, numerous small paintings were 
collated in groups to create an aggregate work. These Conjectures, as they were titled, were 
presented variously, in grid format on a wall, or along a shelf, or in a folder (Figure 11), or 
selected by spectators and arrayed in groups (Figure 10). Many of the individual works 
retained a figurative reference to landscape, through the intersecting horizontal and vertical 
axes that came from an estuarine horizon, and through colours and morphologies 
                                                   
7 Jervis, Ian. (1991). [no title]. Oil on linen: 160x140cm. 
8 Jervis, Ian. (1991). [no title]. Ink and oil on board: 52x68cm. 
9 Jervis, Ian. (2003). [no title]. Oil on linen: 70x105cm 
INTRODUCTION…. 
   
 
 9 
reminiscent of living things. These works were, however, moving away from representation 
in order to explore how painted or drawn forms could invoke tensions, attractions, or 
repulsions internally within the work (see Figure 12).  
 
 
  Figure 10 10  
 
 
  Figure 11 11     Figure 12 12  
In larger paintings, such as those in Figures 13 & 14, where the process of painting is 
necessarily more protracted, more complex interactions emerged in the layering of paint, 
and in the interaction between forms as they began to set up rhythms of sensation that 
served to shift my practice further from representation—a shift aided by the capacity of 
figural elements to work “outside the grasp of structures, and yet to work within them.”13 
 
                                                   
10 Jervis, Ian. (1997). Conjectures. Drawings Gallery , Auckland.  Installation view; individual images: oil on 
paper: 8x6.5cm 
11 Jervis, Ian. (1997). Conjectures. P-P Exhibition 1997, Auckland. Individual images, oil on paper: 8x6.5cm. 
12 Jervis, Ian. (2003). Conjectures. Ink and toner on paper: 30x42cm. 
13 Jean–Francois Lyotard’s concept of the figural is discussed in Chapter Two. The citation here is from 
Crome, K., & Williams, J. (Eds.). (2006). The Lyotard reader and guide (p.15). Edinburgh, Scotland: 
Edinburgh University Press. The term figural is coined by Jean-Francois Lyotard (1971), and introduced in 
Lyotard, J.-F. (2011). Discourse, figure (A. Hudek & M. Lydon, Trans.). Minneapolis, MN: University of 
Minnesota Press. 
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  Figure 13 14   Figure 14 15 
Colour and gesture then began to come to the forefront during painting, so that the 
processes of painting’s sensations became a primary interest (Figures 15 & 16), based on 
affective responses to colour sensations, emerging in experimental layering and composing. 
As a consequence, processes of painting, while still exploring attractions within a work, 
became more occupied with rhythms of sensation that emerged during the process, in the 
flows and intersections and interactions and recursions of colour, and in the forms that 
emerge out of these interactions.  
 
 
  Figure 15 16   Figure 16 17 
All these prior explorations in painting are brought along as givens, as they prefigure my 
focus on emergence and painting of time. I return to these givens in Chapter Three in terms 
of a continual interplay between a clearing of givens in processes of figural deformations of 
                                                   
14 Jervis, Ian. (1994). [no title]. Oil on linen: 160x125cm. 
15 Jervis, Ian. (1996). [no title]. Oil on linen: 160x140cm. 
16 Jervis, Ian. (2008). [no title]. Oil on aluminium: 60x60cm. 
17 Jervis, Ian. (2008). [no title]. Oil on aluminium: 60x60cm. 
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figuration and abstraction, along with recursive and unavoidable returns of givens as quickly 
as they are cleared. How do we understand this peculiar recursive process of painting’s 
emergence as method, in particular, as Bergson’s method of intuition? I approach this via 
Deleuze’s reading of Bergson’s method. 
 
Bergson’s Method of Intuition   
Deleuze delineates three related concepts from Bergson: duration, from Time and Free Will; 
memory, from Matter and Memory; and élan vital, from Creative Evolution. He wants to find the 
interrelationship between these three and does so by looking at intuition. Intuition for 
Bergson, as Deleuze understands it, is that activity in the life of the mind that sets up and 
organises problems: “Questions related to the subject and the object, to their distinction and 
their union, must be set up in terms of time rather than space.”18 What, then, is intuition’s 
methodological character? 
 
In giving definition to Bergson’s intuition as method, Deleuze proceeds by drawing out four 
fundamental characteristics of intuition, four modes of its essential becoming. I will briefly 
introduce each of these four and in doing so suggest how key notions from Bergson, 
concerning duration, succession, matter and memory constitute procedures for composing states 
or things, rather than knowledge of states or things. With this, we begin to discern how 
procedurally the work of art may be considered as a composing procedure. For Deleuze, 
intuition’s first characteristic questions science’s epistemological ground, where critical 
philosophy became nothing more than a reflection on science’s knowledge. Bergson restores 
philosophy to something other than reflection or critique, leading to Deleuze’s second 
characteristic: 
 
We are separated from things: the immediate given is not immediately given. But 
that separation is not entirely from us, a simple accident, mediation from us. 
Rather, the movement that changes the nature of things must be founded in things 
themselves—things must lose themselves in order for us to lose them: being must 
have a fundamental lapse of memory.19  
 
Hence, for Deleuze, matter is that in being that prepares and accompanies space, 
intelligence and science. Matter is an ontological principle of intelligence, rather than 
intelligence being a psychological principle of matter or space. Scientific knowledge, then, 
separates us from things—their true nature—though it grasps one of the two movements of 
                                                   
18 Deleuze, G. (2004). Desert islands and other texts (M. Taormina, Trans.). (p.22). Los Angeles, CA: 
Semiotext(e). 
19 Ibid. (p.23).  
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nature—where “nature relaxes and places itself outside itself.”20 There are not two worlds of 
the sensible and the intelligible but two movements, or more precisely, two directions of one and the 
same movement. With one direction, movement congeals in its product, its result, what 
interrupts that movement; the other direction turns back from the product and retraces its 
steps: rediscovers in the product the movement from which it resulted.   
 
The latter is found beneath the former; hence it is rediscovered. We rediscover the 
immediate because we must return to find it. At every instant movement is no more but 
only because it is not made up of instants: “Instants are only its real or virtual cessation, its 
product and shadow of its product.”21 Being is not made up of presents. Thus from another 
perspective, it is the product that is not and the movement that already was. Bergson shows 
that it is not the present that is and the past no longer, but rather the present is useful while 
being is the past, being used to be. Hence Bergson’s two directions of one and the same 
movement, spirit and matter, two times in the same duration (movement): past and present, 
co-existing in the same duration, one beneath the other and not after the other. Present and 
past form the same world. 
 
That is to say, being is difference and not the undifferentiated, the difference itself of the 
thing—nuance —a concept only for that thing: “An empiricism worthy of the name … would 
measure out for the object a concept appropriate to only that object, a concept of which one 
could barely say that it was still a concept because it would apply only to that thing.”22 
Nuance is not difference of a thing to another thing. This would return us to an exterior 
spatial relation. Nor is nuance difference to everything it is not—a return to dialectical 
contradiction:  “The being of a sugar cube (its nuance) will be defined by duration—a 
manner of persisting in the relaxation and tension of duration.”23 But how does duration 
have this power of differentiation? This takes us to intuition’s third characteristic: the monism 
of duration’s two tendencies. In that we find ourselves before products or results, we cannot 
grasp differences in nature for they are not there. That is, between two products or two 
things there are only differences of degree or proportion. What differs in nature is a tendency in one 
and the same thing between two tendencies that traverse it, two tendencies that encounter one 
another in it. That is, the thing is already a composite of two tendencies. It is never 
homogeneous or pure. The tendency is pure: “the substance is the tendency.”24 Matter and 
duration are not two things but two tendencies or movements in a single thing: relaxation 
                                                   
20 Ibid.  
21 Ibid. (p.24). 
22 Ibid. (p.25). 
23 Ibid. (p.26). 
24 Ibid. 
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(matter) and contraction (duration). Deleuze emphasises that only one of the two is simple in 
a single thing (relaxation of matter). The other disturbs it, leading us back to duration.  
 
However, this does not lead us to an essential dualism of ‘contraction’ and ‘relaxation’. 
Duration differs from matter because it is what differs from itself in itself. Thus, the matter from 
which it differs is still essentially duration. “Everything is entirely defined in duration, including matter 
itself.”25 There are degrees of difference itself, where matter is the lowest, where difference is 
no longer anything but difference of degree. This leads to a fourth and final characteristic of 
intuition. 
  
Differentiation is the power of what is simple, indivisible, of what persists. Duration is élan 
vital, a vital impulse. Evolution and biology, for Bergson, are a production of real differences 
where differentiation is the mode of that which is realised, actualised, made as divergent 
series, lines of evolution, species. The essence of a tendency is its divergent directions. Élan 
vital would thus be duration itself to the extent that it is actualised, is differentiated, that it 
passes into act. Differentiation is not matter’s resistance but a force that duration carries in 
itself. Duration, movement and life are virtual, not actual, that in which all actuality, all 
reality is distinguished and comprehended. For Bergson, duration is a change of nature, of 
quality: “Between light and darkness, between colours, between nuances, difference is 
absolute. The passage from one to the other is itself also an absolutely real phenomenon.”26 
We now see the relation between duration and élan vital as that between the virtual and its 
actualisation, as two extremes. But duration is already élan vital, the essence of the virtual to 
be actualised. We thus need a third aspect that shows it to us, intermediary of the other two. 
Under this third aspect, duration is called memory.  
 
Bergson presents memory in two ways: recollection-memory and contraction-memory. It is the 
latter that is essential. The first returns us to something that has survived from the past. 
However, for Bergson, the past survives in itself. This survival is duration and thus duration is 
memory. Hence, recollection is not the representation of something that was. Rather, the past 
is that in which we put ourselves from the outset in order to recollect ourselves. The past has not ceased 
to be but only to be useful. It survives in itself. The past is not constituted after it was present 
but coexists with itself as present.  As for Bergson’s intuition, Deleuze suggests: 
 
Only the method of which we speak allows us to go beyond idealism as well as 
realism, to affirm the existence of objects inferior and superior to us, while at the 
same time in a certain sense interior to us, to make them coexist together without 
                                                   
25 Ibid. (p.27). 
26 Ibid. (p.28). 
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difficulty …Duration is that which at each instant is differentiated, i.e., 
differentiated into past and present, or the present is doubled in two directions: one 
towards the past and the other towards the future. These three times correspond to 
duration, memory, élan vital.27  
 
Duration is at each instant differentiation. The taking of time is thus an unforeseeable 
nothing, a thing’s nuance as the everything constitutive of its becoming. Is painting then, for 
Bergson, a special case of something—an exception? Rather, painting, the artwork, is 
exemplary of that ‘deep introspection’ constitutive of the grasp of becoming affective, of 
grasping tendency as substance. That grasp is intuition-as-method. The deficit of being is to 
turn this affective becoming into a subject for whom objects are represented as ideas and for 
whom perception is the pathway to knowledge. The painter, in Bergson’s depiction, is 
exemplary as the one who, in freedom, lives the differentiations of heterogeneous states, 
abandoning the measure of things in time. In the following chapter, I engage directly with 
Bergson, and, to an extent, Deleuze, in discussing the work of art in terms of Bergson’s 
notions of image, movement, affection and temporality.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
27 Ibid. (pp.30,31). 
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Does Painting Happen? 
The painter is before his canvas, the colors are on the palette, the model is 
sitting—all this we see, and also we know the painter's style: do we foresee what 
will appear on the canvas? We possess the elements of the problem; we know in 
an abstract way, how it will be solved, for the portrait will surely resemble the 
model and will surely resemble also the artist; but the concrete solution brings 
with it that unforeseeable nothing which is everything in a work of art. And it is 
this nothing that takes time. Nought as matter, it creates itself as form. The 
sprouting and flowering of this form are stretched out on an unshrinkable 
duration, which is one with their essence. So of the works of nature. Their 
novelty arises from an internal impetus which is progress or succession, which 
confers on succession a peculiar virtue or which owes to succession the whole of 
its virtue—which, at any rate, makes succession, or continuity of interpenetration in 
time, irreducible to a mere instantaneous juxtaposition in space. This is why the 
idea of reading in a present state of the material universe the future of living 
forms, and of unfolding now their history yet to come, involves a veritable 
absurdity.1  
 Henri Bergson 
 
Everything in a work of art, everything, as Bergson asserts, is an unforeseeable nothing and this 
nothing takes time. Bergson’s account of the artwork radically discounts all of those elements 
we generally dwell on: painting’s materials and tools, painting’s subject matter and 
painting’s principal agent, the painter. He says: “nought as matter, it creates itself as form.” 
But, so of the work of nature! Bergson then, in this epigraph citation, goes on to mention some 
of his technical terms: succession, continuity of interpenetration in time, instantaneous 
juxtaposition in space. In this chapter I aim to engage with Bergson’s vitalist philosophy in 
order to provide an account of this peculiar notion of a “nothing that takes time” 
constituting the “everything in a work of art.” My sense is that what has grounded and 
guided the emergence—which is to say the movement—of my painting practice resonates 
strongly with such a Bergsonian conception of matter, temporality, change, process, and life. 
My basic question, itself emerging within the milieu of Bergson’s writings, is simply: does 
painting happen? This implies asking how it is that a “nothing” that is “everything” happens.  
 
In this chapter, I initially introduce the work of Bergson by asking, from a Bergsonian 
perspective: What is movement? What is an image? What is temporality or duration? In 
doing so, I introduce aspects of the philosophical writings of Deleuze that engage Bergson, 
                                                   
1 Bergson, H. (2010). Creative evolution (A. Mitchell, Trans.) (p.194). Los Angeles, CA: Indo-European 
Publishing. 
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especially on the notions of time, intuition, movement and image. In the next chapter, I 
address Deleuze’s engagement with the painter, Francis Bacon, as a further encounter of 
philosophy with painting, though it is not in this case Bergson to whom Deleuze turns for 
this encounter.  
 
 
Figure 18  (9x12cm) 
What is Movement? 
Within our everyday reckoning, we encounter movements of all kinds. Works of art are 
moved from one gallery to another, freighted like other things. To encounter artworks we 
move from one gallery space to another, or from one site to another. Artists move into their 
studio space and commence, for example, painting, forever adjusting their distance to the 
works they are developing. There is no mystery here; we understand that things are in space 
and are either in motion or at rest. For the most part there is movement relative to things 
themselves in motion or at rest. We also speak of art movements, general collective 
understandings that change opinion or direction or aim. They come and go. Movement 
implies direction, destination, and point of commencement. We commence making 
something, we are born; we work at something, adjusting, changing things, we mature; we 
complete a project, reaching finality, we die.  
 
Bergson says something quite different to this, concerning movement, which emerges from 
his ontology of matter, memory, time and space. He asks us to radically rethink how 
existence happens and in this, how we think the work of art as something that happens. We 
need to discuss Bergson’s ontology concerning time and image in order to make sense of 
movement as a taking of time that, in a peculiar sense, constitutes that everything and nothing of 
the work of art. I address some of Deleuze’s writings on Bergson though start briefly with a 
comment from Deleuze’s two books on cinema that also constitute a practical Bergsonism: 
Cinema I: The Movement-Image and Cinema 2: The Time-Image. Crucial for us is to define and 
engage with the key notions of time, image and movement. Deleuze comments in Cinema 1: 
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[M]ovement is distinct from space covered. Space covered is past, movement is 
present, the act of covering. The space covered is divisible, indeed infinitely 
divisible, whilst movement is indivisible, or cannot be divided without changing 
qualitatively each time it is divided. This already presupposes a more complex 
idea: the spaces covered all belong to a single, identical, homogeneous space, 
while the movements are heterogeneous, irreducible among themselves.2 
 
The first thing to notice in this brief citation is how time enters in a fundamental 
understanding of spatiality, or extension, in terms of a past and a present. But the citation 
also infers something absolute concerning a mathematisation of things. Divisibility means 
measurement and quantification of nature; indivisibility means qualification or change of 
nature. The third thing to notice is that movement is an act of covering space: it is action, 
and not that covered, extension. So we have two series: space, quantity, homogeneity; and 
movement, quality, heterogeneity. For Bergson these are expressed as two realities that are 
lived, those of time (duration) and space (extension). Our greatest and most persistent error, 
for Bergson, is to confuse these two in one particular way: we measure time, as if time too is 
homogeneous. We quantify time, when time is radically heterogeneous constitutive of the 
immanence of qualitative difference. In this sense, and correlative with this error, we treat 
movement as if it too is measurable in homogeneous space rather than recognising 
movement is a mediating of image and time. But there is much more to be said here. 
 
Life is movement, and movement is common to all things as they interact. Movement passes 
through a medium that is space, with the quality of extensity. In the traversing of space, 
positions or waypoints are measured out in regular intervals, or rhythms, which offer a 
convenient means to translate time, which is qualitative, into the same quantitative terms as 
space. This mistranslation is behind the problem of trajectory. Time, conceived as a 
unidirectional succession of events, now reflects back onto movement so that space is 
conceived in the same terms of linear progression, so that changing orientations are 
conceived as multiple trajectories, which may become distributed as a web. Movement and 
trajectory in painting is seldom conceived in terms of undifferentiated and non-directional 
permeation, diffusion, suffusion, saturation, or smearing. The grain of space suggests 
rhythm and progression, and it allows mapping and planning of movement. This utility 
provides a basis for both conceiving and representing change and life, in ways that fit with 
categories of signification and language, and that serve to frame the world in terms of forces 
and effects. This is the utility that a painter relies on, but which subverts the creation of 
painting.  
                                                   
2 Deleuze, G. (1986). Cinema 1: The movement-image (H. Tomlinson & B. Habberjam, Trans.) (p.1). 
Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.  
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Figure 19 (9x12cm) 
Bergson’s Image 
Every image is within certain images and without others; but of the aggregate 
of images we cannot say that it is within us or without us, since interiority and 
exteriority are only relations among images.3 
 
We need to start with the Bergsonian ‘image’, which is to say Bergson’s understanding of 
perception, Bergson’s ontology: 
 
My perception can, then, only be some part of these objects themselves; it is in 
them rather than they in it. … Perception, therefore, consists in detaching, 
from the totality of objects, the possible action of my body upon them. 
Perception appears, then, as only a choice. It creates nothing; its office, on the 
contrary, is to eliminate from the totality of images all those on which I can 
have no hold, and then, from each of those which I retain, all that does not 
concern the needs of the image which I call my body.4  
 
Bergson here takes up a place between realism and idealism, both of which treat perception 
as that which leads to knowledge. For Bergson, perception is action—virtual action—
leading to actual action. He suggests that immediate consciousness, perception, cannot be 
separated from action/affection:  
 
Everything will happen as if we allowed to filter through us the action of 
external things which is real, in order to arrest and retain that which is virtual: 
this virtual action of things upon our body and of our body upon things is our 
perception itself.5  
 
In this sense, perception is our virtual action that is affective, sensate and corporeal. Bergson 
makes a fundamental distinction between two kinds of image that coincides with his 
                                                   
3 Bergson, H. (1988). Matter and memory (N. Paul & S. Palmer, Trans.) (p.25). New York, NY: Zone Books. 
4 Ibid. (p.229).  
5 Ibid. (p.232). 
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understanding of extensity and affection. My perception indicates the possible action of my 
body on others: its virtual dimension. My body is in space, extended and is capable of acting 
on itself as well as on other bodies.6 In this sense, something of my body enters my 
perception. But then there are external bodies, separated from my body by a distance. As 
that distance diminishes, more possible actions transform to real actions.7 There are then 
two kinds of image: the image that is my body that constitutes a moment when that distance 
separating bodies is nil. The body perceived is my own—a real and not a virtual action. In 
this sense, there is a difference between affection and image. Affection is within my body; 
image is outside my body. Yet, my body is precisely that surface given to me as both 
sensation and image. Affective sensation constitutes my body’s subjectivity. Then, on the 
other hand, exteriority of images constitutes the images’ objectivity. But these are not pure 
perceptions for the sake of knowledge, constituted in the mathematical points of two bodies. 
Sensation and perception are entirely concerned with virtual and actual action. We cannot 
return sensation and image to versions of idealism or realism. Affective sensation constitutes 
my body’s virtual action, my possible action on external images—perceptions—where 
perception is something of a thing itself and not an idea, or representation. When external 
images are de-distanced to my body-as-image, virtual action becomes actual. Crucially, both 
virtual and actual are real. Yet, what of the subjectivity of affective sensation—how is it 
retained? What is recollection and memory? For idealism and realism, memory and 
perception differ in degree. Bergson notes: 
 
If in the case of a present object, a state in our body is thought sufficient to 
create the representation of that object, still more must be thought so in the 
case of an object that is represented though absent. It is necessary, therefore, 
in this theory, that the remembrance should arise from the attenuated 
repetition of the cerebral phenomenon which occasioned the primary 
perception and should consist simply in a perception weakened. Therefore this 
double thesis: Memory is only a function of the brain, and there is only a difference of 
intensity between perception and recollection.8   
 
For Bergson, memory is not a function of the brain. It is not a regression from present to 
past. On the contrary, memory consists in a progression from the past to the present: “It is 
in the past that we place ourselves at a stroke.”9 Crucially, for Bergson, memory is not 
contemplative but rather sensory and motor: “Our present should not be defined as that 
which is more intense; it is that which acts on us and which makes us act.”10 That is, 
                                                   
6 Ibid. (p.226). 
7 Ibid. (p.233). 
8 Ibid. (p.236).  
9 Ibid. (p.239). 
10 Ibid. (p.240). 
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perception is not a difference in degree with respect to recollection. Between affection and 
perception there is a difference in kind that needs to be explored in how Bergson 
understands matter and memory, spatiality and temporality, simultaneity and succession.  
 
In describing matter as an aggregate of ‘images’ in his introduction to Matter and Memory, 
Bergson clarifies (before proceeding to complicate) what he means: “By ‘image’ we mean a 
certain existence which is more than what the idealist calls a representation, but less than that 
which the realist calls a thing—an existence placed halfway between the ‘thing’ and the 
‘representation’.”11 Leonard Lawlor aims at summarising Bergson’s concept of the image in 
relation to a threefold differentiation: “The Bergsonian image differs from an affection, from 
a thing, and from a representation.”12  In the first instance, the ’pure’ image has no affection 
within it. In the second, the image has presence in that it “is what it appears to be,” 
although it is not the thing itself.13 In the third instance, the image has an existence halfway 
between a thing and a representation. Bergson notes: 
 
We will assume for the moment that we know nothing of theories of matter 
and theories of spirit, nothing of the discussions as to the reality or ideality of 
the external world. Here I am in the presence of images, in the vaguest sense 
of the word, images perceived when my senses are opened to them, 
unperceived when they are closed. All these images act and react upon one 
another in all their elementary parts according to constant laws which I call 
laws of nature, and, as a perfect knowledge of these laws would probably allow 
us to calculate and to foresee what will happen in each of these images, the 
future of the images must be contained in their present and will add to them 
nothing new.14  
 
Bergson’s notion of image does not conform to the usual divisions of subject and object, 
mind and matter, and he “neither construes the problem of perception or consciousness in 
representational terms nor does he hold that images are simply in our heads.”15 For Bergson 
everything is image.16 He distinguishes between two systems of image: actual images that are 
constituted in matter, and virtual images that are to do with spirit. In the former “each 
image varies for itself,” while in the latter “images change for a single image that occupies a 
privileged centre.”17 Keith Ansell-Pearson describes Bergson as giving “primacy to a 
                                                   
11 Ibid. (p.9). 
12 Lawlor, L. (2003). The challenge of Bergsonism: Phenomenology, ontology, ethics (p.4). London, England: 
Continuum Press. 
13 Ibid. (p.5). 
14 Bergson, Matter and memory. op.cit., (p.17).  
15 Ansell-Pearson, K. (2002). Philosophy and the adventure of the virtual: Bergson and the time of life (p.145). 
London, England: Routledge. 
16 Bergson, Matter and memory. op. cit., (p.17). 
17 Ansell-Pearson, Philosophy and the adventure of the virtual. op. cit., (p.144). 
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continuity of material extensity.”18 In this continuity everything is “bound together in 
relations” that change continually, and which are conceived in logical and spatial terms, 
thereby “replacing a ‘living unity’ with an empty diagram that is as ‘lifeless as the parts 
which hold it together’.”19 Bergson’s conception of a ‘lived body’ is of a unique body that is 
known both from without, and from within, “in terms of ‘affections,” which interpose 
themselves between the excitations a body receives from the outside and the movements it 
executes in response.”20 Bergson describes how “every image is within certain images and 
without others; but of the aggregate of images we cannot say that it is within us or without 
us, since interiority and exteriority are only relations among images.”21 The body, then, is 
not isolated, but is one of an aggregate of images that constitute the material world, so that, 
as Ansell-Pearson puts it: “the body is a centre of action and not a house of 
representation.”22  Psychic life, which is the basis of duration, is then “made up of diverse 
tones and rhythms” that vary “in accordance with the ‘attention to life’,” so that they 
constitute “zones of indetermination.”23   
 
 
Figure 20  (10x13cm)  
Virtual & Actual Images  
For Bergson, matter has no virtuality, this being solely a quality of mind or spirit; it is only 
the virtual that has potentialities rather than possibilities.24 The aggregate of images that is 
the world is in interaction through the centre that is the living being, and assuming that the 
universe (the totality of all images) is a closed system that operates according to what 
                                                   
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid.  
20 Ibid. (p.145). 
21 Bergson, Matter and memory. op. cit., (p.26). 
22 Ansell-Pearson, Philosophy and the adventure of the virtual. op. cit., (p.144). 
23 Ibid. (pp.144,145). 
24 Ibid. (p.146).  
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Bergson calls “the laws of nature”: “the future of the images must be contained in their 
present and will add to them nothing new.”25 In this respect, we are unable to condition the 
image of the universe; we are unable to expand it through contributing something new. 
Bergson notes: “images themselves cannot create images; but they indicate at each moment, 
like a compass that is being moved about, the position of a certain image, my body, in 
relation to the surrounding images.”26 Because of this interaction, the objects around the 
sensible body (the centre of action) “reflect its possible action upon them.”27 Matter, then, is 
the “aggregate of images,” and the perception of matter is “these same images referred to 
the eventual action of one particular image,” which is the living body.28 Perception, then, is 
only a choice amongst the possibilities of action that a body can perform on other images, 
and it creates nothing, but eliminates other images, for which the body has no use.29 
Bergson avoids separating subject and object, because in the interiority of affective sensation 
there is subjectivity, even though there is objectivity in the exteriority of images in general. 
But if images cannot create new images, and if perception creates nothing but only 
eliminates unwanted images, wherein lies the new, creation and emergence?  
 
Deleuze and Guattari specify that, while the creating of concepts is the object of philosophy, 
“artists are presenters of affects, the inventors and creators of affects.”30 Deleuze turns to 
Bergson for an understanding of the image of and in cinema. In discussing the cinematic 
image, Deleuze describes an actual image as itself having a virtual image that “corresponds 
to it like a double or a reflection.”31 This uniting of the actual and the virtual, as they pass 
into each other, he calls a crystal-image; the actual image united in interaction with 
“recollection-images, dream-images and world-images.”32 
 
We have seen how, on the broader trajectories, perception and recollection, the 
real and the imaginary, the physical and the mental, or rather their images, 
continually followed each other, running behind each other and referring back 
to each other around a point of indiscernibility. But this point of indiscernibility 
is precisely constituted by the smallest circle, that is, the coalescence of the 
                                                   
25 Bergson, Matter and memory. op. cit., (p.17).  
26 Ibid. (p.23). 
27 Ibid. (p.21). 
28 Ibid. (p.22). 
29 Ibid. (p.229). 
30 Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (1994). What is philosophy? (H. Tomlinson & G. Burchell, Trans.) (pp. 5,175). 
New York, NY: Columbia University Press.  
31 Deleuze, G. (1989). Cinema 2: The time-image (H. Tomlinson & R. Galeta, Trans.) (p.66). Minneapolis, 
MN: University of Minnesota Press. 
32 Ibid. (p.67). 
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actual image and the virtual image. The images with two sides, actual and 
virtual at the same time.33 
 
This is the image suspended in a dynamic interaction, indeterminately between the actual 
and the virtual. Simultaneity is distinct yet inseparable and irreducible.34 The 
indiscernibility between the actual and the virtual aspects of this crystal image “constitutes 
an objective illusion; it does not suppress the distinction between the two sides, but makes it 
unattributable, each side taking the other’s role in a relation which we must describe as 
reciprocal presupposition, or reversibility.”35 For this reason, Deleuze states that the 
confusion that arises from the indiscernibility between the real and the imaginary, or the 
present and the past, or the actual and the virtual, is “not produced in the head or the mind, 
it is the objective characteristic of certain existing images which are by nature double.”36 In 
this doubling, the objective and the subjective are brought into clear relation:  
 
The actual is always objective, but the virtual is subjective: it was initially the 
affect, that which we experience in time; then time itself, pure virtuality which 
divides itself in two as affector and affected, ‘the affection of self by self’ as 
definition of time.37 
 
As Deleuze succinctly states, time permeates this mutual image: “What we see in this crystal 
is time itself, the gushing forth of time.”38 He explicates further: 
 
What is actual is always a present. But then, precisely, the present passes or 
changes. We can always say that it becomes past when it no longer is, when a 
new present replaces it. But this is meaningless. It is clearly necessary for it to 
pass on for the new to arrive, and it is clearly necessary for it to pass at the same 
time as it is present, at the moment that it is present. Thus the image has to be 
present and past, still present and already past, at once and at the same time. If 
it was not already past at the same time as the present, the present would never 
pass on. The past does not follow the present that is no longer, it coexists with 
the present it was. The present is the actual image, and its contemporaneous 
past is the virtual image, the image in a mirror. … Our actual existence, then, 
whilst it is unrolled in time, duplicates itself along with a virtual existence, a 
mirror-image. Every moment of our life presents two aspects, it is actual and 
virtual, perception on one side and recollection on the other.39 
 
                                                   
33 Ibid.  
34 Ibid. (p.76).  
35 Ibid. (p.67).  
36 Ibid. (p.68).  
37 Ibid. (p.80).  
38 Ibid. (pp.79,80).  
39 Ibid. (pp.76,77).  
CHAPTER ONE—Movement Image Time… 
   
 
 25 
From what Deleuze is saying here, we get the sense that the ‘new’ happens in actuality, 
which is always already present such that its doubling, in a coterminous virtual, 
accompanies the peculiar temporalising of actualisation by a mirroring pastness. 
Recollection, memory cannot be severed from actualisation but nor can it be understood as 
time past. Time is regained in this mirror of the crystal. It is what Deleuze recognises in the 
substance revealed in Bergsonian duration. That is, each thing is already a composite of two 
tendencies. It is never homogeneous or pure. The tendency is pure: “the substance is the tendency 
itself.”40 (Matter and duration are not two things but two tendencies or movements in a single 
thing: relaxation (matter) and contraction (duration). Only one of the two is simple in a 
single thing (relaxation of matter). The other disturbs it, leading us back to duration.  This 
account of a Bergsonian notion of time, as a ‘snapshot’ of homogeneous reality, outlines the 
multiplicities, simultaneities, interpenetrations, indiscernibilities, dynamics, and 
indeterminacies that all fold into heterogeneous duration. 
 
 
Figure 21  (10x13cm) 
Movement-Image As Sensory-Motor Machine 
Deleuze relies on Bergson’s philosophy of time to construct a framework for his analysis of 
the movement-image. Bergson’s conception of consciousness and perception presumes a 
primal cosmos that is a matter-flow of mutually interacting images—within which the living 
image emerges as a centre of indetermination, where the ego, eye, brain, and body dissolve 
as if into a “gaseous state” that is “a world of universal variation, universal undulation, 
universal rippling: there are neither axes, nor centre, nor left, nor right, nor high, nor 
low….”41 This infinite set of all images constitutes a plane of immanence. On this plane the 
image exists in-itself as matter, so that the movement-image and flowing-matter are 
                                                   
40 Deleuze, Desert islands and other texts, op. cit., (p.26). 	  
41 Deleuze, Cinema 1. op.cit., (p. 58). 
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identical.42 There is nothing hidden behind the image, but only the “absolute identity of the 
image and movement”, so that the movement-image and matter are identical.43  
 
There is no moving body [mobile] which is distinct from executed movement. 
There is nothing moved which is distinct from the received movement. Every thing, 
that is to say every image, is indistinguishable from its actions and reactions: this is 
universal variation. Every image is ‘merely a road by which pass, in every direction, 
the modifications propagated throughout the immensity of the universe’. Every image 
acts on others and reacts to others, on ‘all their facets at once’ and ‘by all their elements’.44  
 
Bergson tells us that there is no need to look in movement for anything more than we see in 
it: “external images act on me, transmit movement to me, and I return movement.”45 
However, going beyond Bergson, Deleuze ontologically equates matter and light and so 
describes the plane of immanence as being “entirely made up of light” which diffuses as it is 
propagated without resistance or loss.46 Just as matter is light, so the image is movement—
and so light is the set of movements (actions and reactions) in the plane of immanence. 
Visual perception then constitutes a filtering of this light, this movement, through the centre 
of indetermination that is the living body, which selectively absorbs or reflects various 
qualities (wavelengths) while allowing others to be transmitted without interference.47 As a 
bloc of light, the ‘thing’ or image-in-itself is a virtual image, while its perception is the 
actualisation of a portion of that bloc. Visual perception is then in thing: “both in the sense 
that perception takes place at the perceived object and that the perceiver is itself an 
emergent configuration of light.”48 In the movement-image there are only lines or figures of 
light—as blocs of space–time. For Deleuze as for Bergson, “the eye is in things, in luminous 
images themselves”, so that “all consciousness is something, it is indistinguishable from the 
thing, that is from the image of light.”49 As a position distinct from phenomenological 
perception, Deleuze reiterates that it is a consciousness which is “diffused everywhere yet 
does not reveal its source: it is a photo that has already been taken and shot in all things and 
for all points, but which is ‘translucent’.”50 
  
                                                   
42 Ibid. (p. 59). 
43 Ibid. (p 58). 
43 Ibid. (p.59). 
44 Ibid. (p. 58). 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. (p. 60). 
47 Bogue, R. (2003). Deleuze on cinema (p.34). New York, NY: Routledge.  
48 Ibid.  
49 Deleuze, Cinema 1. op.cit., (p.60). 
50 Ibid. (p.61). 
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From Bergson’s account of perception, Deleuze extracts three types of movement-image within 
the sensory-motor system that analyses received movements and selects executed 
movements. On the incoming side of the relay between received movement and executed 
movement Deleuze identifies the perception-image, which is in the interval (hesitancy) that is 
the living image—it is the ‘thing’ minus those elements filtered out by perception. However 
perception and action cannot be separated in this interval, because perceptions of the 
external world are affected by expectations or anticipations, and by the possibilities open to 
each individual body (centre of indetermination) for future action. Here Deleuze identifies a 
second type of movement-image as the action-image, which is related to the outgoing side of 
the interval: passing “imperceptibly from perception to action” it puts into effect an 
“incurvation of the universe” which “simultaneously causes the virtual action of things on us 
and our possible action on things.”51 The third type of movement-image, the affection-image, 
is what occupies the interval “without filling it in, or filling it up”—relating movement to a 
“‘quality’ as lived state”, as the coincidence of subject and object in a pure quality.52 In 
parallel with Bergson’s linguistic analogy, Deleuze relates the perception-image to nouns, 
the action-images to verbs, and affection-images to adjectives. While affections (sensation or 
bodily feelings in general) have an essential relationship with the primary qualities of such 
‘nouns’ and ‘verbs’, as “proto-adjectives”, they are qualitatively different from 
perceptions—even though “sensation/affection bears a necessary relationship to perception 
and in fact always accompanies it.”53 Whereas our perception indicates the possible action 
of our body on others, affection is within our body, and sensation is an impurity introduced 
as “part of our own body which we project into all others.”54 For Deleuze, the affection-
image “marks the coincidence of the subject and object in a pure quality…it relates 
movement to a ‘quality’ as lived state (adjective).”55  In summary, he describes how each of 
us, as a special image or contingent centre, is “nothing but an assemblage of three images, a 
consolidate of perception-images, action-images, and affection-images.”56 
 
                                                   
51 Ibid. (p.65). 
52 Ibid. 
53 Bogue, Deleuze on cinema. op.cit., (p.37).  
54 Bergson, Matter & memory. op.cit., (pp.233-235). 
55 Deleuze, Cinema 1. op.cit., (p.65). 
56 Ibid. (p.66). 
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     Figure 22  (10x12cm) 
Time-Image 
Duration is introduced to this “system of the movement-image” by the living image, and so 
Deleuze identifies two aspects or axes of it. One (vertical) axis is of duration, while the latter 
(horizontal) axis is of pure perception or movement without duration. The vertical axis is of 
differentiation, where the virtual multiplicity of duration “continually divides or differentiates 
itself into the closed sets of actual objects in a homogeneous space and an abstract time, 
while that open whole [duration] remains everywhere indirectly expressed through the 
movements of the objects within closed sets.”57 This relates to the immobile cut, the mobile 
cut, and the open whole of duration. The horizontal axis is specification, where “the 
movement-image forms three species of movement-images when related to the interval of 
the living image or center of indetermination.”58 Together, in terms of virtual divisions, they 
constitute a “plane of consistency of image/movement/matter/durée”.59 He describes this 
plane as  “a plastic mass, an a-signifying and a-syntactic matter, a non-linguistically formed 
matter, though a matter that is not amorphous and is formed semiotically, aesthetically and 
pragmatically”—a condition anterior to what it conditions, and so not an utterance, but an 
utterable.60 While Deleuze has previously identified image/movement/matter with light (in 
Cinema 1), here he broadens the conception (in Cinema 2) to include matter/flow, describing 
the plastic mass as a signaletic matter that bears the characteristics of “all kinds of modulation 
features, sensory (visual and sound), kinetic, intensive, affective, rhythmic, tonal, and even 
verbal (oral and written).”61 Language uses this material to make utterances, which then 
dominate or replace the images and signs—so that language “only exists in its reaction to a 
                                                   
57 Bogue, Deleuze on cinema. op.cit., (p.39). 
58 Ibid. (p.39). 
59 Ibid. 
60 Deleuze, Cinema 2. op.cit., (p.28).  
61 Ibid.  
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non-language material that it transforms”, and so that “utterances and narrations are not a 
given of visible images, but a consequence that flows from this reaction.”62  
 
For Deleuze narrative is a secondary product of a structure of time and space, based around 
the practical need for a coordinated sensory-motor schema that can apply perceptions and 
actions towards desires, purposes, or projects. Because of such pragmatism, in order to make 
relations between signs efficient, non-linguistic signs tend to become subordinated to 
linguistic signs. In relation to Pierce’s semiotic theory (where he finds such a subordination), 
Deleuze positions a fourth movement-image, the relation-image, which is to do with Pierce’s 
quality of mediation or “intelligible relation”—“the action of a sign mediating between its 
object and its interpretant”, related to the tendency to form habits.63 Further to this, 
Deleuze identifies two additional types of movement-image: the impulse-image situated 
midway between the affection-image and the action-image, and the reflection-image situated 
between the action-image and the relation-image.  
 
As for the question: are there types of image in the movement-image other than the 
perception-image?, it is resolved by the various aspects of the interval: the 
perception-image received movement on one side, but the affection-image is what 
occupies the interval .., the action-image what executes the movement on the other 
side .., and the relation-image what reconstitutes the whole of the movement with 
all the aspects of the interval …Thus the movement-image gives rise to a sensory-
motor whole which grounds narration in the image.  
Between the perception-image and the others there is no intermediary, because 
perception extends by itself into the other images. But, in the other cases, there is 
necessarily an intermediary which indicates the extension as passage. This is why, 
in the end, we find ourselves faced with six types of perceptible visible images that 
we see, not three: perception-image, affection-image, impulse-image (intermediate between 
affection and action), reflection-image (intermediate between action and relation), 
relation-image.64 
 
As Deleuze indicates here, the necessity of these intermediary images, in relating the 
perception of Deleuze-Bergson to the semiotics of Pierce, is to translate the latter’s extension 
into terms of the formers’ passage. Bergson explains how, instead of containment, the body’s 
sensory-motor system allows passage between images in consciousness and movements in 
space—between images that are qualitative and without extension, and those that are 
extended and quantitative. It is for this reason that Deleuze describes the sensory-motor 
system (schema) as machine rather than mechanism, because mechanism implies the 
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63 Bogue, Deleuze on cinema. op.cit., (p.100). 
64 Deleuze, Cinema 2. op.cit., (p.31). 
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containment of the immobile cuts. The extension into other types of movement-image 
happens because whenever affections, actions, and relations occur, there is “always an 
accompanying perception of affections, of actions, of relations.”65 Thus, “if the movement-
image is already perception, the perception-image will be perception of perception.”66 
Because every movement-image manifests movement as both a translation of the parts and 
an expression of the whole, perception has two poles “depending on whether it is identified 
with movement or its interval (variation of all the images in their relations with each other, 
or variation of all the images in relation to one of them).”67 On this basis Deleuze develops a 
number of non-linguistic signs that operate as internal links between situation and action, so 
that his definition of ‘sign’ is entirely different from that of Pierce—for Deleuze the sign is “a 
particular image that refers to a type of image, either from the point of view of its bipolar 
composition, or from the point of view of its genesis.”68  The purpose of signs, for Deleuze, is 
to “articulate the objects of analysis and their interconnections”, so that signs are discursive 
and generate a proliferation of emerging distinctions, ensuring an “interplay in acentred, 
rhizomatic combinations” that continue to open new territories of relation.69  To borrow 
from Deleuze’s citing of Nietzsche: “it is never at the beginning that something new, a new 
art, is able to reveal its essence; what it was from the outset it can reveal only after a detour 
in its evolution.”70 
 
Aggregation of movement-images offers an indirect image of time as the open whole, but for 
Deleuze there is a separate category of images and signs that provide a direct manifestation 
of time, as the time-image. These include chronosigns that present co-existing relations and 
simultaneous elements of time (the order of time) or a before-and-after in a single becoming 
(the series of time), and noosigns that reveal a new relation between thought and images, and 
lectosigns that manifest a new relation between the visual and the sonic. However it is in the 
halyosigns of Deleuze’s crystal-image that we directly experience time. In principle, the crystal-
image is based on Bergson’s mirroring of the actual and the virtual, in the present, in a way 
that does not relate to chronological succession. The virtual image in its pure state is distinct 
from mental images such as recollection-images or dream-images that, while virtual, have 
been actualised by the needs of perception. It is this pure virtuality, which is “outside of 
consciousness, in time”, and that corresponds to a particular actual image precisely in the 
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present—an “actual-virtual circuit on the spot”, that constitutes the crystal-image.71  In this 
crystal-image Deleuze describes an expansive capacity that is both “a little crystalline seed 
and the vast crystallisable universe.”72 The time-image emerges when the actual image 
enters into relation with its own virtual image, to form an image that is “double-sided, 
mutual, both actual and virtual…to the extent that there is no longer any linkage between 
the real and the imaginary, but indiscernibility of the two, a perpetual exchange.”73 He explains 
how: “It is time itself that arises in the crystal and which is constantly recommending its 
dividing in two without completing it, since the indiscernible exchange is always renewed 
and reproduced.”74 
 
What constitutes the crystal-image is the most fundamental operation of time: since 
the past is constituted not after the present that it was but at the same time, time 
has to split itself in two at each moment as present and past, which differ from each 
other in nature, or, what amounts to be the same thing, it has to split the present in 
two heterogeneous directions, one of which is launched toward the future while the 
other falls into the past. Time has to split at the same time as it sets itself out, or 
unrolls itself: it splits in two dissymmetrical jets, one of which makes all the present 
pass on, while the other preserves all the past. Time consists of this split, and it is 
this, it is time, that we see in the crystal.75  
 
This splitting, “the gushing of time” as a perpetual self-distinguishing, is a limit tendency, 
and so is endless—as Deleuze describes, “it is itself ‘the vanish-limit between the immediate 
past which is already no longer and the immediate future which is not yet…mobile mirror 
which endlessly reflects perception in recollection.”76  
 
 
Figure 23  (c.10x13cm) 
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Perception, Memory, & Duration 
What Bergson calls ‘pure’ perception, which is instantaneous perception, is only an ideal 
conception, whereas every perception “fills a certain depth of duration, prolongs the past 
into the present, and thereby partakes of memory.”77 Perception, then, is a synthesis of pure 
memory and pure perception, as perception–recollection. Lawlor’s formulation that 
“duration equals memory plus the absolutely new” indicates that perception cannot be 
separated from recollection.78 Perception does not refer back to a representation of the past 
that has been lodged, as in memory, but brings the past along with it, into the present, and 
into perception. Bergson argues that, while the process of imagining involves recollection, 
the image on the screen of consciousness does not refer to the past unless it was sought in 
the past, so that the process of referring then becomes a following of “the continuous 
progress, which brought it from darkness into light.”79 As an assemblage for how 
recollection integrates with perception, Bergson gives his diagram of a cone where the point 
indicates the present, while the cone expresses a dynamic of the accumulating past.80 What 
memory recalls are multiplicities and singularities, rather than identities and universals.81 
 
 
Figure 24.  Bergson’s cone diagram metaphor for the interaction between 
  images accumulating in memory and the focal point of perception. 
 
Bergson describes a process of contraction, whereby images from the past are brought up to 
the present, and then relaxed back into the past—this being how memory maintains the 
past in the present. In this conception, the past remains vital, as images are continuously 
being drawn down through the cone’s vortex to interact with perception in the present as 
perception—recollection. The focal point ‘S’ in the diagram can be taken as equivalent to 
the focal point of vision, that inscribes an image as it roams across a surface (the plane of a 
                                                   
77 Bergson, Matter and memory. op. cit., (p.244). 
78 Lawlor, The challenge of Bergsonism. op. cit., (p.ix).  
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80 Ibid. (p.152).  
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painting, for example). This is also the crucible where invention happens.82 This is not a 
representation of the past assembled through memory, nor the representation of a thing 
through visuality, but living-experiencing, where sensation directly invokes the interaction 
that is perception-recollection.  
 
But we forget that states of consciousness are processes, and not things; that if 
we denote them each by a single word, it is for the convenience of language; 
that they are alive and therefore constantly changing; that, in consequence, it 
is impossible to cut off for a moment from them without making them poorer 
by the loss of some impression, and thus altering their quality.83  
Affection & The Virtual 
Bergson describes perception as if it were a process of filtering out the real action of things 
upon our body, in order to retain what is virtual: “the virtual action of things upon our body 
and of our body upon things is our perception itself.”84 This is a process whereby a body 
receives stimuli in order to determine “nascent reactions,” as possible actions the body 
might take in response.85 Because these internal processes continuously “sketch out” possible 
actions, they correspond exactly to perception.86 Bergson explains that they are not, 
however, “its cause, nor its effect, nor in any sense its duplicate,” but they “merely continue 
it, the perception being our virtual action and the cerebral state our action already begun.”87  
Where the body that is perceived is not external to us but is our own body, “then it is a real 
and no longer a virtual action that our perception sketches out.”88  
 
‘Pure’ perception, that is a fragment of reality, is complicated by being mingled with such 
perceptions of its own body, its affections.89 Bergson argues that while sensations are the 
basis of experience, they are not “the materials from which the image is wrought” in 
perception, but “appear as the impurity which is introduced into it, being that part of our 
own body which we project into all others,” namely affections.90  Such affection is localised 
within a body, and if, as Bergson describes, we “restore to the body its extensity and to 
perception its duration,” then affectivity and memory are restored to consciousness, as its 
two subjective elements: “Between the affection-felt and the image-perceived there is thus 
                                                   
82 Bergson, Matter and memory. op. cit., (p.162).  
83 Bergson, H. (2001). Time and free will: An essay on the immediate data of consciousness (F. Pogson, Trans.) 
(p.196). New York, NY.: Dover Publications. 
84 Bergson, Matter and memory. op. cit., (p.232). 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid. (p.233).  
87 Ibid.  
88 Ibid.  
89 Ibid.  
90 Ibid. (p.235).  
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this difference: that the affection is within our body, the image outside our body. …In this 
interiority of affective sensation consists its subjectivity; in that exteriority of images in 
general, their objectivity.”91   
Image & Representation  
Bergson attests that a body, “an object destined to move other objects, is, then, a centre of 
action; it cannot give birth to a representation.”92 The body does not store the past, but 
prolongs the actions that precede the present. As the aggregate of images that constitute the 
external world are perceived by the body as a centre of action, Bergson describes them 
being “entirely changed by very slight alterations of the image I call my body,” including 
the act of prolongation which is memory.93 As Bergson stresses, perception does not provide 
an image analogous to a photograph taken from a fixed point, but constructs an image in 
duration, and through the zone of indetermination that is the body, and which takes from 
what “should be the image of the whole,” but “is in fact reduced to the image of what 
interests you.”94  In this respect, Bergson summarises: “neither in perception, nor in 
memory, nor a fortiori in the higher attainments of mind, does the body contribute directly 
to representation.”95 Where intuition may also access immediate knowledge above the 
decisive turn, “there is no possible transition from the order which is perceived by our senses 
to the order which we are to conceive for the sake of our science—or, if we are dealing more 
particularly with the Kantian idealism, no possible transition from sense to 
understanding.”96 
 
Now, here is the image, which I call a material object; I have the representation 
of it. How then does it not appear to be in itself that which it is for me? It is 
because, being bound up with all other images, it is continued in those which 
follow it, just as it prolonged those which preceded it. To transform its existence 
into representation, it would be enough to suppress what follows it, what 
precedes it, and also all that fills it, and to retain only its external crust, its 
superficial skin. That which distinguishes it as a present image, as an objective 
reality, from a represented image is the necessity which obliges it to act through 
every one of its points upon all the points of all other images, to transmit the 
whole of what it receives, to oppose to every action an equal and contrary 
                                                   
91 Ibid. (p.234).  
92 Ibid. (p.20).  
93 Ibid. (p.226).  
94 Ibid. (pp.39,40).  
95 Ibid. (p.226).  
96 Ibid. (p.229).  
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reaction, to be, in short, merely a road by which pass, in every direction, the 
modifications propagated throughout the immensity of the universe.97 
 
Bergson explains that “our representation of matter is the measure of our possible actions 
upon bodies: it results from the discarding of what has no interest for our needs, or more 
generally, for our functions.”98 Because representation is cut out of the whole, Lawlor 
describes it as “a decomposition of the whole” that “breaks up the natural continuity of 
images.”99 Any re-composition of the whole then becomes an artifice, and it is in this zone of 
artifice, which is less than art, that the imagination constructs “only relations and 
figurations; it is the zone of lines and drawings, schemas and symbols, language and 
sense.”100  
 
Within these critical contexts, painting could not be conceived as a representational project, 
and the image that results from painting—the image of painting and not a painted image—
can itself be neither translated nor represented. Instead painting becomes an act of living, an 
active engagement in the world through responding to immediate sensation, and through 
the action of prolonging the past, and through engaging new conditions that are unfolding 
in duration. It is, in its own limited way, a constituting of becoming as being-in-a-world: 
 
But if we could assemble all the states of consciousness, past, present, and 
possible, of all conscious beings, we should still only have gathered a very small 
part of material reality because images outrun perception on every side. It is just 
these images that science and metaphysic seek to reconstitute, thus restoring the 
whole of a chain of which our perception grasps only a few links. But in order 
thus to discover between perception and reality the relation of the part to the 
whole, it is necessary to leave perception to its true office, which is to prepare 
actions. This is what idealism fails to do.”101 
 
 
                                                   
97 Ibid. (p.36). (Previously cited, in part, on p.26.) 
98 Bergson, Matter and memory. op. cit., (p.38). 
99 Lawlor, The challenge of Bergsonism. op. cit., (p.10).  
100 Ibid. 
101 Bergson, Matter and memory. op. cit., (p.229).  
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 Figure 25  (9x13cm) 
Incongruent Realities 
Homogeneous reality, for Bergson, is divisible into discrete units that occupy separate 
positions in space, and so this reality has extensity. Homogeneity characterises the world of 
matter, and the space that it occupies. Material objects derive their exteriority to us (and to 
one another) from the homogeneity of a medium that inserts intervals between them, and so 
“sets off their outlines.”102 This spatialising of experience is the habit of memory that is 
“accustomed to place alongside of each other, in an ideal space, the terms it perceives in 
turn, because it always represents past succession in the form of juxtaposition.”103 This is the 
treatment that the mind gives to things external to it, where their changing states are not 
successive, “except for a consciousness that keeps them in mind.”104 Where time is 
considered within a homogeneous framework, it is divided into instants, with each 
successive instant set apart as a discrete unit. Time then becomes represented in terms of 
spatial movement between these instants, as if each extensible unit were on a conveyor 
moving from the present back into an accumulating past. In this conception, the past is set 
apart from the present, so that it no longer affects the present. As Bergson explains, this 
homogeneous reality reflects our utilitarian habit of measuring the passage of time, and 
thinking about time in terms of movement and accumulation, and of cause and effect. This 
is the basis of the Aristotelian conception of time, essentially contested by Bergson. 
 
By contrast, heterogeneous reality is constituted of qualitative multiplicities that are affective 
(psychic) states constituted of feelings, sensations and ideas. These psychic states permeate 
each other as an intensive multiplicity, and as a continuum of flux that is indivisible into 
                                                   
102 Bergson, Time and free will.  op. cit., (p.98).  
103 Bergson, Creative evolution. op. cit., (p.194).  
104 Bergson, Time and free will. op. cit., (p.227).  
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extensible units.105 This is the reality of living-experience. The past endures in these 
interpenetrating multiplicities, so that heterogeneity is the nature of duration (temporalising) 
as Bergson conceives it. He describes pure duration as a pure heterogeneity, which is 
“nothing but a succession of qualitative changes, which melt into and permeate one 
another, without precise outlines, without any tendency to externalize themselves in relation 
to one another, without any affiliation with number.”106 He further describes a “succession 
without distinction … a mutual penetration, and interconnexion and organisation of 
elements, each one of which represents the whole, and cannot be distinguished or isolated 
from it except by abstract thought.”107 As an account of duration that might be given by 
someone who was “ever the same and ever changing,” it is “the form which the succession 
of our conscious states assumes when our ego lets itself live, when it refrains from separating 
its present state from its former states.”108 Duration is lived as an experience of changing and 
permeating psychic states, and Bergson identifies an enduring vital impetus or élan vital that 
drives this change. Movement is constituted in duration and not in space. This is the vital 
impetus of life, which is “like a current passing from germ to germ through the medium of a 
developed organism.”109 As élan vital endures through continually unfolding time, so 
“duration means invention, the creation of forms, the continual elaboration of the 
absolutely new.”110 In Bergson’s succinct estimation, “time is invention, or it is nothing at 
all.”111 
 
Bergson describes what happens when, through habit, we (unwittingly) introduce space into 
our feeling of pure succession: 
 
[W]e set our states of consciousness side by side in such a way as to perceive 
them simultaneously, no longer in one another, but alongside one another; in a 
word, we project time into space, we express duration in terms of extensity, and 
succession thus takes the form of a continuous line or a chain, the parts of which 
touch without penetrating one another. Note that the mental image thus shaped 
                                                   
105 Ibid. (p.89).  
106 Ibid. (p.104).  
107 Ibid. (p.101).  
108 Ibid. (pp.100-101).  
In explanation, Bergson offers two analogies. In Time and free will (p.100) he gives a musical analogy, 
whereby each note is musical only as it connects within the rhythm of the whole musical phrase, which 
can be compared with a living being. In Creative evolution (p.10) he gives an analogy with how sugar 
dissolves in a closed system “as if it occupied a duration like our own,” so that while its duration coincides 
with an observer’s (impatient) duration, the observer can neither protract nor contract the duration of 
dissolving. Bergson describes the duration of dissolving as something lived, rather than thought; no longer 
a relation, but an absolute. He describes the whole within which all the elements involved in the dissolving 
are understood, as having been cut out by the observer’s senses, in the manner of consciousness.  
109 Bergson, Creative evolution. op. cit., (p.19).  
110 Ibid. (p.10).  
111 Ibid. (p.194).  
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implies the perception, no longer successive, but simultaneous, of a before and 
after, and that it would be a contradiction to suppose a succession which was 
only a succession, and which nevertheless was contained in the one and the 
same instant. 112  
 
In this conflating of incongruent realities, the notion of extensity persists and so allows the 
paradox of infinite succession (as exemplified by Zeno). However the paradox dissolves in 
heterogeneous reality, which has no extensity. It is revealed to be a false problem arising from the 
confusion that space and movement can be treated in the same way, where movement is 
divided.  
 
While Bergson describes this habit of thinking as illusory, he also acknowledges the 
persistence of “an illusion that is natural, and that will last as long as the human mind!”113 
 
Concrete extensity, that is to say, the diversity of sensible qualities, is not within 
space; rather it is space that we thrust into extensity. Space is not a ground on 
which real motion is posited; rather it is real motion that deposits space beneath 
itself. But our imagination, which is preoccupied above all by the convenience of 
expression and the exigencies of material life, prefers to invert the natural order 
of the terms. Accustomed to seek its fulcrum in a world of ready-made 
motionless images, of which the apparent fixity is hardly anything else but the 
outward reflection of our lower needs, it cannot help believing that rest is 
anterior to motion, cannot avoid taking rest as its point of reference and its 
abiding place. Therefore, it comes to see movement as only a variation of 
distance, space being thus supposed to precede motion. Then in a space, which 
is homogeneous and infinitely divisible, we draw, in imagination, a trajectory 
and fix positions afterwards, applying the movement to the trajectory, we see it 
divisible like the line we have drawn, and equally denuded of quality. Can we 
wonder that our understanding, working thence-forward on this idea, which 
represents precisely the reverse of the truth, discovers in it nothing but 
contradictions? 114 
 
Imagining trajectory remains a common aspect of method, even if for the purely pragmatic 
purpose of generating an impetus for action. In this respect, the undoing of trajectory is also 
inherent to method. Within homogeneous reality, when one trajectory is lost another is 
established in a new orientation, and so action proceeds in a rhythm of shifting trajectories. 
From a perspective obtained from deep introspection within heterogeneous reality, this 
might be perceived as a rhythm of emerging and dissolving images, or an image in the 
continuous flow of change.  
                                                   
112 Bergson, Time and free will. op. cit., (p.101).  
113 Bergson, Creative evolution. op. cit., (p.194).  
114 Bergson, Matter and memory. op. cit., (p.217).  
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Figure 26  (10x10cm) 
Questions of Freedom 
Every demand for explanation in regard to freedom comes back, without our 
suspecting it, to the following question: “Can time be adequately represented 
by space?” To which we answer: Yes, if you are dealing with time flown; No, if 
you speak of time flowing. Now the free act takes place in time which is 
flowing and not in time which has already flown. Freedom is therefore a fact, 
and among the facts which we observe there is none clearer. All the difficulties 
of the problem, and the problem itself, arise from the desire to endow duration 
with the same attributes as extensity, to interpret a succession by a 
simultaneity, and to express the idea of freedom in a language into which it is 
obviously untranslatable.115 
 
The issue that is central to the disjunction between homogeneous and heterogeneous reality 
is that of freedom. Whereas space is privileged in homogenous reality—a realm of scientific 
investigations—duration is privileged in heterogeneous reality—a realm of “inner 
phenomena in their developing,” that is “in so far as they make up, by their 
interpenetration, the continuous evolution of a free person.”116 Bergson points out that it is 
because of the conflation of space with time that homogeneous reality has been led to deny 
freedom, while heterogeneous reality has been led to define freedom, and “thereby, 
involuntarily, to deny it too.”117  
 
They ask in fact whether the act could or could not be foreseen, the whole of the 
conditions being given; and whether they assert or deny it, they admit that this 
totality of conditions could be conceived as given in advance: which amounts, as 
we have shown, to treating duration as a homogeneous thing and intensities as 
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magnitudes. They will either say that the act is determined by its conditions, 
without perceiving that they are playing on the double sense of the word 
causality, and that they are giving to duration at the same time two forms, 
which are mutually exclusive. Or else they appeal to the principle of the 
conservation of energy, without asking whether this principle is equally 
applicable to the moments of the external world, which are equivalent to one 
another, and to the moments of a living and conscious being, which acquire a 
richer and richer content. In whatever way, in a word, freedom is viewed, it 
cannot be denied except on the condition of identifying time with space; it 
cannot be defined except on condition of demanding that space should 
adequately represent time; it cannot be argued about in one sense or the other 
except on condition of previously confusing succession and simultaneity. All 
determinism will thus be refuted by experience, but every attempt to define 
freedom will open the way to determinism.118 
 
For the most part, we are unconscious of our inner states when living freely in duration. As 
Bergson suggests, it is only in rare moments that we grasp ourselves by living our own 
becoming in this way. For this reason he says, “we are rarely free.”119 We only reach the 
psychic states that constitute duration “by deep introspection, which leads us to grasp our 
inner states as living things, constantly becoming, as states not amenable to measure, which 
permeate one another and of which the succession in duration has nothing in common with 
juxtaposition in homogeneous space.”120 To return to Bergson’s nothing that takes time and 
which is everything in the work of art, the question of freedom and the working of art (how 
it is free to do its work) are here intimately linked. The external image whose perception is 
the affective action of and on a body, of a grasping of this body’s own living-becoming, is 
this working of art, without distinguishing for a moment an ‘objective’ measure that would 
constitute a difference between the artist producing and the spectator receiving that ‘work’. 
 
If such deep introspection can give access to the immediacy of living, it is in Bergson’s 
method of intuition that an explanation is given for how that immediate action might avoid 
us having to live outside ourselves: “hardly perceiving anything of ourselves but our own 
ghost, a colourless shadow which pure duration projects into homogeneous space.”121   
 
Not only, by its memory of former experience, does this consciousness retain the 
past better and better, so as to organize it with the present in a newer and richer 
decision; but, living with an intenser life, contracting, by its memory of the 
immediate experience, a growing number of external moments in its present 
duration, it becomes more capable of creating acts of which the inner 
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indetermination, spread over as large a multiplicity of the moments of matter as 
you please, will pass the more easily through the meshes of necessity. Thus, 
whether we consider it in time or in space, freedom always seems to have its 
roots deep in necessity and to be intimately organized with it. Spirit borrows 
from matter the perceptions on which it feeds, and restores them to matter in 
the form of movements, which it has stamped with its own freedom.122  
 
This account of freedom presented by Bergson, a freedom passing through “the meshes of 
necessity” runs against-the-grain of a thinking of freedom as caprice, as indeterminacy, as 
antinomy to necessity. It also asks us to consider carefully how emergence itself is to be 
thought in terms of determinacy and creation. It also casts a consideration on how we have 
come to think of science and art, their relations and, generally, what is thought of as their 
antithetical relations with respect to freedom, determination and truth. In concluding this 
chapter, I will focus particularly on a question of emergence as that question opens a 
consideration of art and science constituted in Bergson’s thinking, as well as in some 
developments by Deleuze and Guattari concerning the plane of immanence.   
 
 
Figure 27  (11x13cm) 
A Theory of Emergence  
The concept of emergence, in its broad application, recognises that the whole is greater 
than the sum of its parts. At each level of complexity in the whole, “new and often 
surprising qualities emerge that cannot, at least in any straightforward manner, be 
attributed to known properties of the constituents.”123  Thus, as an ontological principle, 
emergence is essentially anti-representational in recognising that emergent new qualities 
cannot be directly attributed to the conditions from which they emerge. In reverse 
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perspective, emergence is associated with an anti-reductionist principle that the emergent 
quality cannot be applied to its parts (or to the various conditions from which it emerged.124 
Emergence therefore precludes analysis—in the strict sense of that term—of the quality that 
has emerged holistically, and so is irreducible. It also precludes causality, and while analysis 
may be fruitful in providing a retrograde methodology, its reductionist account is neither 
accurate nor complete, especially if emergence is within an open system such as an evolving 
universe.  
 
Emergence may be weak or strong, epistemological or ontological, according to how it is 
perceived. In weak or epistemological emergence, the emergent quality is perceived as 
reducible to, or determined by, the intrinsic properties of, for example, a work of art, even 
though that quality is difficult to explain, predict, or derive on the basis of what can be 
observed. Epistemologically emergent qualities are then considered to be “novel only at the 
level of description.”125 By contrast, for strong or ontological emergence, the emergent 
quality cannot be reduced to, nor determined by, constitutive elements. Causation then 
becomes immaterial in relation to the ontologically emergent quality, which cannot, even in 
theory, be deduced from knowledge of the conditions from which it emerged.126  
 
Emergence, in its ‘weak’ or epistemological form, was embraced by the British school of 
philosophy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, particularly by the biological 
sciences.127 The then popular notion of an internal mystical vitalism, driving emergence, was 
externalised by Bergson as élan vital, the impetus driving all life, and which is the basis of 
creative impetus of evolution, and of duration. This Bergsonian conception provides the 
foundation for the concept of emergence as it now underpins a post-conceptual 
revitalisation of painting, as we see it today.  
 
                                                   
124 Ibid. [Davies cites John Stuart Mill on the phenomena of life, in A systen of Logic, bk.III, ch.6, §1.} 
125 Ibid.  (p.8). [Clayton cites Silberstein and McGreever, (1999). The search for ontological emergence. 
The philosophical quarterly. 49, 145 (April), 201-214. DOI: 10.1111/1467-9213.00136 ]  
126 Ibid.  In Conceptual foundations of emergence theory (p.5), Clayton describes how precursors to the concept of 
emergence can be traced to Aristotle’s principle of entelechy, which he posited as “a principle of growth 
within organisms that was responsible for the qualities or form that would later emerge.” In this context 
the organism emerged from its (pre-ordained) potential state into its actual state. Clayton indicates 
another precursor in Plotinus doctrine of emanation (3rd century CE) that was developed by neo-Platonists 
as a simultaneous “downward movement of differentiation and causality, and an upward movement of 
increasing perfection, diminishing distance from the Source, and (in principle) a final mystical 
reunification with the One.” Emanation allowed for a gradual process of becoming, and Hegel’s 
philosophy of universal becoming offered a temporalised ontology that prefigures a theory of emergence. 
127 Ibid. (p.x). 
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Figure 28  (10x12cm)  
Art & Science 
Science operates, predominantly, in the homogeneous medium that allows for 
measurement, in terms of quantitatively identical units in space. Time, then, is conceived in 
similar spatial terms, as movement between successive units. This is a matter of convenience 
for science, because it allows all the successive states of the world to be spread out 
simultaneously in space, “without his having to change anything in his science or to cease 
talking about time.”128 In truth, there is no ‘succession’ in the homogeneity of spatiality and 
quantifiable time inasmuch as there is no enduring temporalising but solely the simultaneity 
of measurable states, no pastness but only the disconnection of states encounterable strictly 
in their degrees of difference. ‘Movement’ enters somewhat phantasmatically as that which 
accounts for difference between discrete states. All the while, that movement exists, is only 
encounterable in the heterogeneity of qualitative difference—nuance—of a thing’s differing 
in-itself, duration’s double movements between matter and memory. As Bergson points out, 
the physicist is not concerned with the nature of the units, but only with the number of units 
that any physical process fills.129 This culturally dominant mode of thinking about time and 
change, in terms of movement, causes the process of painting to be conceived as a method 
of production, one that moves systematically towards its objective, like a design process, or a 
science project. However, when the objective is to encounter the new, this mode is not 
instrumental. In this respect, art and science struggle with the same problem of invention.  
 
The persisting stereotype is of an opposition between the indeterminacy of art and the 
determinist agendas of science. However, this does not acknowledge the determinist 
leanings (yearnings) of Modernism, or an artist’s yearning for a systematic method with 
evaluative criteria. It also does not recognise how science acknowledges that its territory is 
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129 Ibid.  
CHAPTER ONE—Movement Image Time… 
   
 
 44 
limited to matters that are testable, and how its methods are limited by multiple and 
unknown contingencies and the need to control (fix) variables. The stereotype also discounts 
those interests and practices held in common: speculation, exploration, concern with the 
invisible and the unpresentable, and with the relationship between order and chaos 
(whether conceived in terms of aesthetics, or predictable rhythms). Just as biology can be 
permeated by religiosity in an often-prevalent assumption that evolution progresses towards 
an ideal, so art can be permeated by a similar teleology in its conception of future 
destinations.130  
 
As a way around this problem of teleological method, the concept of emergence brings the 
focus back to the immediate moment of unfolding, into the continuous crisis of decision-
making and movement in the almost-already changing present. As a concept that has been 
applied to both science and art, emergence occupies an intermediary position between 
mystical thinking about internal vitalism where art becomes a mode of fulfilling the essence 
of life, and a conception of the organism as a complex machine whose novel behaviours are 
determined by (and could be explained in terms of) universal physical laws.131 When 
Bergson talks of creative evolution in the context of both science (life) and art, he connects 
the two disciplines through his philosophy. As he describes the emergence of form in a work 
of art, so he relates it to an equivalent emergence in the natural world: 
 
The sprouting and flowering of this form are stretched out on an unshrinkable 
duration, which is one with their essence. So of the works of nature. Their novelty 
arises from an internal impetus which is progress or succession, which confers on 
succession a peculiar virtue or which owes to succession the whole of its virtue — 
which, at any rate, makes succession or continuity of interpenetration in time, irreducible 
to a mere instantaneous juxtaposition in space. This is why the idea of reading in a 
present state of the material universe the future of living forms, and of unfolding 
now their history yet to come, involves a veritable absurdity. But this absurdity is 
difficult to bring out, because our memory is accustomed to place alongside of each 
other, in an ideal space, the terms it perceives in turn, because it always represents 
past succession in the form of juxtaposition. It is able to do so, indeed, just because 
the past belongs to that which has already been invented, to the dead, and no 
longer to creation and to life. Then as the succession to come will end by being a 
succession past, we persuade ourselves that the duration to come admits of the 
same treatment as past duration, that it is, even now, unrollable, that the future is 
                                                   
130 Gould, Wonderful life: The Burgess shale and the nature of history. op. cit., (pp27-52).  
131 In The re-emergence of emergence (p.x) Clayton describes how, with or without a teleological or mystical 
aspect, emergence was embraced in its weak or epistemological form, by the British school of philosophy 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It was adopted at that time by many biologists, who 
generally conceived evolution as a trend towards monistic unity, rather than emerging (differentiating) out 
of the unity. On emergence in art also see Henry, M. (2009). Seeing the invisible: On Kandinsky (S. Davidson, 
Trans.) (pp.123;124). London, England: Continuum Press. 
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there, rolled up, already painted on the canvas. An illusion, no doubt, but an 
illusion that is natural, ineradicable, and that will last as long as the human mind!132   
 
It is this illusion that causes difficulty when attempting to account for how painting 
proceeds, for how it happens. The problem is that the homogenous medium of space does 
not translate into the heterogeneity of duration, and the attempt to negotiate between them 
confuses matters further.  
 
 
Figure 29*  (10x12cm) 
Plane of Composition 
The three planes, along with their elements, are irreducible: plane of immanence of 
philosophy, plane of composition of art, plane of reference or coordination of science; form of concept, 
force of sensation, function of knowledge; concepts and the conceptual personae, sensations and 
aesthetic figures, figures and partial observers. 133 
 
In What is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari develop a thinking of intrinsic or fundamental 
relations between philosophy, science and art. Certainly each has its specific methods, 
objects and subjects, though the question they pose, radically, is how these three planes fold, 
or construe a juncture. What, though, is a ‘plane’? Deleuze and Guattari suggest a plane is 
what we throw over chaos, how we put a frame over chaos for the sake of order: “Art, 
science and philosophy … cast planes over chaos.”134 They suggest that art forms 
“composed chaos …chaoid sensation as variety,” while science coordinates chaos, forming a 
“referenced chaos that becomes Nature.”135 Philosophy, through the inventing of concepts, 
constitutes a plane of consistency, struggling with chaos “as undifferentiated abyss or ocean 
                                                   
132 Bergson, Matter and Memory. op. cit. (p.194).   
133 Deleuze & Guattari, What is philosophy? op.cit., (p.216).  
134 Ibid. (p.202). 
135 Ibid. (p.206). 
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of dissemblance.”136 Concepts render chaos consistent.137 Creation is a crosscutting 
movement, the emergence of variables on a plane (aesthetic, scientific, conceptual) that 
“crosscut chaotic variability.”138 How do we best discern the difference between 
philosophy’s plane of consistency of concepts and science’s plane of reference of functions? 
Do they not meet or converge as the grounding of knowledge? Don’t science and 
philosophy have the same truth? Deleuze and Guattari suggest: 
 
The first difference between philosophy and science lies in their respective 
propositions of the concept and the function: in one a plane of immanence or 
consistency, in the other a plane of reference. The plane of reference is both one 
and multiple, but in a different way to the plane of immanence. The second 
difference concerns the concept and the function more directly: the inseparability of 
variations is the distinctive characteristic of the unconditioned concept, while 
independence of variables, in relations that can be conditioned, is essential to 
function. 139 
 
With functions, degrees of variation are conditioned, which is to say, what is discerned as 
chaoid variation is expressed as regularity or relation. With respect to the invention of 
concepts, their inventing is unconditional in the sense that concepts are not the outcome of 
discerning an underlying order of reason, but rather emerge from out of chaotic variability. 
What is inseparable in thinking’s variations or variability is the concept. Thus Deleuze and 
Guattari amplify the difference between philosophy’s consistency of concepts and science’s 
relations of function precisely in terms of concept’s emergence in inseparable variations 
“subject to ‘a contingent reason’,” and “a set of independent variables subject to ‘a 
necessary reason’,” determining functions.140 From this perspective, philosophy and science 
are not so much convergent, but divergent: “It could be said that science and philosophy 
take opposed paths” in that concepts consist in events, while functions reference states of 
affairs.141 In this diversion we already recognise the thinking of Bergson, in discerning the 
temporalising of the event of ‘thinking’, what Deleuze elsewhere calls a sense-event (The logic 
of sense), and the essential homogeneity of functions’ states-of-affair. But what of sensation 
and the plane of composition, how do Deleuze and Guattari figure the work of art in this 
schema of divergence?142 If concepts are unconditioned though inseparable variations and 
                                                   
136 Ibid. (p.207). 
137 Ibid. (p.208). 
138 Ibid. (p.207). 
139 Ibid. (pp.125, 126).  
140 Ibid. (p.126).  
141 Ibid.  
142 Deleuze, G. (2004). The logic of sense (M. Lester & C. Stivale, Trans.) (pp.21,22). London, England: 
Continuum Press.  Deleuze states that “the event belongs essentially to language” which is “said to be of 
things,” whereas sense “does not exist outside the proposition which expresses it” and “what is expressed 
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function are conditioned though independent variables, what construes the modes of 
assembly of sensation’s compositions? Moreover, if Deleuze and Guattari suggest 
philosophy and science take divergent paths, how do we understand their junction or fold, 
and especially in relation to art? 
 
In the first case sensation is realized in the material and does not exist outside of this 
realization. It could be said that sensation (the compound of sensations) is projected 
onto the well-prepared technical plane of composition, in such a way that the 
aesthetic plane of composition covers it up. The material itself must therefore 
include mechanisms of perspective as a result of which the projected sensation is 
realized not solely by covering up the picture but according to a depth.143 
 
As inferred from this citation, Deleuze and Guattari suggest there are in fact two planes of 
composition, what they term a “technical” plane and what they call an “aesthetic” plane. 
We see they present a conundrum as to how these two planes coincide, whether or not one 
needs to cover over the other for a work of art to exist. One they call a faux plane, the other 
the genuine plane. They suggest: 
 
Composition is aesthetic, and what is not composed is not a work of art. However, 
technical composition, the work of the material that often calls on science 
(mathematics, physics, chemistry, anatomy) is not to be confused with aesthetic 
composition, which is the work of sensation. Only the latter fully deserves the name 
composition and a work of art is never produced by or for the sake of technique.144 
 
The milieu of the work of art inveighs all manner of considerations of this faux plane of 
technical composition. No work exists without its materiality so composed and considered, 
just as this milieu of art implicates a plane of consistency, the inventing of concepts 
accounting for a logic of sense, production of signs, a realm of competing discourses and 
meanings. Equally, this milieu of the work of art complicates a plane of relations, a chaoid 
of functions whose trajectory is to discern a state-of-affairs with respect to the knowledge of 
art. But none of these constitute what essentially is the composing of sensations. What, then, 
are sensations such that they enter into what Deleuze and Guattari call a “bloc”? In a sense, 
this is the core of Bergson’s thinking. Deleuze and Guattari emphasise an understanding of 
sensation in terms of affection, how a self is affected by and in turn affects a being. We think 
here of Bergson’s perception/affection, where perception is action on oneself and on other 
                                                                                                                                                     
has no resemblance whatsoever to the expression.” Sense, then, is “both the expressible or the expressed of the 
proposition and the state of affairs. It turns one side towards things, and one side toward propositions …It is 
exactly the boundary between propositions and things.” Sense is an ‘event’ “on the condition that the event is 
not confused with its spatio-temporal realization in a state of affairs.” 
143 Ibid. (p.193). 
144 Ibid. (pp.191,192).  
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beings. Crucially, Deleuze and Guattari emphasise a difference between perception and 
percepts, and affection and affects. Percepts and affects construe an a-personal encounter. 
They are not reducible to a self’s lived experience or emotional states. In this sense of the a-
personal, a work of art “stands up” as a being not reducible to an author-origin, or to a 
finalised meaning, but ex-ists solely as a bloc of sensations. 145  Art is not so much what artists 
do, but what a being is when encountered on a plane of composition, where this being 
coincides with our becoming-impersonal.  
 
Provisionally Deleuze and Guattari will discuss art as if there are these two planes of 
composition and a question of a depth that must be negotiated between them. They present 
two scenarios, one where technical concerns abound and the other where sensation’s 
composing abounds: “Take two states of oil painting that can be opposed to each other 
…”146 In the first it is a technical question of preparing the work with considered planning, 
sketching out contours in preparation for the application of colour. In the second, colour is 
directly applied, colour becoming the “architecture” of the work. Deleuze and Guattari 
discuss the “thickness” or “depth” that results in each approach, how aesthetic composition 
covers over technical requirements in the first case and how in the second depth itself is a 
pure dimension of aesthetic composition. This is not a distinction between representational 
and non-representational art: “[N]o art and no sensation have ever been 
representational.”147 
 
They suggest that modern painting turns towards this second pole. In the first case “sensation 
is realized in the material,” which is to say, in Bergson’s terms, duration or that peculiar double 
movement of tension, relaxes or congeals into matter.148 Sensation, that affective action on 
the image-event of one’s body-image, affects the external image in its congealing. Sensation 
is in this sense becoming-matter. With the second pole, “material passes into sensation.”149 They 
suggest that this technical plane “ascends” into the aesthetic plane of composition, and 
deride those who insist that modern painting is composed in flatness. What they in fact 
emphasise is this dimension of depth. This is a thickness “independent to any perspective or 
depth.”150 For Deleuze and Guattari, one needs to consider a history of art from the vantage 
point of the divergences, borrowings, crossovers and crosscurrents of these two poles that 
                                                   
145  In What is Philosophy? (p.164) Deleuze and Guattari note: “The artist creates blocs of percepts and 
affects, but the only law of creation is that the compound must stand up on its own. The artist’s greatest 
difficulty is to make it stand up on its own.” 
146 Ibid. (p.192). 
147 Ibid. (p.193).  
148 Ibid.  
149 Ibid.  
150 Ibid. (p.194). 
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may well be encountered in Bergsonian terms: in one case the congealing of duration’s 
substance in matter and in the other the counter-movement of contracting of duration’s 
substance in memory. It is neither memory nor matter that is the genuine stake of a plane of 
composition, but rather a bloc of sensations that is composed from out of materials that pass 
into sensation.  
 
In this chapter, I have introduced some key aspects of the philosophical work of Bergson, 
especially derived from his key writings, Matter and Memory, Creative Evolution, and Time and 
Free Will. My aim has been to develop a working knowledge of some crucial notions or 
concepts of Bergsonian philosophy, in concert with some of the work of Deleuze and 
Guattari, that most certainly has been affected by Bergson’s thinking. In concluding this 
chapter, I have introduced how Deleuze and Guattari engage with the distinct notions of 
philosophy, science, and art, notions that equally engaged Bergson in his own work. 
Deleuze and Guattari suggest that the work of art is concerned solely with a composing of 
forces of sensation and suggest that the history of art’s producing may well be engaged in 
considering two poles by which sensation and matter can be considered: sensations realised 
in matter and matter passing into sensation. It is the latter that they suggest predominates in 
modern painting. In the following chapter, my aim is to introduce and discuss a range of 
understandings of how in Modernism the new, or emergence, has been problematised and 
discussed. In short, Chapter Two deals with the field of the Avant-Gardes. My aim in this 
discussion is to bring the concerns of key critics and theorists back to my particular 
understandings of Bergson and Deleuze. I conclude Chapter Two with an introduction to 
my own painting practice in relation to the preceding discussion. In Chapter Three I discuss 
my painting exhibition and particular works from it in detail, along with a discussion of 
other key practitioners who appear germane to my practice.  
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Introduction: The Eternal & The Fleeting 
This chapter aims at discussing key concerns in the critical discourse of art theory 
concerning questions of change, the new and evolution. Here I discuss how, in the context of 
Bergson’s conception of time as duration, the ideology espoused by Modernism and its Avant-
Gardes is revealed by Peter Bürger (among others) to embody the same confusion of the 
temporal and the spatial that was causing problems for my own painting. I discuss Bergson’s 
relegation of the possible to the lifeless past, and Deleuze’s refusal of ‘the possible’ as having 
any concern with the new, with emergence, with evolution and with life, as images never 
produce new images. While the avant-garde results from a fundamental break from classical 
mimesis in search of the eternal and the new, Boris Groys describes the paradox-object of 
modern art as constraining the apparent pluralism of possibilities available for contemporary art 
by insisting on a radical self-contradiction. Selected movements within Modernism are discussed 
as precursors to the concepts of provisionality and of emergence, as these embrace the fleeting 
and the eternal in reaction to the paradoxical legacy of Modernism’s constraint.  
 
 
 Figure 31  (9x12cm) 
Radicality of the Absolutely New 
The concept of avant-garde in critical theory comes out of the transformative and 
emancipatory project of the Frankfurt School of Western European philosophy and 
sociology. The challenge to determinism, that is found in Bergsonian duration and its vital 
impetus, is prefigured in the vital power that Nietzsche finds in the capacity of art’s aesthetic 
to effect self-rejuvenation, self-transmutation, and self-transfiguration—and so critique 
social forces. The epistemic basis is shifted from collective truths established in the past, 
towards individual experience—so that critical theory attempts to elude convention or 
dogma—becoming closer to actual life, and avoiding location in either materialism or 
idealism, or becoming confined by its own ideology. Ironically, the critique of ideology 
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inherent to the concept of avant-gardism, has resulted in ideology that permeated from the 
tenets of modernism up to the (global) institution of ‘contemporary art practice’—still 
dedicated to production of the new, even if no longer to progress. Whereas the avant-garde 
is closely associated with historical modernism and its post-modernisms, in a retrograde 
trajectory an awareness from the eighteenth century onwards of how linguistic conventions 
are rooted in socio-political conditions suggests that avant-garde notions permeate the 
historical narrative of art movements reaching back through aestheticism, to symbolism, to 
romanticism. For example, romanticism embraced a “cult of novelty and strangeness” 
before it came to typify the avant-garde that, premised on the critical dichotomy between 
conventionality and originality, explored experimental form as a means to dislodge clichéd 
language and convention.1 Bürger describes how an “apartness from the praxis of life” that 
always constituted the institutional status of art in bourgeois society, then becomes the content 
of the works in avant-gardism.2 The historical avant-garde movements highlight the 
significance that art as an institution has on the reception of individual works, when the social 
effect of a work is determined by the institution within which the work functions, so that it 
cannot be evaluated just by considering the work itself.3  As a legacy of the avant-garde, the 
social conditions within which a work of art is constituted then become a significant aspect 
of the work.  
 
Within twentieth century Modernism, vanguardist discourse around the concept of 
originality is interpreted by Rosalind Krauss as more than simply rejection or dissolution of 
the past (revolt against tradition), but as a “literal origin, a beginning from ground zero, a 
birth.”4 Krauss identifies the self, with its actual and symbolic capacity to continually differ 
from itself, as an origin that has the “potential for continual acts of regeneration, as a 
perpetuation of self-birth.”5 The claim of the avant-garde is then precisely this claim to 
originality—that an absolute distinction can be made between “a present experienced de 
novo and a tradition-laden past.”6 Originality is then a “working assumption” that “itself 
emerges from a ground of repetition and recurrence”, leaving open the question of how new 
                                                   
1 Bürger, P. (1984). Theory of the Avant-Garde (M. Shaw, Trans., Vol. 4) (p.x). Minneapolis, MN. University 
of Minnesota Press. Here Bürger describes how Renato Poggioli draws a parallel between 
commercialisation and degeneration language in the marketplace, and avant-garde scepticism of 
language—indicating causes for the avant-garde in socio-political tensions of bourgeois, capitalistic, and 
technological origin. 
2 Ibid. (p.27). 
3 Ibid. (p.90). 
4 Krauss, R. (1985). The originality of the Avant-Garde and other Modernist myths (p.156). Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press.	  
5 Ibid.(p.157). Krauss cites the Futurists’ promise to destroy museums, and Marinetti’s claim to symbolic 
rebirth after a motoring accident. 
6 Ibid. 
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qualities might be conceived in temporal terms, but also in terms of developing a project of 
avant-gardism. 
 
From what he calls “the failure of avant-gardiste intentions” Bürger deduces that post 
avant-gardist art is also post-romantic, where hierarchy between style and form has 
dissolved so that neither can claim to be more advanced. Before the historical avant-garde, a 
developing autonomy of the aesthetic had already been pre-figured in Hegel’s proposition 
that “what should enchant us, is not the subject of the painting and its lifelikeness, but the 
pure appearance which is wholly without the sort of interest that the subject has.”7 The 
opposition between inwardness and external reality that was in romantic art, is already 
transforming into a concern with aesthetic phenomena, and with how art’s reception and 
representation is framed by phenomenological approaches to perception. It is in this context 
that the question of the new now presents itself—how the new emerges between production, 
creation, and perception. The focus now shifts from the manifestation of the new in the 
production of art within its institutional/historical framework, to consider the underlying 
temporality, and the question of how the present, past, and future relate—a question that is 
central if latent in the avant-garde, but central to the process of perception.  
 
In distinguishing between presentational immediacy (perception) and causal efficacy 
(symbolism) in the work of art, Alfred North Whitehead suggests that artists deal with the 
former—with direct experience which is infallible because it is what is experienced. By 
contrast, symbolism is fallible because the actions, feelings, emotions, and beliefs that are 
induced by symbols, amount to mere notions about things—without “that exemplification 
in the world which the symbolism leads us to presuppose.”8 Theorist Donald Kuspit 
questions an implication that, because artists do not use direct sense experience to symbolic 
purpose, the presentational immediacy of their experience is therefore not subjected to “the 
correction of reason.”9 While Whitehead’s elevation of art above symbolism aims to clear it 
of the past, Kuspit points out that this implies that perception is limited to aesthetic 
response—to “enjoying sense presentations aesthetically.”10 He describes Whitehead’s 
double idealizing of the artist, whose special sensibility is then profoundly realistic, as being 
absurd in its “absolutizing one aspect of art and suggesting a blindspot”, while noting that 
this is a standard modernist belief about art.11   
 
                                                   
7 Bürger, Theory of the Avant-Garde. op.cit., (p.93). 
8 As cited in Kuspit, D. (1993). The cult of the avant-garde artist (p.4). Cambridge, England: Cambridge 
University Press. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid.  
11 Ibid. (p5). 
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In sum, the myth of the avant-garde artist involves the belief that he is initiated 
in to the mysteries of the primordial experience. He is able to display the 
sensuous density of being with a primordial sensuousness equal to its own, to 
produce works of art as enigmatically dense as being itself. His art is an 
amazing act of primordial mimesis, in which he unlearns or suspends ordinary 
symbolizations of experience – one might say the inhibitory symbolizations of 
experience that make it ordinary – in order to display its primordial givenness. 
The intensification of color and shape that art seems to effect – the unusual 
presence it gives them – bespeaks its power to present them with primordial 
immediacy. Presentation is all, representation nothing in authentic art.12 
 
Such unlearning of symbolization prefigures Deleuze’s concept of the diagram as a clearing 
of givens and cliché. However, reiteration of the past that is inherent to the primordial 
mimesis and givenness, belies presentational immediacy or newness. Nevertheless, it is as if 
Kuspit invokes both Bergsonian duration and the Deleuzian time–image when he states: 
“the primordial immediacy of the sense presentation suggests that it is in the perpetual 
process of self-formation, and as such is always new. At the same time it seems the totality of 
experience.”13  It is through Bergson that we obtain clarification of how the past and present 
relate to perception, and to the future that is the new. 
 
Publication of Bergson’s philosophy of time, perception, and creative evolution follows in 
the wake of debate on Darwinian evolution, and a resurgence in vitalist thinking that drew 
on Aristotle’s conception of life’s endurance in the flux of the world, either interpreted 
through anti-materialist filters of mystical romanticism, or through the filter of mechanistic 
(scientific) materialism. Bergson’s temporality, contemporaneous with Einstein’s publication 
on relativistic time, appears within a socio-historical context of prevailingly negative 
perceptions of the present, whereas the future was perceived as promising, or containing, 
hope for change—with science and technological developments, at that time, providing a 
basis for hope. Instead of the mechanistic evolutionary philosophy of Herbert Spencer’s 
determinism, Bergson proposes a continuous creative process, as the basis of evolutionary 
indeterminism, driven by a constant vital impetus—élan vital.14 Whereas Spencer immobilises 
time, for Bergson time is duration—with continual emergence of the new immanent to 
duration, as a continuous actualising of the future. This flow of the absolutely new, as it irrupts 
continuously, then constitutes a critique of Kantian causality that denies the possibility of 
                                                   
12 Ibid. (p.5). 
13 Ibid. (p.6). 
14 For Spencer evolution follows a process of adaptation from the simple to the complex according to a 
universal law as a “continuous disclosure of the order of the universe.” [Guerlac, S. (2006). Thinking in time: 
An introduction to Henri Bergson (p 26). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.] 
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absolute knowledge.15 In extension of this critique, Bergson disputes all ‘mechanical’ 
philosophies based in what he describes as a confusing of the homogeneous with the 
heterogeneous—confusing space with time. Here Bergson sets himself apart from neo-
Kantian epistemology, including positivism. While Heidegger argues that Bergson’s 
rejection of analyses that divide things quantitatively merely reverses Aristotle’s numerical 
definition of time, Bergson eludes this attachment to Platonism because memory, for 
Bergson, is ontological—giving a new sense of being in terms of the past rather than the 
present, or the unconscious instead of the conscious.16  His critique of extension as a concept 
within the Eleatic philosophical tradition, comes from the emphasis he places on the 
absolutely new, so that “the whole is not given.”17  
 
When Bergson citicizes the Eleatic tradition, he in effect criticizes the entire logic 
of the same and the other. He does this in what we could call a ‘philosophy of 
language’. Through the concept of the dynamic schema, Bergson furnishes us 
with a new concept of sense (a new concept of the concept) in which there is no 
alterity, but, instead of representation, there is alteration, variation, movement, 
and therefore, life.18 
 
This emphasis on fluidity (continuum) of movement and change is the basis from which 
Bergson refers to an advance “against the mechanical philosophers” that came with 
Berkeley’s assertion that the secondary qualities of matter (as we perceive it) were as 
important as the primary qualities (as it exists in itself).19 When Bergson defines matter as an 
aggregate of images, he returns to the situation before idealism and realism brought about 
dissociation between matter’s existence and its appearance. That is, he returns to process 
before signification or coding.20  For Bergson, the ‘image’ that is matter, exists as “more 
than what an idealist calls representation, but less than that which the realist calls a thing.”21 
 
For Bergson, phenomenological realism does not satisfactorily address the question of how 
the new is created. In phenomenology perception is prioritized over memory—so that “to 
perceive is not to remember”, and “there is no call from the present to memory without the 
‘immanent sense’ that perception makes available”.22 From Bergson’s position between 
idealism and realism, consciousness refers to matter so that his primacy of memory is not a 
                                                   
15 Ibid. (p 21). Guerlac writes: “Kant’s critique of dogmatic metaphysics (which aspired to knowledge of 
the absolute) legitimized the relative knowledge of appearances that, according to the critical philosopher, 
is framed transcendentally through the a priori conditions of space and time.”  
16 Lawlor. The challenge of Bergsonism. op.cit., (p.x). 
17 Ibid.  
18 Ibid. 
19 Bergson, Matter & memory. op.cit., (p.10). 
20 Ibid. (p.10). See also Guerlac, Thinking in time. op.cit., (p.4). 
21 Bergson, Matter & memory. op.cit., (p.9). 
22 Lawlor, The challenge of Bergsonism. op.cit., (p.ix). 
CHAPTER TWO—Movement & Emergence … 
   
 
 56 
primacy of perception—not a phenomenology of perception.23 For Bergson, perception is a 
process that engages in an archaeology and genealogy of originary experience.24  
 
The ontology of becoming that is Bergsonian duration provides the foundation for Deleuze 
and Guattari’s becomings or bringing-forths, in their own philosophy of immanence. Their 
aim is to deregulate thought in order to “unleash it from the referential rudiments of 
traditional philosophy (i.e. contrariety, similitude, identity, analogy)”—the classical image of 
regulated thought being, for them, a “profound betrayal of what it means to think.”25 For 
Deleuze, every ‘truth’ is “solely the creation of thought” — “the relationship of thought to 
truth in the ambiguities of infinite movement has never been a simple, let alone constant, 
matter.”26  The problem presented by the notion of truth, is that it founds a “vast moral 
system that hijacks thinking”, and overtakes creation.27  In this sense, Deleuze suggests, 
“time has always put the notion of truth into crisis”, and as a critique of idealism in order to 
give room for creative emergence, their notion of being (living) as becoming accommodates 
reality as the field of action in which a lived body is immersed, and which is always to be 
greater than the sum of its parts.28 
 
Deleuze notes a philosophical reversal in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason when he defines time 
as an a priori form of intuition—no longer the ground against which change was gauged as 
succession, but “the form of everything that changes or moves”, so that succession, 
simultaneity, and duration become modes of time.29 In order to mitigate Kant’s unhinging of 
time from space, Deleuze draws on Bergson to frame the movement-image and conceive 
the time-image in terms of virtual and actual movements. From Bergson’s concept of 
virtuality in perception, Deleuze provides a ‘model’ for interaction between the distinct, yet 
inseparable, virtual and actual—as a time-image that is the source of continual production 
of the new. His method of intuition, developed from Bergson, then brings the past and the 
present together in perception as immediate knowledge, that then informs decision-
making—bringing the philosophical framing of perception to bear on the praxis of art.  
 
Whereas the radically different and transgressive quality of the avant-garde work of art is 
conceived chronologically as a rupture with past convention, for Deleuze and Guattari there 
                                                   
23 Ibid. (p.1). 	  
24 Ibid. (p.xi). 
25 Flaxman, G. (Ed.). (2000). The brain is the screen: Deleuze and the philosophy of cinema ( p.3). Minneapolis, 
MN: University of Minnesota Press. See also: Patton, P. (Ed.). (1996). Deleuze: A critical reader (p.7). Oxford, 
England: Blackwell.	  
26 Deleuze & Guattari, What is philosophy? op.cit., (p.54).	   
27 Flaxman, The brain is the screen. op.cit., (p.3). 
28 Deleuze, Cinema 2. op.cit., (p.126). 
29 Flaxman, The brain is the screen. op.cit., (p.4). 
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is neither chronology nor rupture. For them, the ‘contemporary’ is an ontological term 
marking “the emergence of something new as the construction and expression of being in 
becoming.”30 In such emergence the present ‘is’ constitutes a pragmatic start for 
‘becoming’—in a way that is not hierarchically privileged, and so differs from the 
constitutive realities of the present tense given by Hegel or Heidegger. In Hegel’s Idealism 
no outside logics or perspectives are needed to explain any given phenomenon, with the 
problem of how to reconcile a Totality that encompasses change, movement, and progress 
as integral to any concept. In Hegel’s dialectical formulation of Universality there is always 
already a self-satisfying and teleological synthesis of thesis plus antithesis—‘all that there is’, 
plus ‘all that there is not’—synthesised into a totality.31 The becoming of itself (as True or 
whole) is here “nothing other than the essence consummating itself through its 
development.”32 For Heidegger, there is a repeatedly presenting or “bringing forth’ of the 
relations of being (entity)-to-Being (Da-Sein), so that our ability to grasp the ‘out There’ (Da) 
is in the technë that belongs to the bringing-forth or poiesis.33 In this bringing-forth the present 
is the interaction between identity and difference, and in the aesthetics or rhythms of how 
this happens, so that time enters as the timing of these fleeting rhythms. 
 
For Deleuze and Guattari art and philosophy have thinking in common—but with the 
significant difference that artists do not create concepts; rather, they create “percepts” and 
“affects.”34  The role of art is then to “mobilize the ‘powers of the false’ in order to supersede 
the representational categories that have been “invented, procured, and ultimately 
naturalized for the purpose of judgement.”35 In order to transcend the limits of such 
categories it was necessary for the avant-garde to define the limits by conceiving art as an 
institution, and then turning against both “the distribution apparatus on which the work of 
art depends, and the status of art in bourgeois society as defined by the concept of 
autonomy.”36 In relation to such anti-ideology and the appropriation of iconoclasm as an 
artistic device, Boris Groys describes the artwork as positioning itself as a paradox-object 
that, simultaneously, is an image and a critique of the image. The museum then provides 
both a reference point and a given destination for the making and reception of art—
demonstrating what art can no longer look like, so that the artist’s inner curator can 
                                                   
30 Zepke, S. (2010). Anita Fricek: contemporary painting as institutional critique. In Deleuze and contemporary 
art (p.64). Edinburgh, Scotland: Edinburgh University Press.	  
31 Golding, J. (2010). Fractal philosophy (and the small matter of learning how to listen): attunement as 
the task of art. In S. Zepke & S. O'Sullivan (Eds.), Deleuze and contemporary art (p.135). Edinburgh, Scotland: 
Edinburgh University Press. 
32 As cited by Golding: Ibid. (p.135). 
33 Ibid. (p.145). 
34 Flaxman, The brain is the screen. op.cit., (p.3). 
35 Ibid. (p.4). 
36 Bürger, Theory of the Avant-Garde. op.cit., (p.22).  
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prescribe what is or is not possible before painting starts. The default strategy is then to 
produce difference rather than newness, while it is the museum that produces new 
differences. In this context, avant-garde ideology does not open art to a greater freedom, but 
to a “new taboo.”37 
 
Deleuze argues that each painter recapitulates the history of painting in his or her own way, 
and it is the artist’s inventing of blocs of sensations that frees subjectivity from its existing 
conditions.38 In this respect art’s making of new modalities of subjectivity as a realisation of 
autonomy is tradition as much as it is contemporary. Yet, because art produces sensations in 
an a-temporal genesis that exceeds any pre-given conditions of possibility, it is “forever out 
of time”—in a way that reflects Nietzsche’s concept of the ‘untimely’.39 In this context, the 
avant-garde assumes a contradictory temporality, whereby it immediately refers the a-
temporal genesis, that is the immanent expression of being in becoming, to the 
chronological hierarchies of the art institution and, in particular, to the museum. Deleuze’s 
conception of painting as recapitulation as well as creation, and Jan Verwoert’s notion of 
painting as an unfolding of latent contingency, both follow from Kant’s concept of 
immanent critique as revealing its conditions. They also follow Clement Greenberg’s early 
account of modern painting where, in his conception, painting constitutes an immanent 
critique of its own transcendental conditions—of surface (flatness) and colour—through the 
production of abstract visual sensations.40 Again in conjunction with Kant, Deleuze with his 
emphasis on sensation, Greenberg with his emphasis on opticality, and Verwoert with his 
emphasis on emerging qualities and contingencies, all identify sensation as the realm of the 
aesthetic. However, as Stephen Zepke points out, it is Deleuze’s ‘contemporary’ sensation 
that “expresses art’s ‘real conditions’; the becoming-active forces of ‘Life’.”41 
 
The contemporary in art would therefore emerge, according to Deleuze, as part 
of a tradition of the new, one which was not defined by the traditions of ‘art’, but 
neither was it denied to them. So although it is tempting to see the tradition of the 
new as equating with the avant-garde trajectory, the ‘contemporary’ in art does 
not emerge simply through a critique of the present, or of its history, which both 
retain the ‘before’ as the condition of any conceivable ‘after’…The autonomy of 
art, at least when it is realised, is not a bourgeois institutionalization that must be 
rejected, but a radical alterity introduced into the social body as sensation. This 
sensation affirms a body uncontained by its institutions, a body that evades its 
                                                   
37 Groys, B. (2008). Art power (p.30). Cambridge, MA. MIT Press. 
38 Zepke, Anita Fricek: contemporary painting as institutional critique. op.cit., (p.65). 	  
39 Ibid. (p.63). 
40 Ibid. (p.65). 
41 Ibid.  
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negation in the critical ‘consciousness’ of the avant-garde and institutional 
critique.42 
 
As an examination of such a-historical emergence in contemporary painting practice, 
Verwoert analyses the process of painting while it is happening, and so examines emergence as 
it happens, and as the artist perceives it happening. Here, in the dynamics of action with 
interacting movement-images and time-image, conditions for the artist’s decision-making 
emerge together with the decisions, along with the latent contingencies which form 
conditions for emergence itself. This image-of-emergence, immanent to Bergsonian duration, 
relates closely to the Deleuzian time-image and his blocs of sensation—relegating mimesis, 
representation, to historical (chronological) conceptions of painting, but also sustaining the 
radicality of the concept of avant-garde. This essentially constitutes a critique of the art 
institution, and so becomes an extension of avant-garde politics that were aimed primarily 
at the art institution. As Zepke explains, this was a politics that was art—the avant-garde’s 
critical relation to art was actually a critique of the art institution—a critique that was for the 
avant-garde “a condition of possibility to art being ‘new’.”43 
 
 
   Figure 32  (12x19cm) 
The Paradox-Object of Modern Art  
In Bergson’s conception of duration, the changing intensities of our psychic states, 
qualitative intensities, become translated as extensive quantities that are associated with 
progression, with movement through space.44 In this way, the conception of intensive 
change and of what emerges new in change, becomes associated with movement in space, 
which is the conception of the ‘new’ that predominated in Modernism, and which the Avant-
Garde adopted as its raison d’être. This misconstruing (in relation to Bergson) of how ‘new 
images’ are created in space rather than in duration, leads to emphases on the production of 
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works of art as a process of construction rather than creation. It is the legacy of this 
instrumental conception of how an artist creates ‘new’ works that has proven to be 
methodologically problematic for me as a painter. It is central to this thesis problematic. 
Within Modernism, the role predominantly taken by avant-gardism is one of unfolding an 
extant ideology in new terms: in short, to being radically conservative. The artist works to create 
the new, but only with respect to that quality of newness that remains in the service of 
Modernism’s implicit understanding of progress. The artist is then attempting to follow a 
trajectory towards a future destination, conceived in teleological terms as successive 
improvement towards an optimal (utopian) state.45  In this situation, the new is conceived as 
emerging within constraints that have been imposed by the past. Only change recognised as 
significant within these extant terms can be conceived as valuable, although such 
significance will be established and verified retrospectively. This is the artist’s methodological 
dilemma.  
 
We recognise Modernism’s cultural production of an abundance of artists, but also an 
abundance of art historians, critical or otherwise and so, within Modernism, a plethora of 
possible avant-gardes have emerged, each a contender for historical pre-eminence. The 
Modernisms we have in the history books are the result of a winnowing of possibilities; the 
others possibilities having been thwarted. In the context of multiple proliferating 
possibilities, “inflation” is a more appropriate qualifier for avant-gardism than is the term 
“cutting edge.” Despite its spatial connotations, it relates better to durational change, and to 
current models of an expanding universe in continuous change. In the image of inflation, 
the cutting-edge dissolves, along with the concept of avant-gardism as such.   
 
In his introduction to Bürger’s book on the Avant-Garde, Jochen Schulte-Sasse describes how 
within the plurality of modern art, an “ensemble of concepts” becomes gathered as a 
proposition that “permits one to grasp the field in its contradictoriness.”46  In a conception 
that embraces the contradictions rather than attempting to resolve them, Boris Groys 
describes modern art as “not a pluralistic field but a field strictly structured according to the 
logic of contradiction.”47 Within this field “every thesis is supposed to be confronted with its 
antithesis,” so that “contemporary art has the equality of all images as its telos.”48 Under this 
conception, artists can produce unlimited possibilities, so that contemporary art has no 
                                                   
45  An equivalent utopian teleology persists in representations of biological evolution where change is 
interpreted as adaptive improvement. 
46 Schulte-Sasse, J. (1996).  Introduction: theory of the avant-garde and theory of literature.  
In Bürger, P. (1996). Theory of the avant-garde (M. Shaw, Trans.). Minneapolis, MN: University of 
Minnesota Press. 
47 Groys, Art power. op.cit., (p.2).  
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single mode (or trajectory), but has “an excess of taste, including the pluralistic taste.”49 This 
appearance of unlimited plurality is specious because the work of art is a “paradox-object” 
that is required to invoke a “perfectly paradoxical, self-contradictory reaction,” and whose 
“radical self-contradiction” includes a contradiction to its own commodification.50  
 
The territory of Western modern art is described by Groys as “organized around the lack 
of, or rather, the rejection of any aesthetic judgement.”51 He attributes art’s autonomy to 
this absence, the abolishing of “every such hierarchy and establishing the regime of equal 
aesthetic rights for all artworks.”52 In this respect, the historical categories that constitute the 
genealogy of contemporary art are an “heteronomous intrusion into the autonomous sphere 
of art—as the effect of pressure exerted by external forces and powers.”53 The avant-garde’s 
own intrusion into the autonomy of art attempts to preclude or erase other intrusions by 
nullifying aesthetic judgement as a criterion. Through this means, the historical or classical 
avant-garde has “opened up the infinite horizontal field of all possible pictorial forms” so that 
there has been an “equalizing of art practices.”54 This is not to say that contemporary artists 
experience equal inclusiveness, even within their own critical perspectives applied both 
outwardly and turned inwardly. The critical marketplace and history both rely on exclusive 
commodification. 
 
 
Figure 33  (10x12cm) 
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51 Ibid. (p.13). 
52 Ibid. (pp.13,14). 
53 Ibid. (p.14). 
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Ambivalence Towards The Possible  
In the 1970s Bürger acknowledges the problematic teleology associated with a vanguard, by 
attempting to frame a theory of art around the notion of an avant-garde in a way that can 
“avoid the burden of an anterior decision” about the value of an art work.55 Within the 
broad context of cultural development, he emphasises the avant-garde’s break with art as an 
institution, and identifies a key question as being one “regarding the preconditions of 
cognition that are embedded in social development,” that is, how the possibilities for 
thinking about art are constrained by how trajectories of thinking have developed from the 
past.56 In summary of Friedrich Schiller’s estimation, Bürger emphasises the concept of the 
autonomy of art as emerging through “historical process,” with its inherent contradiction 
between the category of autonomy which purports to be “the apartness of art from the 
praxis of life,” and the context of its historical development.57  Here an “element of truth” 
(the apartness) coexists with an “element of untruth (the hypostatization of the fact, which is 
a result of historical development as the ‘essence’ of art).”58 
 
This is a contradictoriness akin to that discussed by Groys.59 For Bürger, the avant-garde is, in 
principle, an “hostility to tradition” where newness is not conceived as a “calculated effect,” 
but as a radical break with tradition, where “it is no longer artistic techniques or stylistic 
principles which were valid heretofore but the entire tradition of art that is negated.”60 This 
self-abnegation of the avant-garde is the paradox of its legacy that resonates in conceptions of 
contemporary art practice as progressive, where its leading edge is cutting a way forward, 
just as it cuts off the past that might allow a forward orientation. In such a context, 
cognition is both mimetic of past modes of thinking but is also a form of production that 
includes production of the new. While cognition precedes the work of art, it also emerges 
differently in response to the work of art, and may itself be a work of art. 
 
Hal Foster identifies a problem between the “deferred temporality of artistic signification” 
in relation to avant-garde’s rhetoric of rupture, and the residual evolutionism that suggests 
such rupture is “entirely significant in its first moment of appearance.”61 Where Bürger 
conceives history as “punctual and final,” and then uses it to affirm the autonomy of avant-
garde art, the effect according to Foster is to turn the “antiaesthetic into the artistic, the 
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transgressive into the institutional.”62 He argues, instead, that in art just as in history, 
“creative analysis is interminable,” and that “the project of the avant-garde is no more 
concluded in its neo-moment that it is enacted in its historical moment.”63 If, as Foster 
suggests, “the aim of the avant-garde as Bürger conceives it, is to destroy the institution of 
autonomous art in order reconnect art and life,” then “life is conceived here paradoxically – 
not only as remote but also as immediate.”64 
 
For the most acute avant-garde artists such as Duchamp, the aim is neither an 
abstract negation of art nor a romantic reconciliation with life but a perpetual 
testing of the conventions of both. Thus, rather than false, circular, and 
otherwise affirmative, avant-garde practice at its best is contradictory, mobile 
and dialectical, even rhizomatic. The same is true of neo-avant-garde practice at 
its best, even the early versions of Rauschenberg or Allan Kaprow. ”Painting 
relates to both art and life,” runs a famous Rauschenberg motto.” Neither is 
made. (I try to act in that gap between the two).”65 
 
Whereas the tension of separation between art and life is here given as providing an impetus 
(aim) for painting, the self-conscious separation between the past, the present and the future 
that allows such a notion of the avant-garde, also extracts it from duration in the Bergsonian 
understanding of this term. While the gap that Rauschenberg identifies is a spacing between 
processes of living and those of living’s engagements with art, this ‘gap’ is closed when an 
artist constitutes that contingent process that is art. In the context of painting, life and the work 
of art e-merge together. From our readings of Bergson, life and painting cannot be 
separately discerned without recourse to a temporalising of either in terms of differences in 
degree, which is to say in terms of the homogeneity of quantitative spatiality coterminous 
with an ontology that falls either into an idealism or a strict realism. In response to 
Rauschenberg, perhaps we say: don’t mind the gap! Don’t look after that spacing. Don’t fall 
into space.  
 
If the neo-avant-gardes of the 1950s/60s did not seek to collapse art and life together, but 
aimed to sustain a tension between them, then they also did not seek to undo the 
“traditional identities” of art forms, but instead to continually test the “frames or formats” of 
aesthetic experience within contemporaneous lived experience.66 The art institution and its 
(paradoxical) radical–conservative conventions may continually be updated, fine-tuned, 
essentialised, and overturned, but never abandoned: 
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What exactly was effected by the signal acts of the historical avant-garde, as 
when Rodchenko presented painting as three panels of primary colors in 1921? 
“I reduced painting to its logical conclusion, and exhibited three canvases: red, 
blue and yellow.  I affirmed: this is the end of painting. These are the primary 
colors. Every plane is a discrete plane and there will be no more 
representation.” Here Rodchenko declares the end of painting, but what he 
demonstrates is different. It is the conventionality of painting: that it could be 
delimited to primary colors on discrete canvases in his artistic political context 
with its specific permissions and pressures – this is the crucial qualification. And 
nothing explicit is demonstrated about the institution of art. Obviously convention and 
institution cannot be separated, but they are not identical. To collapse 
convention into institution produces a type of determinism; to read institution as 
convention produces a type of formalism, the institution of art enframes 
conventions, but it does not constitute them, not entirely. However heuristic, this 
difference does help to distinguish the emphases of historical and neo-avant-
gardes: if the first focuses on the conventional, the second concentrates on the 
institutional.67  
 
Foster identifies a second neo-avant-garde that “sometimes succumbs to apocalyptic 
impulses,” but that now extends the process of testing to “different institutions and 
discourses in the ambitious art of the present.”68 Contemporary artists involved with this 
second neo-avant-garde are concerned more with “subtle displacements” or “strategic 
collaborations,” than with “grand oppositions,” concerned with what Foster calls “a formula of 
practice.”69 These neo avant-garde performances he describes as “immanent and 
allegorical,” proceeding in relation to Modernism and its avant-gardes, rather than breaking 
with them.70  While the prefix ‘neo’ suggests a renaissance rather than a rupture, we note that 
when Jean Francois Lyotard describes the rupture associated with the suffix ‘post’, he 
describes ‘neo’ as a way of “forgetting or repressing the past, that is, repeating it and not 
surpassing it.”71 In multiple instantiations and subtle shifts, the core ideology of the avant-
garde with its problematic temporality, teleology and ambivalence towards embracing or 
rejecting the possible, continues to permeate art institutions and haunt art-making 
methodologies. 
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Figure 34  (8x13cm) 
Modernism’s Others  
Throughout the 1970s the experimental Fluxus movement that developed on Futurist and 
Dadaist disdain for tradition, offered a proliferation of variety in performances, discourses, 
debates, exhibitions, and other events. As a loosely formed movement of diverse activities 
Ken Friedman describes it as “an active philosophy of experience that only sometimes takes 
the form of art,” but that subsequently became “a symbol for much more than itself.”72 In 
particular, it became a sign that “something is happening.”73 Both the foregrounding of 
experience and the flux of spontaneous happenings provide a context for emergence as a 
concept for how art making happens, and how art institutions evolve. This notion of a 
vanguard is sustained in other versions of Modernism, such as Conceptualism, where 
creative cognition is the work of art, and even in the recursive quotations of Postmodernism, 
the exploration of neglected and temporarily thwarted possibilities is framed as progressive. It 
would seem that no perspective on change is future-proof! 
 
In proposing a revised or supplementary historical category, Nicolas Bourriaud coins the 
term ‘Altermodernism’ to evoke the linked ideas of a “Modernism of the others” and an 
“otherly” Modernism, one that is different in kind from earlier versions.74  This notion of an 
Altermodernism is characterised by Terry Smith as: 
 
 [T]hat moment when it became possible for us to produce something that 
made sense starting from an assumed heterochrony, that is, from a vision of 
human history as constituted by multiple temporalities, disdaining nostalgia for 
the avant-garde and indeed for any era — a positive vision of chaos and 
complexity. It is neither a petrified kind of time advancing in loops 
(postmodernism) nor a linear vision of history (modernism), but a positive 
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experience of disorientation through an art form exploring all dimensions of the 
present, tracing lines in all directions of time and space. 75 
 
This heterochrony disperses the leading front that might constitute a vanguard, yet a 
‘paradoxical’ nostalgia for the idea of an avant-garde remains in the traceries (albeit 
divergent) of Altermodernism. “Tracing lines” is the retrograde practice of marking the 
passage of homogeneous time, a framework reinforced in the description of direction, time 
conflated with space, and retrograde trajectories (even if multiple) still imply a leading edge, 
even if the Altermodernist gaze has been averted from it. The “positive experience of 
disorientation” masks the possibility offered by subsequent serial orientation into a trace that 
has been straightened by the lever of retrospection. The retrograde trace is only the mirror 
image of trajectory—a stereoisomer of temporal alchemy. The Altermodernist ethos reflects 
the artist’s “total embrace of everyday life as the domain of affective experience,” although 
within this situation Smith identifies risks. Such risks include a possible tendency towards 
increasingly vacuous self-promotion or reversion to institutionalised Modernism. Another is 
the possibility of slippage into postcolonial aestheticism where “the distinctive poetics of the 
visual arts, their fundamental nonconformity, will vanish into the excited normalities of 
instant communication — with everyone, everywhere, about everything — that have 
become typical of contemporary life.”76   
 
Smith describes how, since the 1980s, museums, artists, galleries, auction houses, and 
collectors have developed brand-images in response to contemporary art-industry needs to 
profile their institutions as dynamic, and in the vanguard of “the kinds of change that 
characterize contemporary life.”77 In this respect, Smith sees contemporary art 
acknowledging life’s other pursuits as competitors for an audience’s attention, even if art still 
maintains its separateness and autonomy. Within this context, he describes 
“Contemporary” art as having become a style, “an aesthetic category and a cultural force as 
powerful as modern art had been in its own time.”78 He describes art today as the product of 
a “mix of cultural, technological, social, and geopolitical forces” where “by absorbing 
imaginable futures, and by contemporizing various competing visions of the past, this mix of 
forces has ‘thickened’ the present, and created a state of permanent transition, of perpetual 
contemporaneity.”79 Such presentation of an eternal ‘presentness’, a constancy of a 
contemporary, glimpses the radicality of Bergsonian duration, a motile ‘present’ whose 
actuality, affective corporeal action happens in the de-distancing of the totality of images to 
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a body-image, coincident with memory’s intensive flexing of matter’s congealing. This is but 
a glimpse, however, as Smith’s account of a ‘style’ of the Contemporary reverts 
temporalising and action to spatialising coordinations, and to subject positions that find 
human agency operating in and with a world of things objectively present. Thus, this 
condition of continual movement that is also a constant, is analogous to the continual 
emergence of the present in duration, when the present remains constant while in continual 
change as it differs from itself.  
 
Bergson has shown that spatial movement and durational change are not equivalent. From 
the point of view of Bergsonism, such discussion needs to encounter the radicality of two 
non-coincident understandings of time, that by which Bergson defines simultaneity in 
spatialising motility without any pastness and that of succession, not assimilable to a series of 
‘now-moments’ but recognised in duration whereby the past is contemporaneous with a 
present. In Deleuze’s terms, these are approached in the differentiation of chronos 
(simultaneity) and aion (duration).80 The historical avant-gardes, their critics, and 
commentators never leave, despite the radicality of their prognoses on time, a strictly 
Aristotelian dimensionality of time.  
 
 
  Figure 35  (12x19cm) 
Contemporaneity  
Peter Osborne indicates that the term “contemporary,” as it indicates presentness to a 
“single historical time of the present,” was used mainly in the twentieth century as a 
qualifier for ‘modern’, at least until the term ‘postmodernism’ emerged in the 1980s to 
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the state of their mixtures in depth (Chronos); on the other , the essentially unlimited past and future, 
which gather incorporeal events, at the surface, as effects (Aion).” Deleuze, G. (2004). The logic of sense. op. 
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imply that this period might also be post-contemporary.81 However, the idea of 
contemporaneity and presentness remain correlative, despite the contemporary having 
epochal reach when the label is used to signify a category. When the term contemporary 
continues to be used for modern art from half a century ago, as well as for art today, the 
past in memory is drawn close up to the present, just as the present is relaxed towards the 
past, so that there is a question of what constitutes presence. As Osborne notes, the idea of 
con-temporaneity is a “problematically disjunctive conjunction.”82   
 
[A] coming together not simply ‘in time’ with our contemporaries — as if time 
itself is indifferent to this existing together — but rather the present is 
increasingly characterised by a coming together of different but equally ‘present’ 
temporalities or ‘times’, a temporal unity in disjunction, or a disjunctive unity of 
present times.83  
 
For Bergson such differentiating and integrating of ‘timelines’ is a spatial metaphor that 
confuses the conception of time, whereas the present is immanent to duration. That is, it is 
not a coming-together of separate positions or trajectories, but a creative emergence of 
change in duration, and as such there is no contemporaneous other present. When used to 
designate what is current or up-to-date, the term’s tautological aspect belies its polemical 
aspect. The residue of political avant-gardism is evident in the term’s ambition to sustain the 
“neo-avant-garde art-historical consciousness” by delimiting a significant art of today, that 
art which presupposes the future, and therefore presupposes the significant past.84 Osborne 
observes that this politicised notion of the contemporary continues to “derive its historical 
intelligibility from its claim on the future, albeit increasingly an abstractly projected 
(imaginary) future or mere horizon, rather than a politically actual one.”85 Groys discusses 
how the term ‘contemporary’ is appropriated by the marketplace and distributed across a 
diversity of art works, producing “a certain blindness to what is contemporary and present,” 
because the global marketplace lacks “the historical memory that would enable the 
spectator to compare the past with the present and thereby determine what is truly new and 
genuinely contemporary about the present,” or what is merely fashionable.86 He argues that 
it is only the museum that allows us to “differentiate between old and new, past and 
present,” and to see for ourselves what ”really is different, new, and contemporary.”87 He 
suggests that the role of museums today is not only to diagnose what is contemporary about 
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the present, but also to “generate the present through the comparison between old and 
new.”88  
 
As spectators, we are then reliant on, and our sense of the contemporary in art is contingent 
upon, the propensities of curators. While in Groys’ conception what is deemed to be 
contemporary emerges as a consensus in discourse with the museum, Osborne refutes a 
more utopian conception of the contemporary as having a unity that could be reached in 
the present. This, he argues, is not possible because “human existence remains socially 
disjunctive,” and there is no shared subject-position from which the totality of currently 
coeval times “could be lived as a whole.”89  Nevertheless, he suggest that the concept of the 
contemporary operates as if there is such utopian unity, and then turns to utility for 
justification, saying that it has a negative aspect that involves a disavowal, but a positive 
aspect that is “both an act of the productive imagination and the establishment of a task.”90 
That task is that of the avant-garde, founded here on shaky grounds: 
 
The concept of contemporaneity involves a disavowal – a disavowal of its own 
futural, anticipatory or speculative basis — to the extent to which it projects into 
existence an actual total conjunction of times. This is a disavowal of the futurity 
of the present by its very presentness; essentially, it is a disavowal of politics.91  
 
That elusive “unity” may be considered in the immanence of Bergsonian duration, although 
this does not allow for customary discourse about art as a project that could be planned. In 
fact, it would make such discourse one of radical silence at best. As a consequence, the work of art’s 
emergence is its reception as contender for contemporary significance. Emergence’s 
predominant image is that of a realm of movements, forces, and strategies constituting 
representation and quantifiable time. This is correlative with expectation or intentionality 
such that an artist is deemed mindful of progress, and employs processes of art-making that 
are methodical and accountable in these terms. The virtual museum then remains the 
ultimate destination for art, and it is in relation to this end that painting is curated, and 
critiqued, not least by the artist during the process of art making.  
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Figure 36  (10x12cm) 
The Ends of Painting  
Within heterogeneous duration, as Bergson has explained, ends are artifices. However, 
when the prevailing conception of time is of successive fixities in homogeneous space, and 
where history is conceived in terms of periodic succession, so art becomes periodised in 
terms of approach and style, beginnings, endings, and transitions. Art history is here 
conceived as a punctuated narrative of successive ideological projects. Foster describes how 
the neo-avant-garde continually engages with art institutions via a creative analysis that is 
“at once specific and deconstructive,” that “enacts its project for the first time — a first time 
that, again, is theoretically endless.”92 When Benjamin Buchloh points to the end of the 
avant-garde celebrated with the advent of postmodernism, it can be seen to follow a cyclical 
pattern of collapsing modernist paradigms that accompany crises, often in reaction to 
particular conditions outside of art, and where ‘end’ actually signals continuance.93   
 
In postmodernist stylistic recursions, ends and beginnings become interchangeable so that 
they blend into one another. Lyotard demonstrates how “a work can only become modern 
if it is first postmodern,” so that postmodernism is “not modernism at its end but in the 
nascent state, and this state is constant.”94 No matter whether it is couched in terms of 
exhaustion, or resolution, or dissolution, the pronouncement of an end also heralds a 
continuation, a beginning-again, as a renaissance. Almost a century of painting’s 
‘beginnings’ have followed various declared ‘ends-of-painting’ in the twentieth century. 
Such would be the case when Rodchenko claimed to have collapsed the project of 
representation through his own definitive abstract painting, even though the claim would 
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subsequently be repeated by Ad Reinhardt in relation to his own more reductively minimal 
style of abstract painting. His absolutism acclaims: 
 
The one art that is abstract and pure enough to have the one problem and 
possibility, in our time and timelessness, of the ‘one single grand problem’ is pure 
abstract painting. Abstract painting is not just another school or movement or 
style, but the first truly unmannered and untrammelled and unentangled, 
styleless, universal. No other art or painting is detached or empty or immaterial 
enough.95 
 
It was his sort of art that Reinhardt believed would bring the historical project of painting to 
an end, and so make the avant-garde redundant.96 However, critic Barry Schwabsky points 
out that abstraction was but “a specific kind of painting, one type among many others — an 
addition to the vocabulary of painting and not necessarily a revelation of painting at its best 
or most basic.”97 Abstraction could be identified stylistically, and differentiated into various 
styles of abstraction. The fact that painting continued to shift into various non-abstract 
genres demonstrates that abstraction fails to “communicate the essence of all painting.”98 If, 
as Schwabsky suggests, Minimalism and Conceptual Art furthered the quest for a more 
universal art that is more “nothing in particular,” then this “totalizing project” has evidently 
failed.99 Painting has continued to unfold in ways that would not be contained by a singular 
totalising ideology.  
 
Writing in 1967, Allan Kaprow describes an increasing nominalism in modern art, with its 
“interminable avalanche of categories.”100 In this context, Anne Peterson suggests that the 
“cul-de-sac” of painting in the 1960s was caused by the Modernist attempt to restrict its 
activities to exploring “the formal aspects of painting, on the theory that all painting is 
basically about painting.”101  Since then, painting has seen the dissolution of such restraints, 
following a contestation of categories, boundaries and fixities through the influx of new 
media and the flux of art practices. Rosalind Krauss (initially in relation to sculpture) coined 
the term ‘expanded field’ to describe this increasing pluralism of practices, and the 
historicising effect of a preoccupation with categorisation. 102 
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With the transferrable (and so generalised) notion of an expanding field, Peterson describes 
how it has become a mythical truth that an “age-old demarcation dispute between the fine 
arts” was closed after art moved into a post-medium condition, subsequent to its 
experiments in the 1960s and 70s.103  Nevertheless another “end of painting” was heralded, 
definitively, in the 1980s, this time by Douglas Crimp in response to his rhetorical question: 
“To what end painting in the 1980s?”104 The reactions to it, as demonstrated by the 
arguments that followed, suggest a general excitement about the idea, and the expansion of 
painting as an art practice since then has shown how that question acted as a stimulus. 
Crimp’s thesis comes out of critiquing historicist conceptions of art as a narrative, and so his 
question is not about temporalising finality, but about what ultimate purpose painting has as a 
project, and what might be the putative end or destination for painting. Thus, he writes of 
contemporary art that its “natural end is the museum, or, at the very least, in the imaginary 
museum, that idealist space that is art with a capital A.”105 By tying the practice of painting 
to a trajectory of history, he collectivises individual practices and subsumes them under a 
prevailing concept: the Modernist Project. The entity of Modernism he describes as “not 
only a canon of art works but an entire epistemology of art,” and reminds us that Art, as we 
think about it today, “only came into being in the nineteenth century, with the birth of the 
museum and the discipline of art history,” a period that aligns with Modernism.106  
 
Within the Modernist conception of art, Crimp tells us that painting is “understood 
ontologically” as having an origin and an essence that is unchanging within the span of its 
historical development, wherein variation—contingency or accident—happens in styles of 
painting understood as the outward manifestation of this unvarying essence.107 Art history 
then becomes a discourse about those changing styles that he describes as “unpredictable in 
their vicissitudes,” and governed by the choices of individual painters when they exercise 
their “boundless imaginations.”108 However, when curated, this boundlessness is constrained 
within a conceptual territory, and within the bounds of the curator’s imagination. Such 
conceptual bounds, as Crimp indicates, are framed retrospectively: “the idea of art 
developed as autonomous, as separate from everything else, as destined to take its place in 
art history, is a development of modernism.”109 In this respect the virtual museum is 
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painting’s end destination. As evidence of painting’s “terminal condition,” Crimp points to 
certain “deserters of the ranks of painting” —Flavin, Judd, LeWitt, and Morris. 110  
 
If this “desertion” is a symptom of a propensity for painters to explore and to find new 
approaches, then the signalling of further ends might be taken as a sign of good health, a 
‘natural’ rhythm in the life of art. Where the end is conceived in less catastrophic terms, as 
an attenuation, or fragmentation, or disorientation, this can be taken as a positive 
development within the context of the neo avant-garde’s aim of “forgetting or repressing the 
past, that is, repeating it and not surpassing it.”111 Even if there is risk of painting 
“vanishing” into everyday chatter “with everyone, everywhere, about everything,” this end 
might be construed as having a positive prospect.112   
 
As Foster says: “[P]ost-war culture in North America and Western Europe is swamped by 
neos and posts.” A myriad of repetitions as ‘revolutions’ begin and are undone, while dormant 
formations “stir again with uncanny life.”113 He refers to the problem of differentiating 
between archaic forms that return to bolster “conservative tendencies in the present,” and 
lost models of art that return in order to “displace customary ways of working.”114 He 
questions, for example, how the “register of history” can distinguish between “a revisionist 
account written in support of the cultural status quo and a genealogical account that seeks 
to challenge it.”115 Both accounts would be retrospective, selective, and partial. The move 
that is implied by the recurring prefixed ‘re’, is identified by Foster as temporal, while the 
prefix ‘dis’ indicates a move that is spatial. Both are intended “to open a new site for 
work.”116  
 
By the end of the 1990’s a broad eclecticism suggested boundless possibilities, and that 
painting could escape stylistic categorisation. Painters drew on influences from throughout 
the history of art, including those that Schwabsky describes as previously off-limits to serious 
painting (for example, the painted kitsch/porno/sentimental confections by Jeff Koons). 
This pluralistic mêlée displayed “sometimes earnest, sometimes slackerish technique — at 
times academic, at other times approaching the simplicity of the Sunday painter or the 
extreme stylisation of the decorator.”117 In this the spectator might also encounter what 
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Schwabsky describes as “the homely distraction of crafts and hobbies into the artistic 
field.”118 The fields of practice that were claimed by or nominated under painting already 
included printmaking, collage, and drawing, but now included aspects of performance and 
conceptual art, often with little reference to any painting tradition and negligible or no 
actual use of paint. Art historian, Jonathan Harrison, describes painting as having become 
experientially as well as theoretically ineffable, a condition found throughout the “material 
fabric of contemporary art.”119 Harrison lists hybridity, hegemony, and historicism as three 
terms that are intricately connected with the fortunes of painting, all of which have their 
own complex, disputed, and interconnected histories.120 The life of painting is evident in its 
evolving fields of practice, as new and diverse approaches continue to emerge. This 
evolution need not be interpreted as progression in the contentious term of advancement, or as 
a moving on from the past, but as a more catholic incorporation that brings the past into the 
process of emergence as vital continuance, perhaps even élan vital.  
 
 
Figure 37  (10x16cm) 
Provisional Painting 
In 2009, Raphael Rubinstein writes of a trend that he notices in recent painting, where the 
work looks “casual, dashed-off, tentative, unfinished or self-cancelling.”121 He analyses this 
as “turning away from ‘strong’ painting towards something that seems to constantly risk 
inconsequence or collapse.”122 He senses a restlessness or dissatisfaction such as Cezanne 
demonstrates in his “infinite, agonised adjustments of Mont St Victoire,” or as Giacometti 
demonstrates in his “endless obliterations and restartings of his painted portraits,” and or as 
Paul Valery indicates in his dictum that a poem “is never finished, only abandoned.” 123 He 
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links the approach to Modernism’s “strategies of refusal and acts of negation,” and 
tentatively names it ‘provisional painting’.124 To form this category, itself provisional, 
Rubinstein gathers artists whose work appears to correlate with his idea. The intention is 
not to establish a genre, but to form a loose sensibility that emerges out of actual paintings, 
which are themselves still in the process of being formed, and still forming their own 
concerns.  
 
While these concerns could coalesce and consolidate into critical standpoints about cultural 
politics, aesthetics and ideas, the work seems disinclined to do this. Instead, Rubinstein finds 
in the works of Raoul de Keyser, Albert Oehlen, Mary Heilmann, Tomma Abts and 
Michael Krebber amongst others, qualities such as a modesty of scale, nonchalance of 
approach, and the absence of any apparent programme or express agenda.125  He finds no 
evidence of an incisive or reductionist strategy, nor any attempt to hide hesitancy, or 
stuttering, or doubt, or laborious adjustment, and he points to the paradoxical confusion in 
Krebber’s exhibition title: Unfinished Too Soon. The ‘state’ of being unfinished holds latency 
that is an impetus for finishing, even if the idea of an eventual finished state is symbolic and 
ironic. The provisional has this latent vitality, which provides a rejoinder to prophecies for 
the end of painting. Provisional painting always has unfinished business.  
 
Rubinstein’s conception for provisional painting is that it rejects “the idea of a finished, 
durable work,” is unencumbered by conventional expectations of object, colour and form, 
and is disinclined to pursue any polemic.126 He suggests that its critical standpoint lies in 
such refusals or disinclinations to adopt received ideas about painting, and that it operates 
as a kind of vanitas by questioning the ambition to make paintings that are historically 
significant.127 Provisional painting is not consumed by anxiety about progress, or its role in 
art history, and does not “feel compelled to finesse or outmaneuver art of the recent past.”128 
Rubinstein describes provisional as being “born in the moment when the painter hesitates 
between painting and not-painting—and then begins to paint nonetheless,” so that 
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provisionality becomes “an index of the impossibility of painting and the equally persistent 
impossibility of not painting.”129   
 
 
  Figure 38  (11x12cm) 
Painting As Emergence  
Provisional painting supposes or pre-supposes change or moving-on. The provisional keeps 
secreted in its hesitancies and in-completions a vision of something final, finalised, total, if 
only to keep itself warded-off from such a destination. Though, destination, as a falling-into 
the un-provisional never escapes becoming a snare to the very conception of the un-
finished. Emergence is then a double move: a trajectory that falls off the path of falling into 
completion. Emergence effectively shrinks the temporal interval, the temporariness of the 
provisional, into the moment of decision-making that is continually presenting itself 
throughout the process of painting. Where everything is in a flux of change as it is emerging 
in the process of painting, any ‘snapshot’ taken of conditions during that process is also 
provisional. This includes every condition for decision making, every decision, every 
consequence, every shift in the developing painting. In developing a theory of emergence 
that follows from the provisional, art theorist-historian Jan Verwoert shifts focus from 
consideration of the made painting, the painting finalised or completed, to look at the process 
by which it was made: how painting might happen in each moment of action when 
decisions are necessary, and when there is no preconceived destination. In his emphasis on 
process, on the incompletion of a work and on the pre-conceptual, Verwoert seems in one 
respect to be close to our Bergsonian concerns. However, we need to assay how he 
eventually accounts for artist and work, whether his ontology of process reverts to some 
version of idealism or realism, whether he returns painting to an intentional agent and the 
work to an object to be inspected in some context. Essentially, our questioning concerns his 
ontology of temporality. 
 
                                                   
129 Ibid. (pp.82-83). 
CHAPTER TWO—Movement & Emergence … 
   
 
 77 
Verwoert’s work comes out of thinking critically about Modernism’s predominant tenets, in 
which he discerns a yearning for determinism, evident in Minimalist art, and in Conceptual 
Art’s striving for precision in how it articulates ideas. He argues that this reductive tendency 
works against the vitality and inventiveness of art practice, and proposes a concept of 
emergence that better relates to how paintings are made. It develops on Modernist 
suppositions, at the same time as it repudiates key Modernist tenets that would impose a 
pre-emptive conceptual framing for how painting was approached and interpreted. He finds 
that the concept of emergence has an openness and expansiveness that is revitalising, as well 
as being “accurate.”130 In this respect, it offers an alternative that was not afforded by 
Postmodernism, even if its extravagances gave some relief from the prescriptions of 
Modernism. He suggests that the field of painting has long been poised to react against this 
constraint.  
 
Verwoert explains that his sponsoring of the concept of emergence comes from observing 
painters at work, hearing them describe their process of painting, and wanting to develop a 
theory of practice that explains what actually happens during painting. His aim was to go 
“beyond explicit intentions in order to inquire into the attitude, the ethos of the work – how 
the work delivers information.”131 He identifies a need to distinguish between the ethos of 
production and the implications of reading the work, in order to avoid the fallacy where a 
theory of production is based on a theory of reception, whereas these are not equivalent. He 
focuses on the method of production, and on a shift from the representation of the process 
of painting in terms of strategic method, towards painting as a process of emergence. In this 
conception, painting is a process of becoming that has no preconceived end, where logic of 
conditions of possibility is not already given or predefined, but has to be created by the artist 
through the process of painting.  
 
These conditions are created initially at the outset of painting, where “the first act of 
production is to produce the very possibilities of that work.”132 Thereafter they continue to 
emerge in each moment of painting, in the unfolding of the material image and its image in 
perception, and in the momentum of painting’s continuance. In this situation and at any 
moment of painting, an artist does not know exactly where painting is going. Instead, the 
painting “emerges from a process of deciding something previously undecided,” so that 
throughout the duration of painting, emphasis is placed on the making of a decision, rather 
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than the correctness of the decision. 133 Structure and complexity emerge during painting, so 
that there can be no deliberation in the deciding. The approach to painting is then akin to 
“working one’s way out of a crisis.”134 ‘Correctness’ in this context has neither meaning nor 
criteria; it could only be provisional, and could only be construed retrospectively.  
 
There is then no definitive point of beginning for a painting, but a continuous stream of 
beginnings without ends, continual change in a continual process of emergence, where each 
move is conditioned but not determined by the previous, and where all perspectives are 
provisional. What might be described as the gestures of painting are in the flux of duration. 
However, Verwoert emphasises that when a gesture is reduced to the span of a moment, 
within a unit isolated in homogeneous space, it becomes so basic that it cannot be invested 
with, or appropriated by, ideology.135 The ‘immunity’ to influence that is afforded by his 
concept of emergence constitutes, in Verwoert’s terms, its own form of utopia, where 
painting is released from having to deal with semiotic pragmatics. 136 Essentially there is no 
signifying practice, no meaning-making, at least in the pre-conceptual moment of decision 
of what is essentially un-decidable. Certainly, this resonates with Bergsonian temporalising 
of duration’s two movements, between contraction and relaxation, between the motile 
becoming of matter and memory, where ‘decision’ happens in the immediacy of intuition as 
method. 
 
The painter is continually dealing with the problem of deciding, but without being decisive, 
and without resolving the problem of criteria for decision-making, each decision being made 
under its own terms. Instead, the protracted rhythms of decision-making, each based on 
newly emerged and still emerging conditions, serve to prolong the impetus of painting. In 
this way the painted image continually develops structures, complexity, its own grammar, 
and its own logic as the process of painting gives form to a work of art.137 Again, this would 
be that ‘nothing’ invoked in each moment of indecisive decision, forgoing criteria, whose 
givens are essentially time-for-the-taking. Form is the happening of duration’s movement-in-
relaxing, the medium of matter’s sensation: painting in-itself and for-itself. All these aspects 
remain in flux, so that Verwoert likens the logic of emergence to that of the Fluxus 
movement and performance, where a new grammar of art emerges through the form given 
to an artwork.. Emergence happens within its own emerging terms, reasons, and 
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consequences so that it has “a specific form of rationality, the rationality of emergence, 
which is the rationality of painting.” 138 Here, the making process is a making of meaning.139 
Painting follows a process of emergence and is in continuous crisis, with a continual 
demand-for-action in the face of an ever-present question of how painting should proceed 
next. However, unlike the crisis of the sublime, there is no urgency or acceleration of tempo 
attached to this crisis of emergence, it being a ‘natural’ condition. In its energising crisis, 
without any apparent decision having been taken, painting can proceed unpredictably and 
largely unaccountably. In a way that resonates with Bergson’s “unforeseeable nothing which 
is everything in a work of art,” Verwoert describes a special quality that gives more to the 
whole than the sum of its parts.140 He does not specifically identify it as ‘the new’, but states 
that the emergence of this special quality is dependent on the painting being successful, where 
success is defined in terms of it having life—or otherwise, not having life. As this quality 
becomes evident in a work, so it becomes apparent that the painting is precisely what it is 
because its emergent properties were unpredictable, and irreducible.141 In Deleuze’s terms, a 
painting “stands up” when successful in that movement from perception to percept and 
from affection to affect, thereby becoming an a-personal encounter with something without 
origin or finality.142  
 
Verwoert argues that because the making of painting is process, so the understanding of 
painting must relate to process, just as Bergson also asserts that time—duration—is essential 
to the work. Because of this, Verwoert eschews connoisseurship, which he describes as 
involving only the routine application of an apparatus of criteria. In her essay on Tomma 
Abts’ painting, Suzanne Hudson concludes that it is “about the painting becoming itself, an 
autonomous thing in the world that can become, or maybe inherently is, congruent with 
nothing except that very painting.”143 This is not a logic of rational synchronisation, and so 
there is a question about how a painting becomes finished, how a decision emerges that 
causes the process to stop when the process is continually opening up new fields of 
possibility, and so sustaining its own impetus, its own life. In response to this question, the 
                                                   
138 Verwoert, Emergence: on the painting of Tomma Abts. op. cit., (sect.1).  
139 When discussing the painting of Tomma Abts (whose work Verwoert considers as an example of 
emergence), Suzanne Hudson senses the issue of reconciling the “very potent thing-ness of Abts’ making 
with making meaning.” She cites Richard Tuttle wanting “to make something that looks like itself,” and 
in relation to this self-sameness, she cites another writer saying “Imagine making an object which will 
maintain its integrity in all circumstances yet which exerts absolutely no demands on its situation.” : 
Hudson, S. (2008). The best laid plans: On accidentally not reading Tomma Abts. In B. Curiger (Ed.), Parkett, 84, 
(p.22). New York, NY: Parkett Books. 
140 Bergson, Creative evolution. op.cit., (p.194). See also: Verwoert, Emergence: On the painting of Tomma Abts. op. 
cit., (p.3).  
141 Ibid. (p.3).  
142 Deleuze discusses ‘standing up’ in What is philosophy? (p.164). See also discussion in Plane of Composition in 
chapter 1, and, later in this chapter, discussion on The figural.  
143 Hudson, The best laid plans: On accidentally not reading Tomma Abts. op.cit., (p.23).  
CHAPTER TWO—Movement & Emergence … 
   
 
 80 
painter Tomma Abts explains: “You know when the painting is finished when you know 
how it began.”144   
Because intuition as method is never ‘pure’, never immediate, never absolute, but 
complicated in hesitation, the process of emergence is informed by memory, and because it 
creates new conditions, this is not a closed system that is preoccupied with its own hermetic 
ontology of becoming, not simply painting about painting. It is, however, an anti-
authoritative and anti-Oedipal engagement with the structures of art, and so has its own 
modes of social-political engagement as a critique of Modernism, and a development of 
Modernism, albeit one that escapes capture by its gravitational field.145  
 
 
Figure 39  (9x12cm) 
From Conceptual Art to Matter’s Affectivity  
By encompassing new media and practices within traditional categories, painting becomes 
situated between medium-specificity and a post-medium condition described by Rosalind 
Krauss, and appraised by Osborne as “suffering from the indeterminacy of its constitutive 
negation, rendering it an empty, periodizing term awaiting determination,” that is to say, a 
provisional term.146 Just as the prefix ‘post’ signifies a trans-category with distanced 
connection to Modernist concerns, so some art practices in the expanded field of 
contemporary art might be described as ‘post-painting’. Such a trans-category could cohere 
as an ethos that is based on fluidity, crisis, and the flux of change—an ethos that is 
evolutionary rather than traditional. Some such ethos is felt strongly enough for the artist-
painter John Hurrell to write:  
 
Painting is so robust these days that anything goes. It is sufficiently loved by artists 
using diverse technical methods that it doesn't need past traditions involving say, 
                                                   
144 Verwoert, Why are conceptual artists painting again? op. cit. 
145 Ibid. 
146 Osbourne, Anywhere or not at all. op.cit., (p.236, #13). See also: Krauss, R. (1999). A voyage on the north sea: 
Art in the age of the post-medium condition (pp.5-7,32). London, England: Thames & Hudson. 
CHAPTER TWO—Movement & Emergence … 
   
 
 81 
canvas, gesso or canvas. Those materials are not essential, and painting doesn't 
need them to survive. 147 
Whether painting is a site of “indeterminate certainty” or a non-site of  “determinate 
uncertainty,” Osborne argues that conceptual interpretation of works of art is needed in 
order to “acquire social objectivity — beyond the received conception of medium.”148  He 
thinks of the trans-categorical leading to a “meltdown” of categorisation that signifies a shift 
away from an historical ontology of art-making mediums, and from Conceptual Art’s 
“ideational ontological purity,” towards a “postconceptual ontology of art in general, and 
hence a fundamentally transcategorical practice.”149 He calls this “postconceptual art” arguing: 
“critically speaking, ‘contemporary art’ is postconceptual.”150  
 
The shift is towards emphasising the experience of art, of whatever media, as an affective-
perceptual encounter. This shift towards affection is the ‘affective turn’ that Patricia Clough 
describes as proposing a “substantive shift in that it returned critical theory and cultural 
criticism to bodily matter” pointing to a “dynamism immanent to bodily matter and matter 
generally — matter’s capacity for self-organization in being informational.”151 Affection, as 
Bergson describes it, is movement-response to sensation, and so the affective turn is literally 
a shift towards the lived experience of encounter with a work of art, a corporeal emergence 
in encounter, in the immediate—unmediated—intuition that Bergson describes as 
preceding interaction-with-memory, and so preceding art-institutional ‘knowledge’.  
 
For the artist, the shift is from the structure of a conceptually pre-framed image that is the 
object of pursuit, to an image expressed by art making, emerging as affective-experience. This 
experience of an emerging image that Brian Massumi describes as an image-event, also an 
expression-event, is process-emergence of the new.152 As Massumi says: “structure is the 
place where nothing ever happens, that explanatory heaven in which all eventual 
permutations are prefigured in a self-consistent set of invariant generative rules” while 
“nothing is prefigured in the event.”153 It is the collapse of structure distinction into intensity, 
                                                   
147 Hurrell, J. cited in Gardiner, J. (2009). Checking painting’s pulse. ArtNews New Zealand, 29 (Winter), 82-
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148 Osborne, Anywhere or not at all. op. cit., (p.107). 
149 Ibid. (p.108).  
150 Ibid.  
151 Clough, P. (2010). The affective turn: political economy, biomedia, and bodies p.207). In M. Gregg & 
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of rules into paradox.”154 We are here in the milieu of that “nothing” that Bergson 
cryptically suggests is the “everything” of art, a nothing that takes time. In this context, Massumi 
suggests that it is the suspension of invariance that allows concepts to come out of 
experience (rather than vice-versa), and he speculates: “Could it be that it is through the 
expectant suspension of that suspense that the new emerges?”155 If it is time that is 
primordially given—as duration—it is perhaps the ‘new’ that essentially takes it. 
 
 
Figure 40  (10x12cm) 
Problematic of The New  
The problematic of the new lies in the question of what constitutes the new, how it comes 
into being, and how it can be identified. As Bergson has shown, it is a quality that is 
inconceivable and unrecognisable, except in terms of nuance, or unaccountable difference. 
This presents an evident problem for the artist whose objective is to create a work in new 
terms. The only conceivable indicator is one of difference from the past, but this does not 
suggest what the nature of that difference will be, or how it will be identified. The purely 
new is absolute difference—immediate, unmediated difference—a difference in kind rather 
than in degree. From Bergson it is clear that the new emerges as the present, which is 
continuous change succeeded (in homogeneous terms) by the future. The new is not 
prefigured by the past, and it does not prefigure the future: 
 
If the future is bound to succeed the present instead of being given alongside of it, it 
is because the future is not altogether determined at the present moment, and 
that if the time taken up by this succession is something other than a number, if it 
has for the consciousness that is installed in it absolute value and reality, it is 
because there is unceasingly being created in it … something unforeseeable and 
new. 156 
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The new emerges continuously in heterogeneous duration, as it is experienced in the 
changing psychic states of an artist. However, as this is happening, a painter is preoccupied 
with how the painted image is emerging in its visual-material relations, and in space and not 
in the image of emergence that constitutes the radical perception-affection image of corporeal 
action underway. This disjunction between the creative emergence of the new, and the 
unfolding of a painting, suggests a problematic disjunction between painting and invention, 
and even with or within the concept of invention, which Groys describes as “the fiction of 
subjective, individual creativity.”157  
 
Groys suggests that it is in reaction to the museum that the artist is compelled “to go into 
reality — into life — and make art that is seen as being alive,” which means “nothing more 
nor less than being new.”158 He describes the most general formula of modern art as being 
the impossibility of continuing to do the old, rather than being free to do something new.159 
The museum shows what the new does not look like, so that if the artist cannot identify what 
is new, his/her ‘inner curator’ can at least ensure the work differs from the old. However, as 
Groys points out, what is recognisably different cannot be new. He states that, for 
Kierkegaard, “the only medium for a possible emergence of the new is the ordinary, 
‘nondifferent’, identical — not the Other, but the Same.”160 In building a case for art’s 
necessary relationship with the museum, Groys suggests it is also necessary to “dissociate the 
concept of the new from the concept of history, and the concept of innovation from its 
association with the linearity of historical time”—so that artistic innovation is not in terms of 
linear time, but in the spatial relationship between an inside and an outside of the 
museum.161  
 
However, within the process of painting, invention happens as emergence in duration. To 
return to Bergson’s scenario about painting—the citation that opened Section 1: 
 
The painter is before his canvas, the colors are on the palette, the model is 
sitting—all this we see, and also we know the painter's style: do we foresee what 
will appear on the canvas? We possess the elements of the problem; we know in 
an abstract way, how it will be solved, for the portrait will surely resemble the 
model and will surely resemble also the artist; but the concrete solution brings 
with it that unforeseeable nothing which is everything in a work of art. And it is 
this nothing that takes time. Nought as matter, it creates itself as form. The 
                                                   
157 Groys, Art power. op. cit., (p.31).  
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sprouting and flowering of this form are stretched out on an unshrinkable 
duration, which is one with their essence.162 
 
Bergson tells us that invention is a process of emergence, and that it happens though painting 
as process of emergence, and it happens through emerging psychical states of a painter as 
painting transpires. For this reason the duration of the process cannot be contracted or 
dilated without modifying “both the psychical evolution that fills it and the invention which 
is its goal.”163 It is this evolution of psychical states, as they are permeated by the past and 
continuously changing in the present, that a painter brings to painting and invention, what 
for Deleuze and Guattari constitutes a “plane of composition” of percepts and affects. 
Emergence can neither be accelerated nor slowed, contacted nor dilated, because “the time 
taken up by the invention is one with the invention itself.”164 Bergson describes this 
invention as akin to “the progress of a thought which is changing in the degree and measure 
that it is taking form. It is a vital process, something like the ripening of an idea.”165 It is in 
this essential respect that painting happens in duration, and as a process of emergence. 
However, the conundrum remains as to how we are able to speak to or address this milieu 
of invention, especially given Bergson’s understanding that the opening of language 
precisely prepares us for the translation of duration to spatial terms. It is, perhaps, Jean 
François Lyotard who has most profoundly approached this question of a radical 
disjunction between the heterogeneity of duration’s nuance and difference of degree. 
Though his starting point is not Bergson, but Kant, especially the Kantian sublime, Lyotard 
broaches the complexity of understanding that separates the conceivable and the 
unpresentable. 
 
Figure 41  (14x14.5cm) 
                                                   
162 Bergson, Creative evolution. op. cit., (p.194).  
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The Unpresentable 
When Lyotard suggests that modernity “takes place in the withdrawal of the real and 
according to the sublime relation between the presentable and the conceivable,” he 
identifies two modes of approach.166 In the first mode, emphasis is on the “faculty of 
presentation, on the nostalgia for presence felt by the human subject on the obscure and 
futile will which inhabits him in spite of everything.”167  Here, the concern is with “the 
power of the faculty to conceive, on its ‘inhumanity’ so to speak … since it is not the 
business of our understanding whether or not human sensibility or imagination can match 
what it conceives.”168 In the second mode, emphasis is on “the increase of being and the 
jubilation which result from the invention of new rules of the game, be it pictorial, artistic, 
or any other.”169 In these two respects, painting addresses both the mode of presenting 
concepts, and the mode of image making. This becomes complicated when that which is to 
be presented, is essentially unpresentable:  
 
I shall call modern the art that devotes its ‘trivial technique’, as Diderot called it, 
to presenting the existence of something unpresentable. Showing that there is 
something we can conceive of which we can neither see nor show — this is the 
stake of modern painting. But how do we show something that cannot be seen? 
Kant himself suggests the direction to follow when he calls formlessness, the absence 
of form, a possible index to the unpresentable. And, speaking of the empty 
abstraction felt by the imagination as it searches for a presentation of the infinite, 
its negative presentation.170 
 
Lyotard identifies ideas for which there is no possible presentation, giving as an example the 
idea of the simple; an idea that cannot be illustrated “by a sensible object that would be a 
case of it.”171 Similarly, there is no conceivable presentation for the absolutely great, or 
powerful, or the sublime—which is a feeling that happens when the imagination “fails to 
present any object that could accord with a concept, even if only in principle.”172  Such 
unpresentable ideas “provide no knowledge of reality (experience),” and they “prohibit the 
free accord of the faculties that produces the feeling of the beautiful,” so obstructing the 
“formation and stabilization of taste.”173 The “axioms of the avant-gardes in painting” are 
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found, according to Lyotard, in this restlessness, and to the extent that painting dedicates 
itself to producing “allusions to the unpresentable through visible presentations.”174 As a 
further example of how painting might address the unpresentable idea of the sublime, he 
suggests that, as painting, “it will of course ‘present’ something though negatively; it will 
therefore avoid figuration or representation.”175 If modern art, in his estimation, is devoted 
to presenting the unpresentable, then in this service: 
 
[T]he various avant-gardes have, as it were, humiliated and disqualified reality 
by their scrutiny of the pictorial techniques used to instil a belief in it. Local 
tone, drawing, the blending of colors, linear perspective, the nature of the 
support and tools, ‘execution’, the hanging of the work, the museum: the avant-
gardes continually expose the artifices of presentation that allow thought to be 
enslaved by the gaze and diverted from the unpresentable.176 
 
Lyotard contends that the unpresentable can become perceptible in the mode of art making, 
especially where new modes are tried without being constrained by (syntactical) givens, 
conventions, or rituals.177  In this respect, he describes the postmodern as: 
 
[T]hat which, in the modern, puts forward the unpresentable in presentation 
itself; that which denies itself the solace of good forms, the consensus of a taste 
which would make it possible to share collectively the nostalgia for the 
unattainable; that which searches for new presentations, not in order to enjoy 
them but in order to impart a stronger sense of the unpresentable.178 
 
Within the context of such an approach, a painter sets out to be inventive, while relying on 
sensation to open the senses to the unpresentable, trying, as Francis Bacon describes, for 
painting to be ”deeply suggestive or deeply unlocking of areas of sensation,” even as he 
simultaneously attempts to be “as factual as possible.”179  Bacon seeks in painting that which 
“unlocks all kind of valves of sensation within me which return me to life more violently.”180 
It is Deleuze’s logic of sensation that perhaps most fully explores this conundrum between 
presentation and the unpresentable in discussion on the painting practice of Francis Bacon.  
In Deleuze’s writing on painting as well as the work by Deleuze and Guattari on the work of 
art, from A Thousand Plateaus and What is Philosophy? we recognise an extended thinking 
resonant with that of Bergson that opens a critique and commentary on this history of 
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modern art’s thinking of the new that we have broached in this chapter. In what follows, we 
engage more fully with Deleuze on the matter. 
 
 
 
Figure 42  (90x85cm) 
A Logic of Sensation  
Deleuze and Guattari describe the work of art as “a bloc of sensations, that is to say, a 
compound of percepts and affects” that is independent of any model, and of its creator, and 
of any beholder.181 From the body’s internal actions that are a response to sensation (when 
looking at a work of art, for example) they differentiate out percepts, affects, and concepts, 
as “beings whose validity lies in themselves and exceeds any lived,” with the corollary that 
“the work of art is a being of sensation and nothing else: it exists in itself.”182  However, from 
an artist-spectator’s perspective, affect is a dynamics of processes of response, and so the 
nature of its being is becoming, where “affects are passages of intensity, a reaction in or on the 
body at the level of matter.”183 Affection, then, is “the body’s passage from one state of 
affection to another” and, as Simon O’Sullivan explains, it is the name given to the “risings 
and fallings—the becomings—of my own body, especially when it encounters another 
body.”184 The perceptual image of the work of art that initially arises from affection, is 
therefore a becoming-image. It is affected by the differing nature of sensation, which 
influences both the capacity of this body to act, and how it acts.  
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As examples of affects, Deleuze and Guattari refer to the harmonies found in consonance 
and dissonance, and in tone and colour, and they identify various compounds of sensation 
such as the tensions or resonances in vibration, resonance, embrace, clinch, withdrawal, 
division, or distension. These are compounds they describe as: “vibrating sensation—
coupling sensation—opening or splitting, hollowing out sensation.”185 The purpose of 
painting is then to “wrest the percept from the perceptions of objects and the states of a 
perceiving subject, to wrest the affect from affections as the transition from one state to 
another: to extract a bloc of sensations, a pure being of sensations.”186 The difficulty for an 
artist is to make the compound that is the work-of-art “stand up on its own,” to make it 
“solid and lasting like the art of the museums” so that the percept or affect is preserved in 
itself.187 Even where the material image is changing continually during the process of 
painting, a fleetingly emergent presence gives sensation “the power to exist and be 
preserved in itself in the eternity that coexists with this short duration.”188 A painter uses 
processes of “creative fabulation that has nothing to do with memory” in order to make 
such an enduring bloc of sensations, specifically using achromatic and chromatic colour “to 
raise lived perceptions to the percept and lived affections to the affect.”189 Perhaps what 
“stands up” as a plane of composition of percepts/affects in Deleuze and Guattari’s sense, is 
what could be termed, in Lyotard’s understanding, as the figural. It is certainly the case that 
my own thinking concerning the making of painting shuttles between aspects of Lyotard’s 
work on the unpresentable and the figural, and Deleuze’s work on Bergson and Bacon, a 
logic of sensation. In concluding this chapter, I begin to introduce my painting practice in 
these terms, somewhere between sensation and the figural. 
  
                                                   
185 Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F., What is philosophy?. op. cit., (p.164).  
186 Ibid. (p.167).  
187 Ibid. (p.166).  
188 Ibid.  
189 Ibid. (pp.170; 171).  
CHAPTER TWO—Movement & Emergence … 
   
 
 89 
 
 
 Figure 43  (85x95cm) 
The Figural   
The paintings ‘de-picted’ in this exegesis do not make direct, conscious reference to 
particular objects, or sites, or scale. The paintings are not figurations, representations, or 
allegories of some thing or things. The motifs are figural rather than figurative or abstract, 
constituted through interaction between visual terms drawn from memory, in-formed by 
external images selected and brought near in the corporeal action of painting. However it is 
precisely memory as a given that continually needs clearing such that creative fabulation is 
released from memory’s taint. For Lyotard, the term ‘figural’ refers to a capacity to work 
“outside the grasp of structures, and yet to work within them.”190  In this respect, a painting 
is figural in the way it always goes beyond any description of it or theory about it: “neither 
an objective figure or shape, nor a figure in a language: it is a process between the two.”191 
For Deleuze, figural motifs are “the sensible form related to a sensation,” and which “acts 
immediately on the nervous system.”192 Thus, the figural avoids the problem that attaches to 
both figuration and abstraction where, for each, the motifs refer to givens held in memory. 
Figuration does not “liberate the figure” for use by the painter in creating new visual 
experience, nor does abstraction free the abstract motifs from their art-historical 
reference.193 By contrast, the figural is a spoiling of figuration that serves to release forms from 
clichéd signification, while colour also provides unlimited means to spoil harmonic 
expectations, and thereby allow scope for invention.  
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In relation to this liberation through spoiling, Deleuze conceives a mode of painting that he 
describes as diagrammatic, and which creates an analogical language for painting. This 
diagrammatic action consists of making a/signifying and non-representative marks and 
patches of colour that disrupt any figurative givens, by causing a chaos that removes 
painting from an “optical organisation that was already reigning over it and rendering it 
figurative in advance.”194 He identifies a triple liberation with this process, wherein 
perspective is replaced by a junction of vertical and horizontal planes, while the 
modulations of colour draw attention away from the tonal modulations of chiaroscuro, and 
from the “mass and declination of the body” that disrupts the figure-field relationship.195 In 
this process of diagrammatic painting, preliminary to ‘actual’ painting, the liberating actions 
provide a “germ of order or rhythm” that suggest possibilities and so will lead into actual 
painting, and out of chaos.196 In this context, the function of the ‘Figure’ in painting is to 
provide a form that conveys sensation directly to the nervous system, and that bypasses or 
renounces any codes of figuration.197 Deleuze proposes that a new order will then be able to 
emerge—painting created in its own new terms. Keith Crome describes how, for Lyotard, a 
painting’s figural sense is “neither meaning, nor a referent, but an effect of disturbance and 
transformation” that cannot be accounted for by the significations of language, or by the 
designation of things.198 
 
As Deleuze suggests, when painting in a diagrammatic mode it is easier to resist 
subordinating visual qualities to the service of a visual whole, and so it is easier for them to 
act independently in providing “the germ of rhythm in relation to the new order of the 
painting.”199 In this way, then, it is, in actuality, sensation that ‘I’ paint, creative liberation of 
painting, aiding the figural in de-forming and re-forming clichés of figuration and 
abstraction.200  
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 Figure 44  (95x120cm) 
Within my practice, forms that are figural elements, such as those in Figure 44, have no 
determining referent, and the logic of what, for example, appears to be a shadow below and 
to the left of the figural elements is not consistent with codes of figuration. Un-decidably and 
ultimately indecisively shadow, it takes an act-of-will to make the image conform to a spatial 
logic, even as the figural works to de-form that logic. This is a troubled painting, troubled in 
its own terms, resistant to mirroring givens, standing up on its own. The power of chromatic 
sensation is its attentive draw-ability, de-forming how we see, and reforming habits of visual 
perception. For Deleuze “sensation is the opposite of the facile and the ready-made, the 
cliché, but also of the ‘sensational’, the spontaneous etc.”201  
 
While painting, I experience the rhythms of changing sensations, and the rhythms of change 
in sensation, and I experience the deformations that sensation is able to effect as it emerges 
in painting. More correctly phrased, the ‘I’ experiencing is a corporeal affection, an action-
image encountering other images. It is not, in duration’s nuance, a reflective ‘I’ constitutive 
of an ego-will. It is none-the-less real and not a cerebral phantasm of imagination. This 
deformation is part of the clearing of givens that under-or-over-take me through painting. 
The immediate ‘knowledge’ of sensation is dynamic ‘action’ that is motile with durational 
change—an inter-action that is sensation–affection effecting the action-of-painting. The 
painting-image/image-of-painting emerges in this dynamic in duration, and in the 
immediacy of the continuously emerging new present, even as that present is permeated by 
a contemporaneous past.  
 
 
                                                   
201 Ibid. (p.31).  
CHAPTER TWO—Movement & Emergence … 
   
 
 92 
 
 
Figure 45  (120x150cm) 
Absolute Emergence 
In the hesitation of perception—mediation—that prolongs sensation so that it can interact 
with memory, givens attendant on the blank canvas re-emerge, so that the image is no 
longer de-formed by sensation, but is re-formed in terms that have been brought from the 
past. These ‘givens’ include recombined and synthesised fragments and images, each with 
elusive references that I sense but cannot locate in memory. I am, for example, aware that 
my painting field implicates change, process, emergence, and evolution, concerns that were 
initially brought to painting from ‘outside’, and that have subsequently become more 
reflexive concerns about the nature of painting itself, its principles and processes. All these 
givens now fold into the currents of painting’s flows, into the question-of-method within this 
context. Painting draws on givens, while focusing on how the image-of-painting emerges in 
utter contingency, a processual ‘new’. This is not a possible future projected forward as a 
distanced destination for painting’s realization, but the virtual that is nonetheless real, 
continually emerging as it is actualised in a changing-present. That is, my focus—though not 
my reflection—is on what emerges immediately as painting proceeds. Reflection ushers in the 
homogeneity of a space-time, rationality of consciousness and the grammar of language. I 
ask what my decisions mean, what actions to take, gestures to make, in regular cycles of 
feeding back to myself what I am genuinely unable to account for: the immediacy of 
intuition and heterogeneity of psychic states.  
 
As painting proceeds by changing the chromatic/achromatic relations of sensation, so a 
perception-image emerges along with new possibilities for painting. As the conditions for 
painting keep changing with the emerging image, so givens proliferate and need to be 
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cleared, and so the process of painting continually reconditions its grounds for emergence. 
These are also the grounds for the affective, perceptual, and conceptual ‘response’ to that 
emergence. My painting process involves clearing givens, releasing potentials, creating 
possibilities, generating more givens, and reconditioning of the terms for painting, 
endlessly—until painting stops. Impetus of change is the fundamental requirement for 
emergence, and the action of painting—what stands up—gives life to the process.  
 
This chapter has aimed at providing, if not provoking, a critical understanding of especially 
late twentieth-century accounts of how the ‘new’ happens in creative art practices. 
Generally defined within discourses of the avant-gardes, this accounting for change, 
emergence or movement in art practices has broached and raked over Modernism’s 
fundamental tenets: art’s relation to autonomy—what autonomy means in such contexts; 
art’s relation to history and institutional practices construing historicity’s structures; and 
art’s relation to life, to process, to artifice and construction. I have especially aimed at 
determining how predominant critical accounts of understanding of emergence and the new 
have recourse, in Bergson’s terms, to a badly-formed problem, inasmuch as an essential 
temporalising, or primordial temporality essential to avant-gardism is itself essentially 
considered in the continuum of a spatialising of time’s modalities of past, present and future. 
In this the radicality of Bergson’s ontology of time as heterogeneous duration is missed. The 
chapter concludes in considerations of an “affective turn” in art-theoretical considerations of 
the new, a turn ushered-in in part by the writings of Deleuze and, in turn, the influence of 
Bergson. In concluding this chapter, I introduced some explicit considerations within my 
painting practice. In the chapter that follows, my aim is to more fully engage in my practice, 
discussing my final exhibition and specific works in some detail, as well as broaching 
consideration of the art practices of a range of painters whose concerns have especial 
resonance or bearing on aspects of my work.  
 
 
 
Figure 46  (9.5x12.5cm) 
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 Figure 47  (120x150cm) 
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Introduction 
 
This chapter initially introduces the exhibition I curated of my painting practice undertaken 
for this PhD research. The exhibition had no pre-scribing title. The chapter goes on to 
examine the ecology within which these paintings have emerged. In this discussion, I bring 
together notions of movement, image, time and emergence in elucidating my practice of 
painting and its relationship with emergence and production: how a painter negotiates 
between incongruent yet inter-dependent realities. One ‘reality’ concerns the action of 
painting unfolding matter as paint in space. The other discerns an image emerging in 
duration. From my own standpoint as a painter working with an understanding of 
emergence, I discuss the approach and methods I employ as a means to accommodate this 
duality of painting’s realities. In particular I discuss how to ameliorate the difficulties of 
conducting painting that, for myriad reasons, is conceived as progressing along a trajectory. 
I also discuss how I conduct painting when, in consideration of the ideas of Bergson and 
Deleuze, it is conceived as proceeding without trajectory, as an image emerging in 
perception’s interactions with memory. In looking at how painting happens in these 
circumstances, this chapter also reflects on the nothing that is everything that Bergson has as 
essential to painting, and how within these terms and in the context of my own painting, a 
response could be given to the question Does painting happen? As this response encounters 
those two ‘realities’ determined in Bergsonism, I discuss the question of what completion could 
mean in emergence, and how a painter determines when painting ceases.    
 
 
 
Figure 48  (95x95cm) 
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The Exhibition 
The exhibition was held at St Paul St. Gallery Three. 17 February–1 March 2014.  
39 Symonds St., Auckland Central  
 
 
 
Figure 49  Map of exhibition layout. 
The exhibition and works were not titled. Notwithstanding an objectification of painting 
entailed in empirical description, an exhibition map also gave the dimensions for each work, 
as well as indicating that each was in oil paint on linen, made within the past two years. 
During the process of painting, each work emerged in unaccountable interaction between 
sensation, memory, and matter, and they are considered to be still emerging in the 
perception of spectators, including my own perceptions. Reference in the work is therefore 
to unpredictable emergence, and to the continuance of that emergence. 
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Figure 50  Installation view; towards gallery entrance ramp.  
 
The paintings in this exhibition came out of what could be termed the complex ecologies of 
my studio, a littoral zone of tidal changes. It is clear that these paintings took time to make, 
and that each took a different time. A time-line could be drawn up, delineating the first 
ones, their periodicity. and their overlaps with subsequent ones, their abeyances, re-
workings and so on. What is not so evident is how they unfolded time, and how that 
unfolding brought with it that unforeseeable nothing which Bergson describes as being everything 
in the work of art, or how ‘time’ has two incommensurable registers from one scene of 
studio encounter to another, from one ecology to another. This marks the studio’s ecologies 
as estuarine, as élan vital, as a creative evolution. From the colours in these works, we 
experience form as rhythms of sensations, but we do not see that essential form which was 
nought as matter, and which creates itself. As a ‘painter’ I cannot account for this nothing which 
is everything. Perhaps I am perennially too early. As ‘spectators’ we may infer that this nothing 
emerges during processes of painting, processes that are not simply completed with the 
cessation of applications of paint. As ‘spectators’ we, perhaps, miss the sprouting and 
flowering of its creation. We may well be perennially too late. While I can testify to having 
been present and actively engaged with the material unfolding of these paintings, I cannot 
say that I was present to the creative emergence of what was essential in painting. This 
emergence was immanent to the continuous emergence of my own living, as it was 
experienced in the intensity of my changing psychic states, as duration. What happened was 
duration, and what happened in its continuum of creative change was everything, and it was 
unforeseeable. I cannot differentiate painting out from duration to say that it happened 
distinctly, just as I cannot differentiate certain qualitative states of change as being novel. 
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Because it happened as duration, the nothing which is everything did not emerge in time 
with the progressively unfolding painting, but it did emerge in coincidence with the precise 
time that it took to make that painting.  
 
As we encounter the works now, it is only the action of painting, in a narrow sense of 
painter-as-agent, that has finished, while emergence continues for the unforeseeable nothing 
which is everything in the work of art, but now in the changing psychic states of spectators 
which cannot exclude the painter-as-spectator. From the point-of-view of time flown—
homogeneous and quantifiable time—we are always too early or too late to coincide with 
that present of a painting’s presentation. Yet, from the point of view of time flowing in 
heterogeneous duration, that present of painting’s presentation is continuous evolution. In 
this flux is sensation’s unforeseeable emergence—matter and memory flexing in contracting 
and relaxing. Here is painting’s essential incompletion: time itself, pure time showing itself, 
as Deleuze’s “crystal image” (see Chapter One) is construed or folded in that mirror-
reciprocity of the doubling of the virtual image and the actual image. Paintings offer a basis 
for that image, while we—intuition—provide a method for emergence. What we experience 
in our encounter with each of the exhibited works is a totality of contingency present at the 
beginning of painting, but which is still just emerging—as a bloc—as we look. This is not 
the contingency of a studio-ecology, but a contingency of virtual sensation immanent to 
duration. As we look now, we see the latency that took precisely this time to emerge in each 
of the works, as we experience emerging in ourselves the vital nothing—everything, which keeps 
us, the work-of-art, and creativity alive. This is the work that we have arrived to undertake, 
and it is so natural that it is no work at all.   
 
 
Figure 51  Installation view; centre gallery return. 
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My painting ‘evolved’ over the ‘duration’ of this study, and the works assembled for this 
exhibition are recent rather than early within the time-line of my painting production. In 
Bergsonian terms, each may be considered from a doubling of viewpoints: we consider, 
from the reality of objects in space and quantifiable time, the specifics of materials unfolding 
in space, the labour of applications of paint by a subject-painter, along with all of the 
requirements of technical composition that generally preoccupy descriptions and 
evaluations of painting processes. Then there is Bergsonian duration, concern with how the 
virtual and the actual relate, how matter and memory, image, time and emergence are 
complicating in any attempt at description. Although all of these paintings emerged within 
my studio ecologies, for each conditions were different, and each emerged in differing from 
itself, as nuance rather than as difference with respect to other paintings in this ‘collection’, 
notwithstanding that we generally define each work in relation to other works in the 
grouping. Each emerged in its own terms, and in its own time. I could assemble a 
retrospective account for how each painting unfolded in space, but this would not account 
for how decisions were made that affected that unfolding, because they were made in the 
temporal flowing of emergence, and because retrospection could not account for what 
actually happened in the dynamics of decision. There was no plan for any of these paintings, 
no preliminary drawings or studies, and there was no trajectory beyond an initial foray 
along a possible path. During painting, I was concentrating on responding directly to 
changing sensations emerging in interactions with unfolding-painting. My body-image-
action responded, as affective responsibility for emergence, in close encounter with the 
totality of images, some of which become bodily encounter: painting sensation directly. 
 
 
Figure 52  Installation view; gallery centre. 
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Criteria for selecting works for exhibition out of a larger body of work undertaken during 
candidature, and curating the exhibition, emerged in a similar way, as currents of response 
started to resonate in and between certain works, and to emerge as rhythms of colours and 
forms, flows and deformations. These qualities, emerging now in an ecology of a gallery site, 
came out of processes of shifting and sorting, ruminating and editing, trying to encounter 
material nuances rather than objects in space. None of the works has been selected to 
demonstrate a ‘point’, nor does the exhibition present a polemic, though inevitably a point-
of-view emerges along with a formal logic of sense. What I saw emerging in the exhibition 
were sensations of aliveness—rather than a demonstration of painting as creative evolution. 
This is élan in the individual and collective resonances and rhythms of sensations coming 
from individual works, and in the interplay between these qualities within memory and 
perception, and in the duration of their play as it emerged in my changing psychic states. 
This was the preliminary and provisional work in setting up the exhibition. It involved 
looking, walking through the locale, encountering different viewpoints, experiencing 
changing light conditions, hearing sounds from outside, movement and change, and 
bringing all this into the internal crucible of emergence. In this, I was testing the exhibition’s 
potentials.  
 
This gallery site is a spatially eccentric and visually active volume that features differing 
floor levels, with pipes, ducts, nooks, ramps and railings, and recursions. This ecology of 
utility hosts a residuum of Modernism, where sections of plain white wall are installed with 
the po-faced rectitude of strict geometries. At their margins we find remnants of another 
past, where architectural features refer to the turn of the twentieth century, when a nascent 
Modernism had hardly touched what was then home for a medical practitioner and his 
family, a building designed for generous if conventional living. Despite the busyness of this 
site, much of it has suffused light, and there is an overall quietude inside that stands in 
contrast to the movement, change and life that surrounds it outside. There is, for example, a 
continual in-flux of light coming from reflections and the changing day, and there is a flux 
of sound and vibration from passing vehicles, and the diurnal and seasonal flux of passing 
pedestrians and student volleyball players in the next-door hostel courtyard.1 The 
consequence is that experience of these paintings is permeated by all manner of sensations 
and memories, so that these paintings are not abstracted or divorced from life, but actively 
engaged in life. With their exuberant colours, they are no wallflowers. 
                                                   
1 This affect is one that I associate with The dream of light, a film in which a painter, working en plein air 
within a high-walled courtyard, struggles to capture an image of a tree that is constantly changing, in 
constantly changing light conditions. Meanwhile the sounds of everyday life filter in from outside, as part 
of the diurnal rhythm of time passing. ([Erice, V. (Director), (Moreno, M.(Producer). (1993). The dream of 
light / The quince tree sun. [Motion picture]. Spain: Facets Multimedia Distribution USA.]). 
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Figure 53  Installation view; upper level; detail of small work, (10x12cm) 
 
 
Figure 54  Installation view; upper level. 
 
CHAPTER THREE—Of Painting… 
   
 
 102 
 
Figure 55  Installation view; long view on entering gallery 
 
On entering the gallery up a ramp, a long-reaching view opens to a pair of adjacent works 
at its end, one large and one small. There is an evident question or tension in the 
relationship between the two works—a difference in degree with respect to scale, or quantity 
of painting, quantity of paint—a difference one can easily convert to ‘amount’ of creativity 
or even value of a work in general. The clichéd response is for the small work to be seen as a 
supplement to the larger, or as subsidiary in the nature of a preparatory study for the larger. 
However, this scalar hierarchy is contraindicated by the allocation of an equivalent field to 
each of the works, as if the relationship was complementary—counter-actuality yet still 
within a play of difference-in-degree. It is the smaller work that forces a shift in viewing 
distance, and so induces interplay between the works that can only take place in memory, 
and so dissolves the hierarchy: opening onto, now, a nuanced affect of difference-in-kind. 
Each work differs in itself, from itself. This interplay between a micro and macro is repeated 
at the near end of the gallery. Otherwise, the paintings have been placed so that they act 
individually but interact collectively, and so that they exercise a spectator’s perception and 
memory. That is to say, we recognise how a plane of consistency constitutes the works in a 
plane of immanence, works that also are encounterable as a plane of relations and 
essentially, as works of art, as a plane of composition, or bloc of sensations. Necessarily, in 
writing on this exhibition, we shuttle between a logic-of-sense, constituted in concepts and 
functions, and a logic-of-sensations proper to the work of art. 
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Figure 56  Installation view; painting in lower level (125x120cm); detail of small work, (11x13cm) 
 
 
Figure 57  Installation view; painting in lower level alcove, (125x120cm) 
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Figure 58  Installation view; painting in upper level (125x120cm) ; detail of small work, (11x13cm) 
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Givens  
 
 
Figure 59  Prepared blank canvas in the artist’s studio (95x90cm)  
As Deleuze explains in his writing on the painter, Francis Bacon, even before painting starts 
the blank canvas is crowded with a profusion of images that precede painting, and that are 
identified by him as everything that is in the artist’s mind and memory, and around the 
artist, and in the studio.2 These images, he says, connect through “pure memory identical to 
the totality of the past,” and  are “already in the canvas, more or less virtually, more or less 
actually.”3 Although these images come from the past, they are continually reconstituted in 
memory. As Bergsonian duration is permeated by the past in this way, these images are 
active in the emerging psychic states of a painter, and so already ‘on the canvas’ as givens. 
They include all the necessary conceptions that a painter has for how painting could unfold, 
and all the possible outcomes that could ensue. Each blank canvas is populated by images 
from my past painting pursuits, and by images that emerged from and informed actions of 
painting over its duration at that time, and all the images that have subsequently emerged in 
my perceptions of those works—the totality of images converging on this body-image. 
Importantly, for my practice, the givens include the unexplored (thwarted) potentialities that 
have emerged along the way, and all the images attendant on these potentialities. The blank 
canvas is also freighted with the image of a cultural history of art and of painting, along with 
all the images that have emerged in the evolution of this history. In short, it is potentially 
populated by the totality of images. Signs are prominent amongst the givens, even as they 
refer to other signs, endlessly. Certain instrumental givens come from past experience, such 
as facility with tools and media that will allow painting to proceed fluidly, or familiarity with 
                                                   
2 Deleuze, Francis Bacon: the logic of sensation. op. cit., (p.71).  
3 Ibid.  
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conventions of signs such as atmospheric and linear perspectival devices: the assemblages of 
a plane of technical composition. 
 
My painting starts when, from amongst these givens, I conceive a possible trajectory that 
has yet to be explored and use it as a basis for moving into action. As I come to discuss it in 
this chapter, this is a faux-beginning which none-the-less establishes the doxa of painting’s 
commencement. As painting proceeds, other givens drawn from memory interact with what 
is emerging in my perception, so that form is a becoming image-of-emergence, how a bloc of 
sensations opens to a becoming-sign. In the process, my preconceived trajectory has become 
one of the givens that is now immanent to processes of emergence, as they continually 
reconstitute my conception of trajectory even as that trajectory is transitory and an artefact 
of spatialised thinking that is alien to emergence. In these problematic terms, painting 
proceeds as a continuous process of emergence, interaction, and relegation, with transitory 
givens continuing to swarm around my painting even though the canvas is no longer blank.  
Related Practices 
As I experience works of art by other artists, an image emerges in my perception and I am 
inclined to frame them (my experience of them) in terms of emergence. The intentional 
fallacy that is based on future-orientated trajectory is a problem for both artist and 
spectator. As a spectator I cannot defer to a contextual framing that ignores this issue, even 
as I understand that customarily it is ignored in much of the discourse with which artists 
engage. More often than not, these discourses by and on other artists do not establish a 
reference field akin to that of Bergson when discussing the notion of emergence, if such 
notion is discussed at all. Nevertheless these works, for me, evoke experiences of movement, 
of time, change, and emergence as virtual images, though actualised or counter-actualised 
as my acts of painting.  
 
As someone who plays on historical concepts of painting, of intention and authorship, the 
painter, Judy Millar, describes her work in terms that seemingly coincide with emergence, 
although strictly speaking she doesn’t use that term. She makes no preliminary studies. Her 
method is experimental. The outcome is treated as provisional, and she resists interpreting 
her work or discussing it in terms of intention, other than in her interest in de-forming the 
conventions and habits of thinking about painting. In this respect, she seems to be less 
interested in re-forming painting, and she leaves the work of interpretation to spectators, not 
only as their right, but also as their responsibility. 
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Figure 60 4 Figure 61 5 
For example, in her installation The rainbow loop (Figure 60), the spectral array rolling out 
across the floor suggests that the artist might be testing whether colour should be used at all, 
before deciding which colours to select and combine in a more nuanced and assured 
deployment. In its raw chromatic state, as we encounter the work, the elemental units of 
painting are exposed, bluntly, as chromatic and achromatic differences. There is a 
provisional or temporary quality to the work, as if it might physically unfurl, slump, or be 
rearranged by the artist at any moment. It could be, for example, that we have arrived 
when the artist was still thinking things through, with the installation yet to be completed. 
This impression is reinforced when we find that the artist would install the work differently 
in another place and time. Millar indicates that she has no particular destination in mind: “I 
work stuff out by painting. Painting is how I figure things out.”6 However, in the context of 
Bergson’s nothing which is everything in the work of art, it is in this work of ‘figuring out’ that an 
image-of-emergence comes into being, so that a work of art emerges in this action and not 
as a result of that action. There is no-thing to figure out. She demonstrates this in her 
changing dispositions during the installing process, and as it changes in response to different 
sites. In its labile state, the image that is the work of art continues to emerge, partially virtual 
image and actual image: materially, conceptually, as sensation, in spectator and artist 
reconfiguring the work. All this serves to emphasise how the work remains in process, in 
movement, in change. Millar describes this process in relation to the transposition of her 
work Giraffe Bottle-Gun (Figure 61) from one venue to another: “the work doesn’t really exist, 
it’s not a physical thing, its a combination of context and reflection of things around it, and 
                                                   
4 Millar, Judy. (2012). The rainbow loop. Pigment on band ply:  installation for BE DO BE DO BE DO, 
Brisbane: IMA (Institute of Modern Art).  
5 Millar, Judy. (2009). Giraffe Bottle-Gun. Ink on vinyl: installlation, La Maddelena, Venice: Venice 
Biennale, 2009. 
6  Gracewood, G. (n.d.) Judy Millar: The artist is present. (Artist interview, 2010). Retrieved August 11, 2014 
from http://toomuchpersonality.com/2013/09/26/judy-millar-the-artist-is-a-present/ 
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things that have historically taken place.”7 In this simple evocation of Bergson’s concept of 
duration, Millar ‘locates’ the work not in any specifics of spatio-temporal encounter with the 
spectator, but in a virtual realm of interpenetrating past and present. 
 
Giraffe Bottle-Gun is ‘timely’ in the sense of being sited in a contemporary international art 
exhibition, yet it is out-of-time and out-of-place, installed in a remodelled eighteenth 
century Venetian church. Transposition and reconfiguration are inherent to the work. A 
global separation spans between a site of conception and manufacture (New Zealand) and 
that of installation (Italy), while a temporal span of more than two centuries separates the 
tropes of contemporary art from those of Baroque architecture. Across this divide, Millar 
brings the secular and the religious together, again, as an equivocal accommodation–
reconciliation that serves to reinvigorate questions held in common by host institutions: art, 
architecture, church, museum.  
 
This initial response to Millar’s gestural extravagance changes as we discover that these 
gestures are translations from one medium to another. They are enlarged in scale and have 
been distanced from human agency through a mechanical printing process. The expressive 
connection between artist and spectator unravels on approaching the work, as the flat 
evenness of tone and colour emerges in perception and as it becomes evident that the 
apparently fluid gestures are fragmented into a myriad of uniform dots. Changeability and 
crisis are inherent to Millar’s approach, where her works emerge in interactions between a 
provisional plan and unplanned contingencies or emerging possibilities. Millar emphasises: 
“painting is not about paint, or even about paint on a support. For me, it is about structures: 
illusionistic structures, logical structures, worldly structures, all sorts of structures.”8 
However, as discussed in Chapter One, Massumi tells us that ”structure is the place where 
nothing ever happens, that explanatory heaven in which all eventual permutations are 
prefigured in a self-consistent set of invariant generative rules.”9 What Millar recalls 
experiencing as an emerging image (what Massumi describes as an image-event) is the 
spatial-material emergence of an installation, whereas the everything that is nothing in her work 
is still emerging in time. Millar figures things out as she proceeds, and what emerges is the 
total structural contingency that only becomes visible as painting proceeds, so that as 
Verwoert says: “the beginning of a painting, paradoxically would only become visible at its 
                                                   
7 Millar, Judy. (n.d.) filmed in conversation: Contemporary focus: Judy Millar’s ‘Giraffe Bottle-Gun’. Wellington, 
New Zealand: Toi Te Papa Tongarewa. [Video file].Retrieved 14 October, 2014, from 
http://www.tepapa.govt.nz/new-zealand-art-toitepapa/ContemporaryFocus/Giraffe-Bottle-Gun-
Video.html  
8 Leonard, R. (n.d.). Robert Leonard interviews Judy Millar. Robert Leonard: Contemporary–art writer and 
curator. Retrieved 10 October, 2014, from http://robertleonard.org/judy-millar/  
9 Massumi, Parables for the virtual. op. cit., (p.27).  
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very end.”10 We see this play of reversals in Millar’s commenting on her work: “space will 
turn into time, and time into space. What was behind will suddenly be in front, edges will 
become lines and lines will become edges—everything will be turned inside-out.”11 Millar 
translates an image into these terms of dynamic unfolding—enfolding between space and 
time, as dual realities to be negotiated as an artist.  
 
 
Figure 62 12 
James Turrell provides an exemplar of an artist’s preoccupation with creating an experience 
of emergence within a spectator, although his process is not one of emergence, and his work 
is planned, carefully designed, and constructed with precision. Nevertheless his work, as I 
experience it, brings that ‘nothing which is everything’ in the work of art, and which 
emerges slowly as a liminal quality on the limits of perceptibility. Time is central to this 
experience, and in an environment of sensory deprivation that he often creates to allow 
emergence to happen in this way, a spectator becomes acutely aware of how an image-of-
emergence is intensive body-experience. In this respect, Turrell’s installations are composite 
blocs of sensation’s image, matter, memory, and duration. Representations of his work do 
nothing to convey its essential nature. The three slightly shifted points-of-view in the 
holographic work shown in Figure 62 indicate how form emerges, recedes, or disappears 
with every minor movement by a spectator, yet none-the-less this presentation seems to 
emphasize a faux-plane of technical acuity in lieu of the locus of sensation’s a-personal 
percepts/affects. With Turrell’s works, what promises to become distinct form never 
materializes with clarity within the transparency of its medium. This image (of completion) 
remains temporally and spatially evanescent, and is available only as a virtual—which is to 
say potential—image-of-emergence for a spectator. In this experience, spectators become 
acutely aware of the dynamics, contingencies, temporality, and (in most of Turrell’s work) 
                                                   
10 Verwoert, Why are conceptual artists painting again? op. cit.  
11 Leonard, Robert Leonard interviews Judy Millar. op. cit. 
12 Turrell, James. (c. 2004). [Untitled]. Hologram, glass (3 views), c.40x25cm. 
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the liminality of their own perceptions. This is no different for any of the various artists’ 
works discussed here, all of which are considered within art historical/critical discourse to 
‘stand up’ as works of art, as if the processes of affection and perception had become reified 
as those affects and percepts that Deleuze and Guattari describe as “beings whose validity lies 
in themselves and exceeds any lived.”13 However, it is in the irresolution of the continuing 
emergence of these works that vitality lays. The subjective ‘I’ in my discussion is immanent 
to the particular emergence that is translated and then related here, but a work of art as 
differential emergence happens in the passing to sensation of this materiality of Turrell’s 
installation, or Millar’s coiled band ply, or Rembrandt’s paint (Figure 63). In the case of 
Turrell, the ‘materials’ are evanescent space, light, and time, so that these works create in 
me a particular experience of temporality in the fleeting, the fugitive, and the enduring.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
This image has been removed by the author 
 of this exegesis for copyright reasons 
Figure 63 14 
My ‘experience’ comes out of sensations: light reflecting, emanating or refracting from 
materials, responses to ways they have been handled, so that in Rembrandt’s late self-
portrait (Figure 63), for example, an image of indeterminacy in change emerges from 
painting gestures that both model and undo (de-figure) facial form so that it appears to be 
modelled softly, tentatively, provisionally. While, yes, this is a portrait, we would say a 
likeness of the face of Rembrandt, a representation, a facial image, what strikes me, 
encounters me, is an indecisive temporalising and formalising—figuring and de-figuring— 
its emergence in (my) memory and imagination. 
 
Similarly, in Jude Rae’s painting Interior (Meg) (Figure 64) an intermittently broken surface of 
paint has been dry–brushed across a chromatically saturated and luminous imprimatura.15 As 
                                                   
13  Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. What is philosophy? op. cit., (p.164).  
14 van Rijn, Rembrandt. (1669). Self-portrait at the age of 63. Oil on canvas: 84x69cm. London, England; 
National Gallery. 
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a spectator approaches this painting, sensations of colours emerging from the substrate 
through a myriad of small surface fissures, effects de-formation of the figure depicted. An 
image-of-emergence is then suffused by chromatic sensations, as figuration recedes. These 
de-figuring chromatic stimuli emerge from the interior of this material object, such that the 
very foundation of the painting is a becoming formless. I recognise a convergence between 
Rae’s approaches to technical composition and those I activate or employ.  
 
In Jenny Saville’s self-portrait (Figure 65) an image emerges directly from the sensation of 
reflected light that is perceived as a quality of wetness, and so connects with a perception of 
compromised integuments, osmotic leaching, and exchange between interior and exterior. 
She effects another de-figuring strategy by turning the head sideways in order to obstruct 
habitual modes of reading a face. The image that keeps emerging when I turn away from 
this painting is of this sensation of wetness and movement, and this emerges through a 
‘synaesthesia’ in memory as sensory qualities of tactility, sound, taste, and smell. 
 
 
 
 
 
These images have been removed by the author 
 of this exegesis for copyright reasons 
Figure 64 16 Figure 65 17 
In all these works, nuance in the articulation of paint with its particular tonal and chromatic 
differences, along with the nuanced ways in which a work is constructed, become 
fundamental to how we receive these works. For example, in Mark Wallinger’s Time and 
relative dimensions in space (Figure 66), blemish-free lacquer prevents one’s gaze from locating 
this object’s surface, so that a viewer focuses instead on a virtual image mirrored in that 
surface. The illusion is that we are seeing into the interior of this form, whereas it actually 
reflects our gaze back outside. The effect is to cause a massive object to appear transparent, 
weightless, and insubstantial, in contravention of the laws of physics, and in breach of the 
trust we place in perception. The object appears to dematerialise and re-materialise with a 
                                                                                                                                                     
15 A foundation layer of colour on a white ground, intended to chromatically modify subsequent layers. 
16 Rae, Jude. (2004). Interior (Meg). Oil on linen: 35x40cm. 
17 Saville, Jenny. (2002-3). Reverse. Oil on canvas: 213x243cm.  
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spectator’s shifting point of view, and there is a confusion between the actual and the virtual 
in Bergsonian terms, so that as Deleuze describes: “the actual optical image crystallizes with 
its own virtual image.”18 In this crystal image the virtual and the actual exist simultaneously, 
so the image we have cannot be attributed solely to either the real or the imaginary. As 
Adrian Searle describes, the effect is “to realise that what you see isn't always what you get. I 
feel a fault line opening up, between what I see and what I think I know.” 19  
 
 
 
 
 
These images have been removed by the author 
of this exegesis for copyright reasons 
Figure 66 20 Figure 67 21 
Again, as if neither perception nor matter could be trusted, Jude Rae in her work SL131 
(Figure 67) depicts objects that seem to be materially as well as perceptually constituted in 
light. Reflected light dissolves edges as if these were in the flux of exchange between the 
particle and wave properties of light, suspended in a dynamic equilibrium between 
sublimation and dissolution. Rae describes this effect as a “structural ambiguity, the play of 
illusion and materiality.”22 
 
Gerhard Richter’s painting Mediation (Figure 68) invokes in me a tic whereby I scan for 
spatial cues that would allow me to establish a figure-field relation from these random 
marks, to rescue order from threatening chaos, but also to then reconstitute the cliché that 
the artist was working to clear. The a-signifying gestures of Richter’s squeegeed paint are a 
means to de-form figuration, even as the spectator subsequently works to undo this clearing. 
                                                   
18 Deleuze, Cinema 2: The time-image. op. cit., (p.67).  
19 Searle, A. (2009, February 16). Lets’ do the time warp again. The Guardian (art review). Retrieved from 
http://www.theguardian.com/culture/2009/feb/16/mark-wallinger-the-russian-linesman 
20 Wallinger, Mark. (2001). Time and relative dimensions in space. Mirror, police box. London: Hayward 
Gallery. 
21 Rae, Jude. (2002). On time. Oil on linen: 56x76cm. 
22 Rae, Jude. (2011). Sight undone (artist’s essay). Sydney. Australia: Jensen Gallery.  
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Figure 6823 Figure 69 24 
What we may perceive as chaotic colour in this painting (Figure 68) is also the taxonomic 
disorder of the formless that Yve-Alain Bois describes: “nothing in and of itself, the formless 
has only an operational existence: it is a performative.”25 It is this performative that I 
connect with emergence, and here the semblance of the formless lies in its ability to 
“disappoint expectation” and so clear the ground for emergence.26 For Immanuel Kant the 
formless becomes something that, perceived by our senses, is “given a form by our intuition, 
and conceptualised by our understanding,” so that “we may only feel and never know the 
formless.”27 Between this intuition and Lyotard’s sublime intuition of Is it happening? the 
formless for both Kant and Lyotard “undercuts and challenges the viability of any and 
every form of thought and action.”28 In this respect, what I habitually perceive as incipient 
form eludes my will to have it emerge as form in my reception of this painting. Richter 
employs this radical clearing so that the ‘content’ of the work becomes the performative 
operation of painting, a position consistent with the concept of emergence. Bois describes 
how this operation “splits off from modernism, insulting the very opposition of form and 
content—which is itself formal, arising as it does from a binary logic—declaring it null and 
void.”29 When considered in the context of these squeegeed paintings, in his figurative 
evocation of Two Candles (Figure 68), the question of what we are perceiving in terms of the 
actual and the virtual and how they are both real, performs a similar deforming operation.  
 
                                                   
23 Richter, Gerhard. (1986). Mediation. Oil on canvas: 320x400cm. 
24 Richter, Gerhard. (1982). Two candles. Oil on canvas: 140x14cm. 
25 Bois, Y-A. (1997). The use value of "formless", In Y-A. Bois & R. Krauss (Eds.), Formless: a user's guide 
(p.18). New York, NY: Zone Books. 
26 Ibid. (p.15).  
27 Murphy, S. (2005). Forms of the 'Avant-Garde'. In Crowley, P. & P. Hegarty (Eds.), Formless: ways in and 
out of form (p.68). Bern, Switzerland: Peter Long AG. 
28 Ibid. (p.74) 
29 Bois, op. cit., (p.16).  
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Figure 70 30 Figure 71 31 
Even though she will discuss subject matter, performance is central to Amy Sillman’s 
approach to painting (Figures 70, 71), where painting is deliberately a process of emergence. 
For her painting is a “physical thinking process” that is “a way to engage in a kind of internal 
discourse, or sub-linguistic mumbling.”32 Sillman’s insistence on the central relevance of 
space, matter, and bodily action tacitly acknowledges the primacy of sensation and affective 
responding. As spectators we can surmise from the traces of figuration, that as figures started to 
emerge in the process of painting, she took steps to de-figure them by a process of “unpainting” 
that confuses signs and introduces a-signifying marks.33 Perhaps these figures are my image-of-
emergence? During painting, they simply came out of “handwriting in a language that isn’t 
language yet,” so that Sillman only “aspire[s] to the condition of painting.”34 Linda Norden 
describes Sillman’s painting/un-painting process as “relentlessly labor-intensive.” Just as 
Millar labours to figure things out, so Sillman works to un-figure things out so that they 
emerge unencumbered by structure.35  
 
In Brice Marden’s Cold Mountain 3 (Figure 72) form emerges in traces left by a brush 
attached to the end of a long crooked stick. Marden’s actions are translated capriciously into 
a continuously drawn line that twists and wanders in reconnoitre of the canvas arena. This 
intervention of an unreliable mechanical process is strangely analogous to Millar’s 
intervention by a more predictable printing process, as ways to de-figure an authorial ‘I’ in 
their work. 
                                                   
30 Sillman, Amy. (2007). P. Oil on canvas: 130x115cm. 
31 Sillman, Amy. (2005). Cliff 2. Oil on canvas: 183x152cm. 
32 Sillman, Amy. Any Sillman, artist notes . London, England: Saatchi Gallery. 
http://www.saatchigallery.com/artists/amy_sillman.htm. (Retrieved 3 Oct., 2014). 
33 Norden, L. (2007). Amy Sillman: The elephant in the painting (p.240). ArtForum International, 45, 
February, (pp.239-245). http://artforum.com 
34 Ibid. (p.240).  
35 Ibid. (p.245). 
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Figure 72 36 Figure 73 37 
In those paintings in Marden’s Cold Mountain series, he describes a strategy for de-figuring. 
He started this series by translating grid structures, with which he had previously worked, 
into a process of four layerings or sequences of painting, based on four couplets in a Chinese 
poem. Then, he uses the caprice of his crooked-stick technique to force a further de-figuring 
of the grid geometry, and later in the process he adjusts the paintings by inserting “counter-
figures.”38 The painting emerges through this process of forming, de-forming, and re-
forming. 
 
Tomma Abts’ approach to painting (Figure 73) is to follow a rigorous method of emergence 
where there is no preconceived destination, no plan or preliminary drawings, and where she 
makes decisions in response to an image-of-emergence continually infolding her as she 
paints. As structures emerge in the painting, they become restructured, as Verwoert 
suggests: 
 
The emergent quality of the pictures lies in their almost imperceptible but 
persistent animation of structures. It is, one might say, a sort of trembling floating 
or flowing that enfolds the entire structure of the composition of the picture, as it 
becomes progressively clear, that the state of necessity, which it mediates derives 
from a condition of pure, limitless possibility. …In these pictures decisions are 
made according to one or more standards. The criteria for making decisions 
changes from moment to moment and from form to form…the particular 
impression of a structure, which is animated by a subliminal, but nonetheless 
                                                   
36 Marden, Brice. (1989-91). Cold Mountain 3. Oil on linen: 274x365cm.   
37 Abts, Tomma. (2011). Weers. Acrylic & oil on panel: 48x38cm. 
38 Marden, Brice. (n.d). Brice Marden on cold mountain. Art Babble, San Francisco Museum of Modern Art. 
[Video file]. Retrieved Setember 2, 2014 fromhttp://www.artbabble.org/video/sfmoma/brice-marden-
cold-mountain  
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sustained dynamic instability, therefore arises precisely from this variability of the 
criteria used in the construction of the composition.39 
 
This opportunistic abandonment of trajectory in the advent of a more interesting possibility 
is clearly not random, because the resultant paintings cohere aesthetically in ways that 
suggests certain images in memory are constantly in interplay within perception. The 
shifting orientations more often come out of Abts changing preoccupation with detail, more 
than radical shifts due to freshly emerging possibility. They may well not be apparent if it 
were not for the palimpsest of visible ridges and textures that come from constant over-
painting. She makes no effort to eliminate these traces of earlier emergent states that are 
inherent to painting. Any perception that the work is designed could only have emerged 
retrospectively. As previously mentioned, she explains that she knows when a painting is 
finished when she can see how it began.40  
 
In Bergson’s ontology, works of art emerge in duration, and in the interactions that are 
affects and perceptions. My painting inevitably folds with a range of works in a variety of 
media. From aggregates of sensation, each work emerges in me as affects and what I affect, 
virtual and actual images, memory and matter: constituting junctions of concepts, functions 
and affects. In this respect they emerge in interaction with all the images in my past and, 
potentially, with the totality of all images.  
 
 
 
Figure 74  (85x90cm) 
                                                   
39 Verwoert, Emergence: on the painting of Tomma Abts. op. cit., (Sect. 3). 
40 Verwoert, Why are conceptual artists painting again? op. cit. 
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Clearing Givens 
These givens are brought to the painting undertaken in this research, and while my painting 
is reliant on them, I also need to clear them so that the image I have of an emerging work of 
art is not framed in terms of the past. My so-called ‘blank’ canvas is full of ways, furrows, 
traces, and histories. Painting’s task or effort is that of clearing: becoming tabula rasa in ever-
repetitive procedures of readiness for something new to emerge. As Deleuze quips: “the 
painter does not have to cover a blank surface, but rather would have to empty it out, clear it, 
clean it.41 My sense is that I affect a clearing rather than a cleaning. In fact, my painting 
depends on givens: a plane of immanence of painting’s concepts—the unconditional, a 
plane of relation of painting’s functions—the conditioned, a faux-plane of composition of 
painting’s techniques. These givens are constitutive of a realm of signs, a logic of sense, 
visual terms, codes and conventions that determine and are determined by painting’s 
reception, even if they are exterior to processes of emergence. Processes of painting clear 
this clutter of givens so that a composite of percepts/affects, an aesthetic order can frame 
the chaos. In particular, I need to be cleared from those possibilities continually re-
presenting themselves during painting that offer an apparent solution to a problem, albeit one 
that is exhausted of life.  
 
While givens are being cleared by painting, more emerge as painting continually 
reconditions its grounds for emergence. Hence, decisions made in this process of clearing 
are provisional, taken in the flows of emergence. The grounds for decision-making change 
as painting proceeds, as my affective responses change with changing sensation. Yet, these 
very responses have the capacity to become clichéd. Deleuze suggests: “even the reactions 
against clichés are creating clichés.”42  Within the continuum of duration such responses 
constitute an image-of-emergence. Although I attempt to clear clichés through the actions of 
painting, there is no end to this cycling of clearing and emergence of givens and clichés, and 
so processes of painting continually create a need for further clearing. Painting is nothing 
other than this creating. For painting, this is without end—perhaps that one half of painting 
that is eternal, according to Baudelaire. The other half is the fleeting.43  Deleuze suggests 
that a painter cannot escape from clichés by transforming them, but that it would instead be 
                                                   
41 Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The logic of sensation. op. cit., (p.71).  
42 Ibid. (p.73). 	  
43 Baudelaire, C. (1964). The painter of modern life (p.12). In J. Mayne, (Trans. & Ed.) The painter of modern 
life and other essays (pp.1-35). London, England: Phaidon. In this seminal essay of 1863, Baudelaire suggests: 
“By 'modernity' I mean the ephemeral, the fleeting, the contingent, the half of art, whose other half is the 
eternal and the immutable."  
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better to “abandon oneself to clichés, to collect them, accumulate them, as so many 
prepictorial givens.”44  
 
As the actions of painting unfold as matter in the homogeneous simultaneity of space, they 
also unfold in memory as a virtual image-of-emergence which is a continual differing in 
kind, as fluid succession. This both clears cliché yet retains it in memory, as the past 
continues to permeate emergence, just as it permeates duration. Clearing, were it possible, is 
a Sisyphean task. Nevertheless, in the face of a confusion or chaos of givens, painting is 
processual ‘editing’ of givens: clichés—obstacles to painting. A persistent cliché, continually 
being cleared, is the habit of considering time as something lapsed or lapsing, that passes, 
which is to say, measuring time. This is what Bergson describes as “imaginary homogeneous 
time” which is “an idol of language, a fiction.”45 It causes painting to be conceived as pursuit, 
with a teleological finality, a future objective already given, or pre-given. The new becomes 
the already planned, fashioned fashion, contrary to the notion of emergence. Spatial 
thinking continually threatens to return my painting to the question ‘where is the image?’ 
which in fact originally framed this study, revealed as a ‘false’ problem when stated in these 
spatial rather temporal terms. This is the same problem that holds painting in thrall to art 
historical agendas. The habit of conceiving the heterogeneous in terms of the homogeneous 
is the most pernicious impediment to my painting as process of emergence.  
 
 
 
Figure 75*  (125x120cm) 
                                                   
44 Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The logic of sensation. op. cit., (p.76).  
45 Bergson, Matter and memory. op. cit., (p.207).  
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Approach 
My painting is conducted in a studio environment, which provides an ecology of at-hand 
resources: paint and other related media, various tools, trolleys for mixing paint, devices for 
communications and research, publications, controllable light conditions, facilities for 
cleaning, and so on. These facilitate unexpected and spontaneous interactions during the 
process of painting, and so emergence in painting happens readily within this ecology—
much as emergence happens within the interactive dynamics of those ecosystems where I 
originally came to dwell on the importance of change as basis for biological evolution. 
There are ways to approach this spatiality of the studio, its workshop character as a 
temporalising-nearing locale of potentiality of intensive encountering. There is a curious 
register here with Bergson, in how space becomes nullified in action: distance diminishes to 
nil as external images are neared to a body image, thereby exacting virtual to actual in a 
percept/affect/action image.  
 
This ecology incorporates everything from my past, including all my past painting and the 
images and ideas that informed them, and that emerged from them. I conceive of these past 
paintings in terms of emergence, and of their emerging within a Bergsonian understanding 
of duration, even if that was not considered at the time as I was in the habit of thinking 
about time, painting, and evolution in terms of progression and spatial movements. In these 
currently exhibited paintings, there are rhythms, patterns, and motifs that could be seen as 
having figurative or biomorphic associations. However, these formal qualities, if they are 
indeed there at all, emerged during the process of painting contingently, without thinking 
such associations. What I remember emerging were rhythms—refrains—open interactions 
between colours and forms, becoming complicated, amplified, and extending painting, as a 
becoming outside itself. I see these phantom biomorphic registrations, retrospectively, as 
having a figural function within the work, disrupting figurative givens read into painting. I am 
still inclined to do this when, for example, I relate the perceived rhythms of sensations to 
those of change and growth. Painting was flowing, without the intercession of conscious 
decision-making, and without the discontinuity that comes from continually evaluating 
direction and progress. That is, in so much as I was able to paint direct affective responses 
to sensations, painting sensations, this was painting proceeding without trajectory, and 
without apparent crisis.  
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Figure 76*  (125x120cm) 
In each painting an image-of-emergence unfolds in ways that are unexpected and 
unplanned, such that the work always surprises me. The work’s nuance, difference in kind 
that cannot be predicted, nor expected, now emerges in my consciousness. In retrospect, I 
feel intimately bound within each work, as each seems to register or sign a logic of sensation 
in my name. Or, rather, my name is most palpably, most substantially, that logic of 
sensation, such that ‘I’ emerge along-with the work of art. However, I also feel removed from 
it because of the givens that were brought to the processes of emergence, and because I have 
no influence over how duration unfolds—a-personal percepts/affects of a work on its own, a 
‘no longer’ of my perceptions and affections, “standing up” as Deleuze says. I do know that 
because it emerged in my body-image of (its) emergence, it emerged in the interactions of 
conditions, images, matter and memory, contracting and relaxing, affecting ‘me’ and being-
affected by ‘me’ at the moment of painting. While the painting-as-thing appears to unfold in 
space progressively, with coherence, its becoming-actual is continuously in change, without 
trajectory. From this point-of-view, the processes of painting were in continual crises of 
orientation, in framing chaos, bringing it to aesthetic order, and it is not surprising that I am 
surprised by how the paintings turned out. The decisions that affected the course painting 
took as it unfolded in space, emerged as part of the image-of-emergence—one might even 
here say emergency—inseparable from the emergence of my own life, and inseparable from 
duration. Whatever it is that was ‘new’ or ‘created’ in these paintings emerged despite those 
decisions, and without my knowing how it happened. Nevertheless, it is the experience of 
new qualities in my image-of-emergence that gives vitality to painting, while the doxa would 
CHAPTER THREE—Of Painting… 
   
 
 121 
have it that they were attributes of material unfolding in homogeneous space. The new—
unpredictable and indeterminate—could not emerge by way of the measure of things.  
 
 
Figure 77  (10x12.5cm) 
Each painting commences within processes of clearing the clichés that are “precisely what 
prevents the genesis of an image.”46 These processes—crises of decision-making—create what 
Deleuze describes as conditions for catastrophe, conditions for the destruction of cliché.47 In 
his discussion of Bacon’s diagrammatic approach to painting, Deleuze likens catastrophe in 
painting to “the emergence of another world,” invoked by a-signifying traits or insignificant 
marks that are “irrational, involuntary, accidental, free, random.”48 Signs attach to a system 
of givens, and readily become clichéd. While I am unable to clear signs from painting, as 
qualities emerge that could become attached to signification, I am able to disrupt their 
operation by such catastrophic means. Emergence is emergency. 
 
As a given, the white gesso ground is already replete with colour, with a full chromatic 
spectrum folded into white light incident on and reflecting from its surface. Paradoxically, in 
Modernist painting white symbolises the ideal of reductive minimalism. Here the apparent 
chromatic impoverishment that white enjoys implies (belies) conceptual refreshment 
associated with a clearing of the past with its aesthetic clichés. While white may be 
perceived as depleted sensation, its ability to reflect all visible colours means that it is fully 
charged with chromatic and achromatic potentials. For my painting, the richness of white 
lies in its latent potential. It needs only the suppression of incident light for that latency to be 
released as sensation of relative brightness, and it needs only the subtraction of certain 
chromatic qualities in order to discharge a chromatic efflorescence. All I need to do in order 
                                                   
46 Smith, D. (2003). Deleuze on Bacon: Three conceptual trajectories (p.xxiii). In Deleuze, Francis Bacon: 
The logic of sensation. op. cit.  
op. cit  
47 Ibid. (p.xxiii).  
48 Ibid. (p.82).  
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to discharge this potential is to subtract colour, and this I achieve by adding pigments that 
selectively absorb certain colours within white light. Painting becomes an additive process 
with a subtractive ‘purpose’. This capacity to unfold chromatic and achromatic difference is 
the basis for painting to clear givens (including the conception of white as depleted), and to 
generate sensations becoming composite.  
 
 
 
Figure 78  (85x90cm) 
For each work images emerge in interactions between givens held in memory, and 
sensations of colour / light reflecting off painted surfaces. Because memory is constantly in 
the process of being reformed through its interactions internally and with sensation in the 
present, my perceptions of how painting is emerging is also constantly being reformulated. 
It is therefore also continually emerging newly in the context of all that has transpired since 
painting stopped, and all that continues to transpire in the unfolding present. Consequently, 
the works cannot be located chronologically, especially as chronology is measured in 
homogeneous space, whereas I conceive of emergence as happening in heterogeneous 
duration. Consequently the series of paintings in this document are not presented in terms 
of any progression (whether chronological, conceptual, or methodological). Nevertheless, 
the works are all provisionally complete in that painting has ceased and shows no signs of 
being rekindled in these works. For the convention of customary discourse, they have been 
given dates indicating when the action of painting last happened. 
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Figure 79*  (95x95cm) 
Sensation  
What emerges from my processes of painting, as a work-of-art, is what (as I have previously 
mentioned) Deleuze and Guattari describe as a “bloc of sensations, that is to say, a 
compound of affects and percepts…being of sensation and nothing else: it exists in itself.”49 
My painting creates such sensible aggregates, which emerge in my affective responding to 
sensation. What is preserved is a material object from which stimuli for sensations derive. 
My decisions when painting are directed towards creating sensation, as Deleuze suggests: 
“sensation is what is painted.”50 Deleuze describes how, from a phenomenological context, 
while looking at colour I “become in the sensation and something happens through the 
sensation, one through the other, one in the other.”51 That is, “colour is in the body, 
sensation is in the body, and not in the air.”52  As Bergson points out, it is the same body 
that both generates and receives sensation, so that as a spectator “I experience the sensation 
only by entering the painting, by reaching the unity of the sensing and the sensed.”53 My 
decisions are responses to sensation, in that internal interaction which is the 
interpenetration of the sensing and the sensed. That is, my decisions emerge in duration. 
These decisions happen in me rather than are made by me—as actions and not ideas. ‘I’ am 
immanent to the image-of-emergence and so am continually being reconstituted in that 
                                                   
49 Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. What is philosophy? op. cit., (p.164). 
50 Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The logic of sensation. op. cit., (p.32).  
51 Ibid. (p.31). 
52 Ibid. (p.32).  
53 Ibid. (p.31).  
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process of emergence. That is, change happens without a decision having been taken. If I 
introduce the hesitation that allows an ‘I’ that has been constituted in memory to analyse 
this process of decision-making, it happens in response to the immediacy of experience that is in 
sensation and that Bergson situates above the ‘decisive turn’ where perception turns toward 
utility. 
 
The form related to sensation is a rhythm that comes not only from sensations of changing 
chromatic–achromatic relations as painting proceeds, but from layers or orders within 
sensation, the nature of which is “to envelop a constitutive difference of level, a plurality of 
constitutive domains.”54 These levels come from the shifting psychic states of durational 
change, and from the transference of sensation though the nervous system as it interacts in 
different levels of organisation. They come from the plane of action, and the plane of 
memory, and the myriad planes of consciousness between these two.55 Hence, Deleuze 
describes sensation as having an “irreducibly synthetic character” where every figure that 
might be found within a painting is “already an ‘accumulated’ or ‘coagulated’ sensation.” 
This synthetic nature of sensation then provides the capacity for sensation to be the “master 
of deformations,” such as happens with figural elements in a painting.56  This capacity for 
deformation is used in my painting as figural elements emerge, dissolve, and re-emerge 
differently in the flux of the painting process.    
 
 
 
Figure 80  (90x90cm) 
                                                   
54 Ibid. (p.33). 
55 Bergson, Matter and memory. op. cit., (pp.241,242).  
56 Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The logic of sensation. op. cit., (p.33).  
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Sensations of colours constitute my primary experience of emergence. Sensations emerge in 
layers, orders, and rhythms constituting refrains. As actions in painting respond to 
sensations, colours change, persist, or become deleted in an image-of-emergence, and so 
painting proceeds in ways that I subsequently interpret as an affective inclining-toward or 
withdrawing-from certain sensations, so that they are either prolonged or withheld in 
further painting. Immediate experience of a painting is thereby continually being refreshed 
by actions of painting, and by actions of changing sensation-affection. This is before the 
action of perception turns that experience towards the past, towards memory and the utility 
of decision-making.  
 
 
 
Figure 81  (125x150cm) 
In the painting shown in Figure 81 for example, colour relations have emerged in processes 
of negotiation, as shifting rhythms of sensations have eventually settled into a prolonged 
state we encounter in the (provisionally) finished work. These negotiations involve 
continuous painting over a whole area, in layers, with continual remixing of pigments in 
response to whatever emerged during previous applications. The decisions I make in this 
process are distributed indeterminately between a direct utility of the autonomic nervous 
system and a mediated utility of the brain, where memory intercedes in determining the 
nature of response. As blocs of sensation emerge during painting to be received in an 
interplay that is my affective response to changing sensation, I attempt to tune-in to these 
“risings and fallings—the becomings—of my own body,” so that I am present to the 
immediate experience of their emergence.57 This experience of ‘being in the moment’ is the 
                                                   
57 O'Sullivan, Art encounters. op. cit., (p.41).  
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experience of being immanent to one’s own becoming, of being as one with the becoming-
image that is emerging in the body’s passage through changing states of affection. These are 
the ‘becomings’ that aggregate or accumulate to constitute the image emerging in sensation. 
My painting is (in) these becomings while ‘I’ ex-ist, am outside or radically exterior to ‘my’ 
painting. 
 
 
 
Figure 82  (90x120cm) 
Figure-Field 
Subjective colour response is categorised according to qualities of chroma, saturation, and 
brightness. When tonal and chromatic gradations (differences of degree) are codified in 
perspectival convention, they allow the depiction of three-dimensional form, and allow 
spatial relations to emerge in the reception of a painting, as figure–field relationships. This 
codification is vision’s utilitarian response to the exigencies of living and moving in space. 
These habitual codes are so familiar that they are highly resistant to being cleared, even in 
abstract painting as minimal as Ad Reinhardt’s unmodulated white or black fields. My 
habitual response to visual sensation is to organise it in similar spatial modulations. This 
happens even when there are no immediately evident figurative or figural elements in the 
work. For example, while the blue motif in Figure 82 is coded to be perceived or ‘read’ as 
three-dimensional, I perceive a deformation and reformation emerging as orange competes 
with blue for my attention. I perceive the orange as if it were advancing spatially, so that it 
starts to assume the status of figure, while the blue form becomes relegated to background 
status. This is the challenge that colour presents to other conventional signs indicating figure 
versus field. This ‘competition’ is between my response to the immediate datum of 
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sensation, and my response to sensation referred to memory. The habit of spatially coding 
sensation causes me to perceive this painting as rhythms of spatial modulation.  
 
Chromatic and achromatic sensation, as an architecture of a work, here competes on the 
plane of reference as spatial signs, as these signs act to deform one another, and 
consequently to subvert spatialising codes. For my painting, these codes are not in the 
service of representation, and in the context of Bergson’s nothing which is everything in the work of 
art, as Deleuze and Guattari assert: “no art and no sensation have ever been 
representational.”58 In this respect, these competing sensations question distinctions between 
stylistic approaches of figuration and abstraction, by showing how each persists in the other. 
What is not evident in this image of this painting (Figure 82) is how the orange area is 
constituted in layers of varying colour and tone, so that latent forms emerge as the 
apparently flat plane of orange begins to assume an indeterminate depth, as if it also had 
spatial form. The blue figural element then suffers its own deformation from orange’s 
double tendencies of advancement, and spatial recession. It is in this process of layering 
that, as Deleuze and Guattari describe, a plane of technical composition that is to do with 
the material paint, encounters a plane of aesthetic composition which is the composing of 
aggregates (blocs) of sensation as “the work of sensation.”59  
 
 
 
Figure 83  (90x90cm) 
In the case of my work where figural elements are built on a luminous ground, the material 
includes “mechanisms of perspective” so that as the compound of sensations is projected 
                                                   
58 Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. What is philosophy? op. cit., (p.193).  
59 Ibid. (p.192).  
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onto a technical plane of composition, there is a depth emerging in the covering up.60 On 
the other hand as I paint colour on and adjacent to colour, the architecture of the work 
emerges in colour as it is aesthetically “assured by the ‘contrast of complementaries and the 
agreement of analogues’.”61 In this case, as Deleuze and Guattari say, it is not sensation that 
is “realised in the material” but “the material passes into sensation.”62 The image emerges in 
this double action of covering by planes of technical and aesthetic composition. There is 
latency in this depth of covering, and in the dynamic intensities of sensation within the 
image that keeps painting vital. In Figure 83 we see the luminous flare of two spots on the 
orange or the incipient form within the yellow (evident in the greenish edge and adjacent 
highlight). As material passes into sensation, I perceive ‘shape’ with overtones of form, 
colour and tone, field and figure, all in continual dynamic interaction as they negotiate the 
terms in which the image is experienced and how it is prolonged in memory.  
 
 
Figure 84  (90x120cm) 
Emergence 
In that hesitation of perception prolonging sensation and interacting with memory, a 
contamination of ‘pure’ intuition, givens attendant on the blank canvas re-emerge such that 
the image is no longer de-formed by sensation, but is re-formed in terms that have been 
brought from the past. These include recombined and synthesised fragments and images, 
                                                   
60 Ibid. p.193).  
61 Ibid. (p.192). Here Deleuze and Guattari reference van Gogh. They are discussing the authentic plane 
of composition: “[I]ncreasingly the colors become accents, the architecture being assured by ‘the contrast 
of complementaries and the agreement of analogues’ (van Gogh); it is through and in color that the 
architecture will be found, even if the accents must be given up in order to reconstitute large colouring 
units.” 
62 Ibid. (p193). 
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each with elusive references that I sense but cannot locate in memory. I am, for example, 
aware that my painting is informed by thinking about change, process, emergence, and 
evolution, concerns initially brought to painting from outside, and that have subsequently 
become more reflexive concerns about the nature of painting itself, its principles and 
processes: a junction of concepts and sensations, consistency and composition. All these 
givens now fold into the current exploration of painting’s capacity to be creative, and into 
the investigation of what method might mean in this context. While my painting continues 
to draw from these givens, focus now is on how painting will yet emerge in a future, and 
how new terms emerge in the process. This not a future projected as distanced destination 
for painting, but the virtual that is continually emerging as it is actualised in a changing 
present. That is, my focus is on what is emerging immediately as painting proceeds, and on 
the terms in which it is emerging, and on how these changing conditions in the present 
affect my deciding about what action or gesture to take next. Sensations’ affects are 
elsewhere than here, in me pondering a ‘next’.  
 
 
 
Figure 85  (90x90cm) 
As painting proceeds by changing chromatic-achromatic relations of sensation, so a 
perceptible image emerges as new potentialities for painting. As the conditions for painting 
keep changing with an emerging image, so givens proliferate and need to be cleared, and so 
the process of painting continually reconditions the grounds for emergence. These are the 
grounds for affective, perceptual, and conceptual responses to emergence. My painting 
processes involve clearing givens, releasing potentials, creating possibilities, generating more 
givens, and reconditioning terms for painting, endlessly, until painting comes to a halt. The 
action of painting gives life to the process.  
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With Figure 85, sensations—composites of colours and forms—comprise an entanglement 
recognised in the completed work. As painting draws out colours from white, they in turn 
draw out other colours, as if drawn toward each other. As colours emerge, they delineate 
forms that extrude from, fold into, and twist around each other, emerging fluidly in this 
mutual interaction. While painting this work, I had no explicitly conscious conception of 
where it was going, or how and when it might finish. Eventually it finished in a ‘state’ that I 
would earlier have described as provisionally incomplete, particularly the yellow rhythm at 
the bottom of the painting. This emerged as a ribbon of unmodulated colour, as shape. 
Conceived as an imprimatura, the yellow remained in this provisional state until it eventually 
emerged as heterogeneous quality: nuanced differing in itself. Such emergence continues 
after ‘painting’ has ceased, or been suspended. Again, this suggests painting to be a curious 
temporalising and not a discrete act or sequence that commences and concludes with a 
painter. 
 
 
 
Figure 86*  (125x120cm) 
Trajectory 
For Bergson, the past is not given, but is continually being constituted in the present, as the 
succession of qualitative multiplicities that is duration. My habit of thinking about the future 
in terms of the past conflicts with this, although I persist in throwing possible trajectories 
into a ‘virtual’ future. Provisional planning sets out along a path towards a destination 
whose location is yet to be established, though thrown forward, and already present and 
waiting in a future, laid out in the simultaneity of space. This conception of a future 
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available to the present contradicts temporality and the concept of emergence, and undoes 
creative potentials of painting. It is simply a convenient fiction that I employ in order to get 
painting underway, and one that I intend to abandon as soon as an image-of-emergence 
starts to displace this spatial thinking—yet that intention itself is the ruse of a further 
convenient fiction. As there is delay or hesitation between an image of immediate intuition, 
and an image of perception—the too-and-fro of movement’s doubling—I continue to 
conceive of trajectories emerging, no matter how transitory they might be, and no matter 
that they are conceived retrospectively. Further, because language essentially spatialises, I 
continue to imagine that I can plan painting in these metaphorical terms, so that I conceive 
myself directing the course of painting. Even as I understand that emergence is not in those 
terms, it is their apparent utility that leads to their retention as givens, albeit clichéd and 
false. I think of these givens as inevitable, necessary, and ruinous to painting. They may lend 
impetus to painting, but they offer no vitality and are an obstacle to emergence. Unlike the 
simultaneities that are given in the medium of space, duration has succession and 
immanence. For this reason, there can be no trajectory towards a future, nor is there any 
pre-existent future destination for my painting. The future only emerges in durational 
succession—an ever changing present though not to be thought as a sequence of now-
moments—and any destination for my painting will only emerge precisely when painting 
stops, though as painting it is incessant, and thus without destination.  
 
 
 
Figure 87  (125x150cm) 
My painting starts with a possibility because it translates into a trajectory along which 
painting may commence. However, the possible is already given and, although it may seem 
new, it is constituted in a recombination of extant terms, as a spatial trajectory that offers 
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“nothing other than location, the environment, the totality of differences in degree.”63 For 
this reason, trajectories are givens that I am trying to clear from painting, as they would lead 
painting on a recursive path, and so cannot serve any creative purpose: painting the possible 
leads to illustration. Possibilities are excessive in the largesse they offer. However they include 
previously thwarted possibilities that have yet to be explored through painting, and so offer 
the prospect of a different, if not a ‘new’, experience. In this Bergson distinguishes between 
possibility and potentiality, wherein potentiality inheres to a radical immanence of the 
virtuality and actuality of perception-affection. A body image has potentiality or capability 
in becoming. An external image is one of an infinity or totality of images, an external 
possible. The value of the possible is that it provides scope and enticement sufficient for me 
to generate impetus to start painting. For this reason I continue to conceive trajectories for 
painting, but treat them as provisional and only for this purpose. I have no commitment to 
them, but instead I plan to shift to more interesting or promising possibilities as they 
emerge. My consistent plan is to abandon trajectory entirely when painting is in the flow of 
emergence, and this I will do by clearing it from painting. This will also be a clearing of any 
planning, so that emergence happens unpredictably in duration, which is the realm of 
emergence of the new.   
 
 
 
Figure 88  (105x135cm) 
In the meantime, I am preoccupied with maintaining impetus in unfolding a material image 
in space. I am caught in both of these incongruent frameworks, the heterogeneous and the 
homogeneous, and so practice happens in both, neither essentially simultaneously nor 
successively. Time, essentially is out-of-joint: a crystal image—painting’s crystal image. This 
                                                   
63 Deleuze, G. (1991). Bergsonism (p.32). New York, NY: Zone Books. 
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is a where and when of emergence: neither homogeneous time nor quite homogeneous 
space. If I were to succeed in painting in duration, I would have no need for method, but I 
would also have no means to plan or direct painting, and nothing to say about what 
happens. At this stage, I am still practicing the clearing of givens, and possibilities are 
proving to be among the most obdurate of them. 
 
Despite my efforts at clearing space from time, while painting I am in the habit of constantly 
evaluating proceedings in terms of orientation, trajectory, and progress, even as I remind 
myself that emergence is not in those spatial terms. I do this in order to be able to make 
decisions that will maintain impetus in painting. However, this translating of temporality’s 
peculiar coincidence of past and present into spatial progression, serves to reverse the 
clearing of space from time, so that I begin to clear the image-of-emergence from my 
conception of how painting proceeds. I proceed to paint images in time with recourse to 
questioning the meaning of this activity and the images produced.64 I do this because 
language operates in homogenous reality, and this allows me to frame concepts, and to plan 
and direct the course painting takes. Despite the potential for confusion, this translation of 
the temporal into the spatial does not interfere with or stall emergence. Painting happens 
within the incongruent realities of heterogeneous duration and homogeneous space. 
Emergence happens in duration, while my reflection on emergence happens in space.  
 
My use of trajectory is pragmatic: simply to generate impetus for emergence. But this—
pragmatism— is my phantom. Emergence happens irrespective and, indeed, in spite of my 
pragmatism. The nature of any particular trajectory is of limited relevance except in how it 
provides conditions within which supposedly new qualities will emerge in a context that has 
currency, in the sense that it has a critical context that facilitates its unfolding through a 
consistent plane of concepts. For my painting, such planes of consistency are those being 
explored in this study. However, when new qualities are perceived to have emerged in a 
painting, any possibility will retrospectively be judged to have had latent creative potential. 
The problem I have is how to select from the multitude of possible trajectories on offer and 
so in the first instance painting becomes a reductive process of limiting rather than 
extending possibilities.  
  
                                                   
64 While Verwoert does speak of emergence in terms of what a painter sees unfolding as a material 
painting, his constant reference is to the temporality of emergence.  
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Figure 89  (10.5x13cm) 
In a manner that resonates with the spatial paradox of extensity, my process of painting in 
homogeneous space is conceived as proceeding via serial decisions, each of which extends 
the path of painting, and each of which is theoretically reversible, as much as the trace of 
these decisions could be used to construct a retrograde trajectory. In this problematic 
scenario, which ignores the non-linear nature of temporal change, each decision is necessary 
for painting to proceed. Painting sets out with a decision to make the first mark, while the 
second and all subsequent decisions re-orientate the previous—even if that is to confirm the 
orientation. Painting then proceeds in extensity as a staccato of crises-of-(re)orientation until 
painting stops. Such serial decisions are untraceable in my experience, untraceable in terms 
of cause and effect, and untraceable in the continuum of duration. By introducing extensity 
to painting, they make it incompatible with the continuum of emergence. I can evade this 
problem by conceiving the trajectory as being traversed in a “single unique bound” that 
admits no extension.65 However, the only trajectory available is retrograde, and it will not 
serve my purpose for painting. The corollary is that the crisis of painting is a false crisis, an 
artefact of spatial thinking.  
 
However, I do make decisions. When thinking in spatial terms, I continue to conceive of a 
crisis that is reiterated in each decision and each act of painting, a rhythm familiar as if it 
were a continuum. These decisions are incidental to emergence, and disadvantageous when 
their crises impede painting’s impetus and flow. However, there is one critical decision: 
when does painting stop? In the meantime, I am reliant on spatial thinking that allows me to 
plan, while I am dependent on emergence proceeding, heedless of my plan.  
 
The qualities that I perceive to be emerging in the unfolding painting are framed as limits 
differentiated out of dynamic change, and out of the chaos of interacting sensations. That is, 
                                                   
65 Bergson, Creative evolution. op. cit., (p.177).  
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I perceive the qualitative in terms of the quantitative, as fragments of change that succeed 
each other in the homogeneous medium of space. This contradicts the continuum of 
emergence by fragmenting it into the simultaneity of comparative episodes. In painting, 
emergence happens with no hiatus or crisis, without decisions being taken. As Bergson 
states: “The duration wherein we act is a duration wherein our states melt into each other. … 
The duration wherein we see ourselves acting, and in which it is useful that we should see 
ourselves, is a duration whose elements are dissociated and juxtaposed.”66 Emergence resists 
substituting for real experience what Bergson describes as “the factitious unity of an empty 
diagram as lifeless as the parts which it holds together.”67 As painting creates compounds or 
aggregates of sensation, the logic of sensation is one of interactions between these as an 
aesthetic plane of composition.68 This requires me to clear the logic of sense that has been 
brought to painting from the past: from sense-event to image-event, from perception and 
affection to an a-personal percept/affect. 
 
 
 
Figure 90  (85x90cm) 
In order to become acutely tuned to the dynamic immediacy of emergence, I attempt to 
clear my mind of concepts, images, and terms brought from the past and that continually 
refer to the past. By doing this, I am attempting to be present to my changing psychical 
states, aware of what is transpiring in terms of changing sensation, but without translating 
that awareness into sense. This involves relaxing memory, so that sensation translates 
readily into action, before being complicated and turned towards the past through 
perceptual processing. By this means I attempt to have decisions emerge just as the painted 
                                                   
66 Bergson, Matter and memory. op. cit., (p.186).  
67 Ibid. (p.183).  
68 Deleuze, G., & Guattari, What is philosophy? op. cit., (p.196).  
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image emerges, and for painting’s actions to respond without any apparent decision having 
been made. If this can be achieved, painting emerges in its own composing-ordering, 
“stands up.” Criteria for decision-making emerge within that same composite bloc. The act 
of painting is the act of deciding. I paint in the immediacy of emergence, as if responsive to 
the intuition of sensation’s affects before it is complicated in perception. I clear any 
tendency to critically analyse what is emerging as painting proceeds. This clearing is a radical 
break in painting, not a reorientation-to, but a dissolving-of all concepts of orientation. This 
is tantamount to ‘pure’ emergence, time’s auto-affection, or painting happening in ‘pure’ 
duration where painting is simply differing from itself, continuously 
 
 
 
Figure 91*  (90x90cm) 
Translating Emergence 
I experience emergence happening, but my perception of that temporal experience is 
tainted by the intercession of memory, language, and space. Givens that I have been trying 
to clear are reintroduced in the hesitation of perceptual processing. The dynamic of 
continuous change that is emergence is untranslatable. Any translation would be a deficit of 
an event-image, entangled in its immediate intuition thereby constituting some infinite 
regress, impoverished, as emergence would have been extracted from duration. Yet in order 
to be able to even discuss, let alone evaluate, processes of painting it is necessary for me to 
conceive of emergence in spatial terms: “artificially decomposed for the greater convenience 
of customary knowledge.”69 This is the utility of translation which serves the “facility of 
                                                   
69 Bergson, H. Matter and memory. op. cit., (p.186).  
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action and of language” and so allows me to evaluate proceedings, but which Bergson 
identifies as problematic: it “holds to the terms and neglects the relations.”70 It fragments the 
continuum of emergence into successive, quantitative, and artificial events that exclude the 
impetus of qualitative change in duration. This “parcelling of the real” as Bergson calls it, 
supplants the real intuition of painting as a living intuition in duration.71 This living affection 
of emergence is “experience at its source, or rather above that decisive turn where, taking a 
bias in the direction of utility, it becomes properly human experience.”72 While 
representations of individual lived experience in shared terms may serve to unite human 
experience, it is not that actual experience, which can be neither represented nor shared. About 
the immediate experience of emergence nothing can be said, apart from the “it is 
happening?” of Lyotard’s almost-already sublime moment where the vital impetus of 
Bergsonian duration is sustained in a continuing emergence.73  
 
 
 
Figure 92  (85x90cm) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                   
70 Ibid. (p.183).  
71 Ibid. (p.183).  
72 Ibid. (p.184).  
73 Lyotard, The sublime and the avant-garde. op. cit., (p. 198).  
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Figure 93*  (10.5x13cm) 
I am unable to abandon either of these realities in my painting practice. While the 
methodological conundrum dissolves in heterogeneous duration, practice’s drive to meaning 
making constitutes an obstacle to undertake painting solely in those terms. While temporal 
emergence and spatial unfolding accompany one another, my experience of the former 
precedes my knowledge of the latter.  
 
 
Figure 94*  (11x13cm) 
Fluidity 
In the small paintings, I am able to make radical and rapid changes to the overall image by 
minor actions, such as the twist of a brush, a smear, or a slip. Because of this, the nature of 
what emerges during painting tends to be more surprising, giving the appearance of 
significant reorientation in direction. The crisis of decision-making is acute here, because of 
the profound effect that each decision has on the whole image, but it is also of less 
consequence because of the rapidity and ease with which it then can be changed. Painting 
tends to proceed quickly, freely, and fluidly when making these works, and I am not so 
prone to hesitation, reflection and givens. It is in this enhanced state of psychic freedom that I 
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sense painting being more directly informed by immediate experience, in a way that is more 
closely attuned to Bergson’s method of intuition.   
 
 
 
Figure 95  (11x13cm) 
Each of these small works is made in one session. Paint remains wet and malleable. This is 
aided by the paint’s slowness-of-drying and the viscosity of oil paint, allowing wet layers to 
be applied cleanly over one another, or with controlled levels of material disturbance 
between layers. An appearance of fluidity is enhanced by the transparency of the medium.  
 
 
Figure 96  (10x12cm) 
With Figures 92 to 97, for example, such fluidity instils a palpable sense of emergence-in-
action, a responsiveness to nuance. For this reason, I feel I am conducting painting as 
immediate experience, sensitive to emerging novelty, and heterogeneous emergence. These 
works surprise me, and so remain alive to me. There is sense of provisionality that comes 
from that lambent quality that, for me, feels to have freshly emerged as if still in change—
still emerging—to my surprise. 
 
In these works, process eliminates many traces of how painting emerged, and so I am less 
likely to formulate any retrospective trajectory. ‘Artist’ closes to ‘spectator’ where, after 
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painting has ‘finished’, I continue to engage in processes of emergence. The provisional 
quality of the work opens to a demand for further work from me. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 97*  (90x90cm) 
This fluidity is also apparent in larger paintings, though is less apparent especially when 
figural elements are delimited by distinct outlines. Despite what might appear to be planned 
(for example in paintings such as Figures 75, 76, or 81), the coils, colours, forms, and fields 
emerge through a fluid interacting during processes of painting.   
The New 
As an image-of-emergence, I intuit changing compounds of sensations that emerge in 
processes of painting, and experience them in ways that are different and new. Virtual 
images—affects as the new—emerge through painting, in perception and in an efflorescence 
of forms that painting generates. This emergence of a ‘new’ in my changing psychic states is 
the impetus of change giving vitality to painting. The painted image is alive in a way that is, 
as Groys describes: “nothing more nor less than being new.”74 This experience is what I am 
‘looking for’ when painting, a quality that sustains joy—Deleuze might say jouissance—of 
painting, a vital impetus of living-and-painting. For the most part, I understand this joy as 
derived from an internal quality that is mine that I impart to materials in the working 
processes of painting, thereby conveying this joy that is mine to any spectator in general. 
Yet, this understanding is essentially a turn away from emergence, towards shared human 
                                                   
74 Groys, Art power. op. cit., (p.24).  
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experience and the question of how painting could make a “bid for entry in the book of art 
history.”75  
 
 
Figure 98  (10x12cm) 
The new emerges in duration as both nothing and everything in that it is virtual, immanent 
to duration, and so is immanent to the totality of all images. It remains a virtual quality that 
is a tendency towards action, whose ‘presence’ I intuit. As a plane of composition, a 
composite bloc of sensations, the work-of-art stands apart from me. I am neutral, im- or a-
personal to its becoming, neither author-creator nor destination-of-meaning. As I ‘sense’ 
this quality in painting, it is an unrecognisable and mysterious “difference without 
difference, or a difference beyond difference.”76  It is because of its liminal-virtual presence, 
that I strive to be attuned to the intuition that might herald its actualisation in painting, and 
so inform my subsequent actions.  
 
 
 
Figure 99  (85x95cm) 
                                                   
75 Verwoert, Why are conceptual artists painting again? op. cit. 
76 Groys,  Art power op. cit., (p.28). 	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My actions as a painter painting serve to condition the grounds for emergence of new 
qualities, so that the new, “nought as matter,” can create itself as form.77  When this nothing 
that is everything does emerge, its emergence is immanent to duration’s double movement, 
as Bergson tells us: “it is this nothing that takes time.”78 The emergence of the new is 
unpredictable and there is no sign to indicate that it is happening. While I may continually 
assay the emerging image for new qualities, I am unable to recognise the new as it emerges, 
even though I experience it in that emergence. Instead, through intuition, I encounter 
sensations familiarly unfamiliar, unaccountably different, a difference without difference. 
Such a tentative sense of the new remains provisionally novel, until inevitably I find that it 
has become familiar, recognisable, and no longer new. And so, painting continues with its 
infinite conversation. For this reason, I cannot claim to be responsible for new qualities in 
my painting, even though I provide impetus essential to the process. I am unable to account 
for how the new emerges. 
 
 
 
Figure 100*  (85x90cm) 
Provisionality 
My focus when painting is on an emerging present, and I conceive what is emerging as 
provisional, changing. The temporality of the provisional is conceived in homogeneous 
reality as a metaphor of suspended movement. While painting, I make provisional decisions 
that will later be confirmed or rescinded, or I may decide to postpone decision-making 
about some possible act. However, the emergence of any decision, including the decision 
                                                   
77 Bergson, Creative evolution. op. cit., (p.194).  
78 Ibid.  
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not to decide, is in itself inseparable from emergence. Emergence is not provisional. It 
happens and is what happens. Painting emerges in its own time and not in stages, or 
recursions, or false avenues, but through processes that take that time to happen. On a plane 
of technical composition, method may divide the process into phases that are provisional, 
until painting progresses to the next, such as imprimatura to grisaille to glaze, but this planning 
excludes emergence, and progression is in the grip of spatial thinking. Emergence happens 
outside of method conceived in this manner.  
 
In Figure 100 the lower half emerged fluidly and quickly, in a process that I would 
retrospectively describe as negotiation between colours and forms, as they tried to 
accommodate one another in changing conditions. They remained provisionally in this 
negotiation until, after a long break, I returned to work further on this painting. However, 
instead of changing the lower area about which I was unsure, I changed a more settled area 
above it, which created a different tension that then either distracted my attention, or 
dissipated the tension of that undiagnosed problem which had caused me to consider the 
work unfinished. The truth or falsity of the problem remains undiagnosed, but a way of 
moving past—though not entirely past—the provisional eventually emerged though 
painting, and since then the work has remained provisionally complete in my estimation of 
it. Insomuch as I remain surprised and puzzled by how the painting turned out, I sense 
rather than perceive new qualities in this work, and so as a spectator the work remains 
provisional for me while the question of how this novelty might be comprehended remains 
unresolved. It is because this liminal quality of the new remains provisional, enigmatic, un-
locatable, and untranslatable for me, that the painting remains vital. 
 
 
 
 Figure 101  (125x120cm) 
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The yellow field in Figure 101 is constructed experimentally by layering several different 
yellow pigments over a pure white ground. Various yellow paints are layered, with each 
subsequent layer added while the previous is barely touch dry. When the next layer is 
applied it softens, and all the layers slowly merge across the interfaces. Transmission and 
reflectance of light is mediated through this composite, so that colour emerges in nuanced 
and unpredicted ways. This is a physically and optically dynamic area of paint, so that a 
‘subjective’ experience of what is named ‘yellow’ is emerging as this colour composite is 
continually changing, long after the action of painting as such has finished.   
 
 
 
 Figure 102  (120x150cm) 
The principles of this method of painting are historical givens modified by my 
experimentation and for my purposes. The technique is the basis of the pentimento,79 but no 
longer with the connotation of error. I originally employed the technique as a means to 
sustain looking, as rhythms of chromatic and tonal modulation slowly emerge from within an 
apparently uniform field of colour. I describe such fields as ‘optical greys’ because the 
chromatic indeterminacy causes them to be perceived primarily in terms of their achromatic 
values. For example, the field in Figure 102 is painted in layers with very different 
chromatic values, but similar achromatic values, bright orange layered over bright blue. 
The latency and life of colour experience is in the dynamic equilibrium between these 
different chromatic experiences, similar to the optical mixing strategies used by Constable 
or Seurat. In retrospect, the development of optical grey in my painting prefigures ideas of 
provisionality, temporality, change and emergence that have now become central to my 
                                                   
79 The reappearance of elements of a painting that have previously been painted over, usually with the 
intention of hiding a mistake or alteration – from Italian pentirsi: ‘to repent’. 
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exploration as I connect these with Bergson’s concepts of duration and creative evolution. 
Like the pentimento, the emergence of colour within the yellow field of the painting in Figure 
101 or the optical grey in Figures 102 and 103 is a trace of time and change. As underlying 
colours slowly emerge, what we see as a palimpsest in the present is not a past revealing 
itself, but a new image of emergence. It has taken precisely that time for this grey that is 
orange–blue to emerge in my painting, as qualitative difference that has come out of the 
quantitative difference of distributed pigment, materials passing into sensation. 
 
 
 
Figure 103  (120x150cm)  
As with all my paintings, the orientation for decision-making was modified continually in 
response to changing perceptions of the emerging image. Just as the resolved appearance of 
Tomma Abts’ painting belies the non-programmatic processes from which they emerge, so 
my own painting emerges in response to the emerging image I have of its emergence. From 
a homogenous perspective, the course of painting is continually being reorientated by my 
decisions, as situational exigencies emerge.  
Decision 
As painting proceeds, it unfolds a continuous provisional destination, which may at any time 
be transposed to the homogeneity of a finalised state. Painting is interminable while this or 
that painting is a becoming-finality. This transformation happens when a decision emerges 
that will terminate painting, or it happens when some other factor intervenes to collapse 
painting’s impetus. In none of my works could I account for how such a decision emerged, 
how a painting arrived at this particular destination. For any work I could describe at least 
one significant decision that changed the course of painting, although it is also the case that 
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painting simply unfolded in the way that emergence happened, and that there was no 
decisive rupture or crisis. When painting, I still have concern for how emergence happens, 
because I want it to appear coherent, as if aesthetic order is my concern, even though 
emergence coheres no matter how a painting unfolds.  
 
 
 
Figure 104  (120x125cm) 
As painting progresses in homogeneous reality, for each increment of progression an actual 
or a deferred decision has the same crisis and the same status. An apparent rupture of 
trajectory can happen at any time. However, in emergence crisis is not episodic, but is a 
motility of psychic tensions that permeate painting’s processes. There are no decisive events, 
no deviations, or hesitations, and there is no room for spatial reorientations. Painting 
emerges in the impetus of change. Any perceived decision is an artefact of spatial thinking, 
where painting is dislocated from emergence. Even as I continue to ‘manage’ processes of 
painting by making conscious decisions, it is the spatial unfolding along a trajectory that I 
am managing, and not emergence itself. When in this systematic mode of analysing and 
making decisions, I am less responsive to immediate experience and less sensitive to 
emerging new qualities. I am then more likely to obliterate emerging new qualities by 
continuing to paint, and as a consequence, it is more likely that painting will arrive at a 
destination that is largely preconceived.  
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Figure 105  (9x12cm) 
Finishing 
In emergence, painting is a process that “never ceases to reach fulfilment as it proceeds—art 
as ‘experimentation’.”80 In such an approach to painting, Deleuze maintains that art 
becomes “a process without goal, but that attains completion as such.”81 In order to become 
this painting (Figure 104 or 105, for example), processes of painting had to unfold along the 
exact path they took—necessity as completion of process. This process could not have been 
more efficient, nor more true, nor different. It took that time, that duration of painting and 
of all that preceded painting, for it to emerge in this state, for those forms to sprout and 
flower in “an unshrinkable duration, which is one with their essence.”82 Yet, what we see is a 
resultant state that is not complete, because this painting has no identifiable beginnings and no 
definitive ends. There is no beginning because each work emerges in a confluence of all the 
currents, thinking and composing-conducting from my past, an evolutionary continuation of 
my living. In this respect the nominally ‘finished’ state of its emergence is only so because 
the action of painting has ceased.  
 
The painted image emerges in the context of all that precedes it, and so in conditions that are 
continually emerging, and so continually folding into the painting process and subsequent 
emergence: an endless process as long as the impetus for painting is maintained. As new 
potentialities keep emerging, so painting would seem to have an endless prospect. But with 
continually changing conditions, the conditions of painting’s crises are also changing 
constantly, and so painting could cease at any time. The significant methodological 
dilemma that I face is how and when to decide that painting should cease. The criterion 
                                                   
80 Deleuze, G. (1996). Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and schizophrenia (p.371). Minneapolis, MN: University of 
Minnesota Press.	  
81 Ibid. (p.370).  
82 Bergson, Creative evolution. op. cit., (p.194).  
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would appear to be evident: as soon as painting meets its objective of creating an encounter 
with the new, impetus should collapse. However, I am unable to recognise this new, and 
even though it is continuous virtual emergence, I am uncertain how to actualise painting. 
This is the real crisis of painting, or painting’s crisis of the real. Painting continues 
provisionally, as potential destinations emerge continuously and, potentially, endlessly. 
Some external conditions or functions, such as exhaustion of materials, or personal 
exhaustion, may terminate painting. However, my habitual recourse is to turn towards 
homogeneous reality and utility, in order to evaluate whether, for me and in relation to the 
givens that have constantly been in painting, an image is sufficiently different, surprising, or 
puzzling. When I sense that this is that case, and deem that further painting would make it 
less so, I stop painting. However, even when the action of painting has ceased, images 
continue to unfold and enfold in a work’s reception, and so the work of the work of art 
continues, endlessly. Beyond this, the whole process of emergence continues to in-form, and 
to e-merge: other painting as endless emergence in endless painting. 
 
 
Figure 106  (13x15cm) 
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Vitality in Painting 
This research project, Painting of Time, has explored how, in ‘pursuit’ of the new, a painter’s 
process may be considered as conducting invention. The new is not simply the difference 
between spatial-visual (re)arrangement, but the creation of the absolutely new. Resolution, 
which cannot become a solution—but an absolution—comes with Bergson’s method of 
intuition. A first stage for me was recognising the problem itself, how to orientate painting 
towards the new. This revealed the problem to be temporal rather than spatial. Painting’s 
two tendencies proceed, on the one hand as difference of degree conceived as progression 
through the homogeneity of a divisible medium like space, and on the other hand 
proceeding in continuous change that is a differing-from-itself in duration. With the former, 
a painter conducts painting. With the latter, painting proceeds as emergence that is 
intensive to a painter and immanent to living experience. Utility requires the former; 
creativity requires the latter. In all painting, what is essential to it as a work of art can be 
said to emerge in the latter, in duration. What is new and vital to painting emerges as 
qualitative change that is a change in kind—an intensive emergence whose image is an 
image-of-emergence in changing heterogeneous states of a body-image’s perceptions-
affections. What emerges is an unforeseeable nothing that Bergson describes as being everything in 
the work of art, but which creates itself as form that is living experience. This emergence, irreducibly, 
takes time. Importantly, according to Bergson, in the vital impetus (élan vital) of duration this 
unforeseeable nothing creates itself, so that, while immanent to the process of emergence, a 
painter is implicated-in rather than responsible-for invention. What is created new is not 
determined by the past, and so happens irrespective of painting’s intentions. This is vitality in 
painting. 
 
Duration has two movements or tendencies—the one that tends to “congeal in its product” 
and the other that “rediscovers in the product the movement from which it resulted.”1 
Painting’s movement—its image—happens in the immediacy of an emergent present. It is 
through this rediscovering in the emergent present that possibilities present at the start of 
painting are revealed, so that painting proceeds according to a logic of retroaction 
coinciding with or as a logic of sensation. In this process, as structures emerge in painting, 
they progressively reveal a latency of structure that was always present. The processes of 
emergence are those of inventing a painting’s unique possibility.  
 
                                                   
1 See Deleuze’s essay Bergson, 1859-1941 (p.24) in  Deleuze, G. (2004). Desert islands and other texts. op. cit., 
(pp.22-31).  
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Consequently, criteria for decision-making emerge according to the same logic. Their 
application retroactively brings painting to its present. Latency— potentiality—emerges as a 
present, as a present continually emerging, such that a “nothing which is everything” is duration’s 
qualitative multiplicities. Because retroaction is not retrospective but is creative, it absolves 
painting from the teleology of future-orientation, absolving a painter from the dilemma that 
opened this research. Here painting is not conceived as progressing along a trajectory in the 
homogeneity of spatialised time, but instead emerging in a continuum of heterogeneous 
duration with no beginnings, ends, trajectories, nor crises of decision-making.  
A Problem Badly Posed 
Although absolved of the responsibility for invention, a painter’s role remains to compose 
compounds of sensation through painting. As Deleuze suggests, an artist paints sensation, 
such that a painting emerges in layering a faux plane of technical composition and an 
authentic plane of aesthetic composition, creating an aesthetic aggregate that is a ‘work’ of 
sensation. An intensive image-of-emergence is this sensation’s affect, in interactions between 
sensation and memory, during processes of perception. Through the immediacy of 
changing sensation, the new presents itself to intuition, without being inferred from what is 
already known. In this way, a painter can respond to what is emerging during painting 
without referring decision-making to the utility of past terms, and thereby undoing invention. 
As Bergson describes, through hesitations of perception, intuition is informed by intellection 
to some extent, and so painting in this mode of intuition requires practice negotiating 
between incongruent realities of the heterogeneous and the homogeneous, as a painter 
constantly re-solves the problem of painting in both time and space. 
 
The first stage of Bergson’s method of intuition conducts a critical evaluation of the problem 
itself, to ascertain the validity of its terms. When applied to the methodological problem 
identified in this study, this revealed a confusion between time and space, a problem badly 
posed in the terms given to the original question for the study: Where is the image? The 
confusion comes out of a cultural habit of measuring time; time conceived as flowing through 
a divisible homogeneous medium, such as space. Chronological time brings with it the 
problem of extensity, and Bergson shows how, when temporal succession is translated into 
serial movement in space, the continuum is disrupted by introducing extensity, which is the 
basis of the painter’s methodological conundrum.2 Bergson instead proposes a more 
essential or primordial disclosure to existence, where continuous change driven by a vital 
impetus (élan vital) provides the basis for a continuance of living and creative evolution, and 
                                                   
2 The problem of extensity is exemplified by Zeno’s dichotomy paradox. 
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for the production of the new. Here time is duration, experienced as qualitative change in 
the intensive psychic states of an individual. It is in Bergson’s conception of duration that 
the study found a means to mitigate the problem of extensity, and so ameliorate painting’s 
methodological dilemma. However, this theoretical understanding of time as duration, 
which is shared by Deleuze, necessarily relies on a pre-theoretical disclosure that, for the 
most part, is difficult to glimpse, because it is immanent to living experience. While 
everything that does happen necessarily happens along lines that Bergson discloses, we 
generally don’t quite see it in that way, but instead discern a causally driven and 
intentionally derived world of our making. All painting emerges in duration, but just as in 
our everyday dealings we necessarily treat time as measurable, and movement as spatial 
displacement, so in painting we discern it advancing in the homogeneity of a spatialised 
time that allows planning and the measuring of progress.  
Bergson & Deleuze 
The study did not attempt to resolve this temporal duality, nor to choose between a ‘correct’ 
Bergsonian way of seeing the world and, for example, an ‘incorrect’ Kantian way. Painting 
is conducted within everyday and art-institutional realities that require planning and dealing 
with practicalities, and so requires quantifiable time. For painting, Bergson and Deleuze’s 
philosophies help to clear givens that obscure what happens in painting, which always 
involves processes of emergence. The ontology of becoming that Bergson and Deleuze 
develop provides for approaches to painting that accommodate inherently dynamic 
contingencies, and so are more responsive to happening, as such. Bergsonian conceptions of 
time, movement, and the image have been investigated for their capacity to absolve 
painting from paradoxes and incongruencies that shadow its enterprise, and so liberate 
painting from demands for historical utility. Here Deleuze’s discussion about painting with 
sensation, in referencing Francis Bacon, has been brought into an analysis of how a painter 
addresses what is essential to the work of art, and how decisions are accordingly made in 
conducting painting. In particular, the research examined how Bergson asserts that what is 
essential is an “unforeseeable nothing which is everything in the work of art,” and that this nothing 
“creates itself as form.”3 By discounting the material aspects of painting and suggesting that 
painting has an autonomous, creative vitality, he further absolves a painter from 
responsibility for invention. However, ‘form’ so created is not material painting, but is an 
intensive image-of-emergence, an image in continuous change. The basis of this ‘form’ is 
sensation itself, as it interacts with memory in processes of perception, and as a painter’s 
living experience that is indivisible, irreducible, and endless. In this situation where 
                                                   
3 Bergson, Creative evolution. op.cit., (p.194).  
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emergence is an intensive experience immanent to living, the question becomes: Does painting 
happen? 
 
In the final stages of the study, Bergson’s analysis of sensation, perception, image, and the 
interaction between matter and memory, along with Deleuze’s discussion of preparation for 
painting and the givens that need clearing before painting starts, were brought to bear on 
Verwoert’s discussion concerning painting’s emergence. Here theoretical underpinnings are 
brought into confluence with method in my own practice, as Verwoert developed a logic of 
retroaction that explains how emergence can be accounted for in terms of latency, in a way 
that avoids teleology or retrospection, acknowledging creative potential that is duration, and 
so acknowledging the centrality of time to painting.  
Image-of-Emergence 
The work of art emerges in the flow of movement between an actual image that is the 
body’s response to external stimuli, and a virtual image that is the body’s response to its own 
internal movements. That is, the work of art emerges as a dynamic image-of-emergence, so 
that time and movement inhere in the work of art. In this continuum of emergence, there is 
no point of beginning, and no end point, even after the action of painting has stopped. For 
each work undertaken in this study, ‘beginnings’ in an indeterminate past emerge and 
multiply as painting proceeds in a retroactive ‘awakening’ as they are brought into the 
process of emergence happening in the present. Each painting ‘produced’ during this study, 
therefore, embodies its own beginnings that are not concrete form, but the form of 
movements intensive within painting’s act.  
 
The creative potential of emergence is in the indeterminacy of its irreducible and 
unquantifiable movement, such that “emergence is its own reason and its consequence in 
itself.”4 We may fruitfully here juxtapose or recognise a resonance between Bergson on 
movement’s nuance and Verwoert’s discussion on emergence. As Verwoert explains:  
 
The reason for the quality of a thing emerges at the moment when the thing 
appears as what it is. And that it appears as what it is, happens because a quality 
becomes visible in it which is irreducible and unpredictable, precisely because it 
is what makes the thing into what it actually is. …These paradoxical 
formulations have little to do with irrationality, but have a specific form of 
rationality, the rationality of emergence, which is the rationality of painting.5  
 
                                                   
4 As cited in Verwoert, Emergence: On the painting of Tomma Abts. op. cit., (p.2).  
5 Ibid. (p.4).  
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Here there is a “retroactive effect of emergent properties on the single parts.”6 Such 
retroaction happens during the hesitation between sensation and the perception of that 
sensation, as the immediate experience of emergence becomes retroactively informed by an 
act of thought that refers the emergent property back to the past.  
 
Verwoert describes what we see becoming visible as painting proceeds as being “the total 
contingency that was present at the very beginning when there was no structure given,” so 
that the emergence of a structure then “testifies to the fact that at the beginning there was 
none.”7 In this situation the actions or gestures made during painting have a latency, that 
only reveals itself when the painting begins to form itself, so that “the beginning of a 
painting, paradoxically would only become visible at its very end …every painting might be 
an invention of its own beginning.”8 In this “reverse logic of painting,” the very possibility of 
a painting emerges as its outcome. This leads Verwoert to suggest that there is perhaps a 
need to revise the customary logic of linear temporal development in a painting from idea-
to-execution to the “logic of postponement of the end.”9  When a provisional ‘destination’ 
for painting is continually emerging because decision-making defers to what is still 
emerging, the problem becomes how to determine when painting should cease. In order to 
address this question of how decisions can be made during the course of emergence, and 
how to decide when painting should stop, the study turned to Bergson’s method of intuition.   
 
Verwoert allows for the gesture of a latency that is relieved of historical self-consciousness. 
However, retroaction is not innocent of trajectory, and although the latency of meaning in a 
gesture cannot be taken directly from the gesture itself, it is dependent upon the historical 
context that it both actively construed and is retroactively perceived.10 Even so, by emerging 
retroactively, the historical context is not given by history per se, nor does the gesture have a 
single meaning. As Walter Benjamin argues, “no picture [is intended] for the beholder.”11  
Does Painting Happen? 
The question, “Does painting happen?” that comes out of this study, relates to the nothing which 
is everything, and which emerges fleetingly as intensive form immanent to duration that is 
permeated by past, present, and future. As such, painting cannot be differentiated from 
living experience, and what is created new comes out of the totality of all images. To locate 
                                                   
6 Ibid. 
7 Verwoert, Why are conceptual artists painting again? op. cit.  
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid.  
11 Benjamin, W. (1992). The task of the translator (p.70) In Illuminations (H. Zohn, Trans.). London, 
England: Fontana Books. 
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‘happening’ in painting would necessitate fragmenting duration, so causing time’s translation 
from heterogeneous succession to homogeneous simultaneity. Such translation reactivates 
the very problem that led to this study, from which I now see a painter being absolved. We 
can only speak of painting happening in measured time, progressing by degree, through 
repeated crises of decision-making, and where the question constantly reiterated becomes 
Lyotard’s sublime crisis of: Is it happening?  Whereas, in duration there is no beginning or end 
to painting, no crisis of orientation, but instead happening that is the continuous creative becoming 
of duration. In homogeneous (measured) time discussion is limited to what is inessential to 
painting, whereas in heterogeneous time there is only a living experience of emergence, with 
nothing to be said about the no-thing, which is everything in the work of art. In this situation a 
suitable response to the question “Does painting happen?” is, perhaps, that painting is in and of 
itself and happens in its own unaccountable terms. 
 
The overarching ‘finding’ of this study is to link Bergson’s conception of time, as an 
ontology of becoming, to the concept of emergence as a conceptual and processual basis for 
painting that, while not resolving the problem of having to paint in dual and incongruent 
realities, does absolve painting from the conundrum of future-orientation that was its legacy 
after Modernism. It is in these ecologies of concepts, practices and approaches that my own 
painting now proceeds, as I work to clear givens, practice a relaxation of memory, and 
practice accessing intuition’s encounter with sensation, in its own newly emerging terms. 
That is, I practice painting-with-sensation. The evolution in my approach to painting has 
been from representation of emergence to painting-as-emergence, with its own ‘littoral’ 
ecologies of interacting dynamics that are the vitality of both life and art.  
 
 
 
 
 Figure 107  (12x12.5cm) 
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